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Glossary 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Wikipedia, 2005), is the term used to describe those 
countries of Africa that are not part of North Africa and lie south of the Sahara 
Desert. This division of Africa has arisen from the perception of North Africa as 
predominantly Arab or Berber in ethnicity or culture and the perception of sub- 
Saharan Africa as predominantly black in ethnicity or culture and from the 
geographic separation of the two regions by the sparsely populated Sahara Desert. 
North Africa has long been integrated with the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, had sporadic contacts with the rest of 
the world before the modem era partially due to the effect of endemic diseases like 
Malaria. While the coasts received visits by traders, much of the interior of the 
continent remained unknown to the outside world until the colonial era. The exact 
position of the dividing line between the two regions is not clear. However, 
according to one classification of the two regions, sub-Saharan Africa includes 
forty-eight nations. Forty-two of these nations are on the African mainland. In 
addition, four island nations in the southwest Indian Ocean (Madagascar, The 
Comoros, Mauritius, and Seychelles) and two island nations in the Atlantic Ocean 
(Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe) are considered part of Africa. According 
to this classification scheme, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are: 
Republic of Angola (Angola), Republic of Botswana (Botswana), Republic of 
Burundi (Burundi), Republic of Cape Verde (Cape Verde), Republic of Chad 
(Chad), Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo (Congo), Republic 
of Djibouti (Djibouti), State of Eritrea (Eritrea), Gabonese Republic (Gabon), 
Republic of Ghana (Ghana), Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Guinea-Bissau), Kingdom 
of Lesotho (Lesotho), Republic of Madagascar (Madagascar), Republic of Mali 
(Mali), Republic of Mauritius (Mauritius), Republic of Namibia (Namibia), Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria), Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe (Sao 
Tome and Principe), Republic of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone), Somalia, Kingdom of 
Swaziland (Swaziland), Republic of Togo (Togo), Republic of Zimbabwe 
(Zimbabwe), Republic of Benin (Benin), Burkina Faso (Burkina), Republic of 
Cameroon (Cameroon), Central African Republic, Federal Islamic Republic of the 
xv 
Comoros (Comoros), Republic of Cote d'Ivoire (Cote d'Ivoire), Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea (Equatorial Guinea), Ethiopia, Republic of the Gambia 
(Gambia), Republic of Guinea (Guinea), Republic of Kenya (Kenya), Republic of 
Liberia (Liberia), Republic of Malawi (Malawi), Islamic Republic of Mauritania 
(Mauritania), Republic of Mozambique (Mozambique), Republic of Niger (Niger), 
Republic of Rwanda (Rwanda), Republic of Senegal (Senegal), Republic of 
Seychelles (Seychelles), Republic of South Africa (South Africa), Republic of Sudan 
(Sudan), United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania), Republic of Uganda (Uganda), 
Republic of Zambia (Zambia). 
The Republic of Ghana 
The Republic of Ghana is a nation in West Africa. It borders Cote d'Ivoire to the 
west, Burkina Faso in the north, Togo to the east, with the Gulf of Guinea on its 
southern coastline. Formerly the Gold Coast, the name Ghana is derived from the 
Ghana Empire (although its territory never reached present-day Ghana). Ghana 
was formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast and the British 
Togoland trust territory. In 1957 Ghana became one of the first European colonies 
in black Africa to gain its independence. 
Stools 
Stools refer to the larger corporate indigenous land owning group or community 
made up of people of common ancestry and headed by a chief or king in Ghana. 
Stool Land 
Stool lands refer to lands owned by Stools in Ghana. 
Family Land 
Family lands are lands owned by extended families made up of members from the 
same lineage with common ancestry and headed by a family head. Families are 
typically smaller than Stools though family lands are not necessarily smaller in size 
than Stool lands. 
Real Estate 
Real estate in this usage comprises the surface of the earth together with 
developments permanently affixed to it. 
xvi 
Regulatory Policies 
This genus of policies consist of all policies that impose statutory controls on real 
estate transactions and transactors 
Distributive Policies 
Comprise policies that have been employed by government to successfully acquire 
land and private property on payment of full compensation 
Redistributive Policies 
Comprise policies that have been employed by government to successfully acquire 
land and private property without the payment of full compensation 
Delivery Policies 
This comprises the government bureaucracies and departments together with their 




Justification for policies, whether in the field of real estate or others is conditional 
on their ability to stimulate markets to contribute positively to economic growth 
by promoting efficient allocation of the resources they affect. Yet outcomes of 
policies though crucial are not self-evident and as such require conscious 
calibrations. While there is a burgeoning concern for more robust evaluation of 
real estate policy impacts in sub-Saharan Africa, the tools and methodologies for 
accomplishing this remain less fully developed. There are at the moment few 
impact evaluation methodologies that are entirely applicable to real estate policies 
and even fewer that are specifically applicable to sub-Saharan Africa real estate 
policies. To this end, this thesis presents a portable quantitative framework for 
evaluating sub-Saharan Africa specific real estate policies. This is accomplished 
through an extensive review of the focal literature surrounding land policy 
impacts evaluation in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the conventional economic 
impacts methodologies. The review provided a broad overview of the ongoing 
dialogue surrounding real estate policy impacts together with the origins and 
general taxonomy of extant real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Adopting a quantitative approach to knowledge claim and research, empirical 
data on the operational variables identified in the devised measuring framework 
were obtained and plugged into ' the framework to estimate the quantitative 
dimensions of the impacts of sub-Saharan Africa real estate policies using Ghana 
as a case study site. The empirical results show that the impacts of extant real 
estate policies in Ghana are not heading in the same direction. They are instead 
dependant on the regulative, distributive and redistributive qualities of the 
policies to the extent that regulative policies engender the most negative (deficit) 
impacts followed somewhat by redistributive policies. On the converse 
distributive real estate policies tend to produce the most positive quantitative 
impacts in the study area. The costs of compliance and administration of policies 
came up as the critical determinant of the overall impacts of the policies. Based on 
these findings recommendations for improvement in policy practices as well as for 
further studies are submitted. 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background to the Study 
1.1 PROLOGUE 
This study aims to, on the basis of theoretical and empirical evidence; provide 
insights and quantitative indications of the scale of the economic impacts of extant 
urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa on both market dealers and the 
broad economy. A map of the geographical context of Africa is provided in Figure 
1-lwhiles Figure 1-2 provides a map showing the geographical context sub- 
Saharan Africa. The glossary at page xv also provides a detail definition of the 
geographical location and composition of sub-Saharan Africa. To place the thesis 
in the appropriate context, real estate policies are defined at this stage to comprise 
all governmental laws, regulations, criteria procedures and enforcement 
mechanisms designed to dictate the way undeveloped and developed urban land 
rights are supplied, demanded and formalised. Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 (p. 86) 
derives a more comprehensive technical definition of real estate policies. 
Figure 1-1: Geographical context of Africa 
To the extent that in every society, land and real estate resources offer the basis for 
shelter, workplace, amenities, recreation and the social integration that are critical 
to the sustenance of socio economic life, it is vital that mechanisms are put in place 
1 
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to ensure their efficient allocation. Advocates of market economies harp on the 
comparative merits of a purely price operated resource allocation mechanism, the 
price system, to efficiently allocate all forms of resources of society to their highest 
and best uses. 
Figure 1-2: Geographical Context of sub-Saharan Africa 
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Real estate markets in sub-Saharan Africa, like many other commodity markets, 
however are far from being perfect as to allow prices to purely allocate land and 
real estate resources. The imperfections of real estate markets imply that if left 
purely price operated or on their own, on occasions, they are likely to fail, 
sometimes, gravely in allocating real estate resources efficiently. For this reason, it 
is now generally accepted, at least among moderate economic opinion, that there is 
some justification for government interventions to provide support to the price 
system in the allocation of real estate resources. Accordingly, almost without 
exception, nations have evolved devices and practices to achieve government 
interventions in the operations of the real estate price system. These devices, which 
in some countries operate in place of the price system altogether or in conjunction 
2 
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with it, have been achieved through legislation and edicts. These concessions for 
government interventions however are subject to the proviso that such 
government interventions must satisfy some standard economic efficiency and 
social justice criteria. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, there is nothing new about this phenomenon of 
government interventions particularly in real estate markets. Historically, 
government interventions in land and real estate markets have been applied for 
more than a century in much of sub-Saharan Africa since the colonial era. 
Postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa additionally has gone through about four and a 
half decades of social, economic and political changes during which real estate 
policy responses have been enacted. These enactments were aimed to remedy 
what was perceived at various historical times to be the problems of real estate 
markets in the respective sub-Saharan African economies. To the extent that these 
real estate policies are increasingly recognised as growing constraints on the 
performance of real estate markets, sources of increasing social costs to urban 
population and a physical representation of inequalities and inequities in the 
distribution of wealth within the sub-Saharan Africa society they demand greater 
attention. This is even more patent given the dire economic conditions of the 
region as reviewed below. 
1.2 THE ECONOMIC BACKDROP AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
The quest for socio-economic development of Africa and the developing world at 
large has remained for a long time a prominent theme in international 
development dialogue. The creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions in the early 1940s ( see Mason and Asher, 1973; United Nations, 2000) 
for instance marked the commencement of formal global efforts and unified 
framework to address these international economic and political concerns. 
Subsequently, several international development agencies got involved in the 
pursuit of international development (DFID, 1997). To date however, the 
aspirations to spur economic growth in the world through these institutions have 
not been borne out in practice in many nations. Instead, Africa and other 
developing economies for instance remain consistently plagued with major 
economic setbacks making them all the more impecunious and debt drenched. 
3 
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These hindrances have been attributed to flawed economic policies, inequities and 
injustices in the distribution of wealth together with unfair terms of international 
trade (DFID, 1997). 
The 1960s through to the 1980s were remarkable in this regard. Such was the dire 
conditions of Africa in the 1980s that the then head of the World Bank, McNamara 
in 1985 affirmed that Africa is confronted with "a crises of unprecedented 
proportions"(McNamara, 1985). Desperate measures by the World Bank and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction in the 1980s to salvage the African situation 
through Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) produced less 
than satisfactory results (World Bank, 1994). So also did the United Nations 
Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 
which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at its thirteenth special 
session (resolution S/13-2 of 1 June 1986). The circumstances that led to the 
adoption of these programs still prevailed (United Nations, 1993). In the end, 
Africa, the World Bank (1989a) conclude lost the equivalent of three decades of 
development by the close of the 1980s. Not only were several decades of 
development lost by Africa, prospects for development also became severely 
disrupted (, see further Hammond, Antwi et al., 2004). 
So bleak and inexplicable were the prospects that even academics became 
despondent about ever finding a remedy. As Glickman (1988) observed, in 
reference to Africa "survival rather than progress emerges as the dominant theme 
in recent collections of essays devoted to analysis and prescription". Even so, these 
conditions were predicted to worsen increasingly. The United Nations in 1983 
frantically predicted for instance "the picture that emerges from the analysis of the 
perspective of the African region by the year 2008 under the historical trend 
scenario is almost a nightmare" (United Nations, 1983). The crises of the 1980s 
compounded in the 1990s and then the Millennium. To this trend, the United 
Nations (United Nations, 1993) observed "the economic and social crisis 
confronting Africa throughout the 1980s has continued into the 1990s and has been 
compounded by emergencies brought about by severe droughts and social 
turmoil". As predicted, poverty worsened in sub-Saharan Africa more than in any 
of the developing world between 1990 and 2001. 
4 
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1.2.1 The Poverty and Growth Pattern in sub-Saharan Africa 
The poverty status of sub-Saharan Africa is important to this study due to the 
symbiotic correlation between poverty levels and the development of property 
markets. The degree of prosperity of a society strongly influences peoples housing 
and urban property demands. Given suitable institutional arrangements, this in 
the end will lead to a well functioning urban property market to ensure efficient 
allocation of urban land and real estate resources to promote growth and poverty 
reduction. Low incomes generate low effective demand for real estate, though 
actual real estate needs could remain high in societies with a growing population 
such as sub-Saharan Africa. As a result low income people who cannot afford their 
housing and real estate needs settle for all manner of real estates leading the 
formation of poor sluggish market development, slum generation; extreme 
pressures on urban infrastructure and rapid squatter settlements (Pugh, 1997, 
p. 1550). These in turn frustrate prospects for growth and poverty reduction as real 
estates are not, under such conditions, allocated to their highest and possible best 
uses thereby setting in motion a cycle of poverty and underdevelopment This 
makes the poverty situation in Africa even more concerning. 
Though poverty was unevenly distributed across the developing world, it is self- 
evident from Table 1-1 that sub-Saharan Africa recorded the highest concentration, 
and increasingly so, of people living on less than US$1 a day - extremely poor 
(44.6 percent in 1990 and 46.5 percent in 2001). 






East Asia and Pacific 472 284 33 16.6 
Europe and Central Asia 2 18 0.5 3.7 
Latin America and Caribbean 49 50 11.3 9.5 
Middle East and North Africa 6 7 1.6 2.4 
South Asia 462 428 40.1 31.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 227 314 44.6 46.5 
Total 1,218.00 1,101 27.9 21.3 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
What is disquieting is that while extreme poverty is relieving to some degree in 
most parts of the developing world, it appears to be exacerbating in sub-Saharan 
Africa. On the whole, according to the table the number of people living on less 
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than US$ 1a day reduced in the selected regions by an average of 6.6 per cent. In 
East Asia and Pacific this reduced by as much as 16.4 percent thereby lifting some 
188 million people in the region above the poverty line between 1990 and 2001. On 
the contrary, in the same period some 87 million additional people (i. e. 1.9 per cent 
of population) fell below the poverty line in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The fact is sub-Saharan Africa was not the only region that encountered increases 
in poverty levels. Yet again, it is the scale of the increase in sub-Saharan Africa that 
makes it more disquieting. For instance though 16 million more people fell below 
the poverty line in Europe and Central Asia this figure constituted only 18.4 
percent of the number that fell below the poverty line in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Similarly while one million people more fell below the poverty line in the Middle 
East and North Africa this figure represented approximately 1.15 percent of the 
equivalent in sub-Saharan Africa. 
On a criterion of US$2 (about £1) a day the poverty situation in sub-Saharan Africa 
becomes even more patent in comparison to other developing countries. 
According to Table 1-2, the number of people living on less than US$ 2a day in the 
developing world reduced overall by 6.6 percent (that is by some 43 million 
people) between 1990 and 2001. 
Table 1-2: People Living on Less Than US$ 2 (£1) a Day 
Millions Percentage 
Region 1990 2001 1990 2001 
East Asia and Pacific 1,116 868 69.9 47.6 
Europe and Central Asia 58 94 12.3 19.7 
Latin America and Caribbean 125 128 28.4 24.5 
Middle East and North Africa 51 70 21.4 23.2 
South Asia 958 1,059 85.5 76.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 382 514 75 76.3 
Total 2,690 2,733 27.9 21.3 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
Consequently by 2001,78.7 percent of the total population of the developing world 
lived above the US$2 mark. Yet, only 23.7 percent of the population of sub-Saharan 
Africa survived on $2 or more a day in 2001. This is in comparison to 52.4 percent 
in East Asia & Pacific, 80.3 percent in Europe & Central Asia, 75.5 percent in Latin 
America & Caribbean, 76.8 percent in the Middle East & North Africa and 23.1 
percent in South Asia. Even with South Asia that has about the same percentage as 
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sub-Saharan Africa the significant difference in the numerical size of people who 
joined the class of less than US$2 a day between 1990 and 2001 in the two regions 
shows clearly the speed with which sub-Saharan Africa's poverty conditions are 
deteriorating. While between 1990 and 2001,101 million extra people joined those 
living on less than US$2 a day in South Asia; as much as 132 million (that is 23.5 
percent more than that of South Asia) in sub-Saharan Africa joined the group. 
Thus if income poverty is an effective measure of the scale of economic conditions, 
and it is, then sub-Saharan Africa is by far the world's foremost development 
challenge. 
The reality is that sub-Saharan Africa is not only poverty stricken, its economies 
are also not growing. In comparison with other developing countries, the growth 
of sub-Saharan African economies has been profoundly sluggish as Table 1-3 
clearly illustrates. This makes the region the least performing in the world with 
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the period 1999 to 2003 of US$341 
billion dollars. This is small in comparison to US$640 for South Asia, US$1,825 for 
Latin America and Caribbean and US$1,731 for East Asia and Pacific. 
Table 1-3: GDP Current USD (Billions) 
Region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
East Asia & Pacific 1,488 1,604 1,680 1,833 2,051 
Latin America & Caribbean 1,790 1,984 1,919 1,699 1,734 
South Asia 581 597 615 649 756 
Sub-Saharan Africa 323 326 319 322 417 
Source: World Bank (2005c) 
The major observations are that sub-Saharan Africa's average GDP for the period 
1999 to 2003 represents just 53.3 percent of the GDP of South Asia, 18.7 percent of 
Latin America & Caribbean's and 19.7 percent of East Asia & Pacific. These 
conditions means that the region's real estate markets are thus poised to suffer 
severe weaknesses if not appropriately harnessed and this will in turn exacerbate 
the deepening economic crises of the region. 
1.2.2 The Global Concern for Sub-Saharan Africa 
The crises of Africa have clearly come to the brink. Disparate international 
development supports to Africa appear no longer workable and global concerted 
efforts are apt for experimentation. Through the Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDG) enunciated by the United Nations in 2000,189 countries globally have 
signed up their commitment to eradicate extreme poverty in its many dimensions- 
income, hunger, disease, ignorance, inequalities, injustices, lack of adequate shelter 
and exclusions in the developing world by 2015. With barely a decade to go, sub- 
Saharan Africa remains far from reaching the established milestones required for 
accomplishing the MDGs. It is indeed paradoxical that sub-Saharan Africa, a 
region immensely endowed with the ingredients for economic growth and 
sustained poverty reduction: land, labour and the potential for capital 
accumulation from the region's land resources (Feder and Noronha, 1987; Feder 
and Feeney, 1991; Brandao and Feder, 1995; Feder and Nishio, 1999; see further 
Deininger, 2003) should find itself in such economic squalor. This is even more so, 
if indeed, as economic theory suggests, land is a prime source of capital 
accumulation as much in Africa as in the western economies (see De Soto, 2000). 
At such sluggish growth rates, Gordon Brown, the British Chancellor, opined that 
it will take Africa 150 years to accomplish the MDGs set for 2015. This awareness 
has prompted in particular overwhelming United Kingdom government's support 
through the African Commission, UK, to help expedite economic recovery in 
Africa. The African Commission estimates, in its policy document, Our Common 
Interest, launched in March 2005 that an additional US$75 billion annual 
investment in governance, public investment and social expenditure is required to 
kick-start the African economy. African governments are to contribute under these 
proposals over three to five years roughly US$12.5 billion. (Our Common Interest, 
2005). Further, the Group of Eight (G8) wealthiest nations on June 11,2005 agreed 
to back a deal that calls for an immediate scrapping of 100 percent of the debt (up 
to US$55 billion) owed by the 18 poorest countries. Most of these nations are in 
sub-Saharan Africa. There are underway massive campaigns by civil society and 
charities of the developed world dubbed "make poverty history" to call on rich 
nations to do more to help African economies. Indeed, never in the history of man 
has so much global concerted humanitarian efforts been directed towards the 
eradication of extreme poverty in Africa. 
The debt cancellation by the G8 if implemented will mark a major accomplishment 
considering that at present sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world 
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pays US$10 billion in debt servicing annually to the rich countries of the world 
(Principal Voices, 2005). With such debt cancellation, at least in theory, some extra 
money will be available to be spent on domestic African development 
programmes rather than servicing debts owed to rich countries. Additionally, if 
the campaigns for rich countries to remove market protection and subsidies that 
have distorted the international economic terrain are heeded to, a levelled 
economic playing field could be created on which developing nations can perform. 
To these extents, it is logical to conclude that debt relief; increased aid and 
equitable international trade are important and inexorable inputs to the 
development processes of sub-Saharan Africa. But such assertion has to be made 
with some trepidation. It is important not to oversimplify the sub-Saharan Africa's 
economic crises by placing too much hope on these international global efforts 
than they are actually capable of delivering. After all, these external supports offer 
no more than temporary relief. They have not and cannot provide permanent 
prosperity for the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus thrusting the whole 
development processes of Africa on international support will mean deferring the 
destiny of these economies indefinitely. Even so, it is questionable if these global 
efforts can really make headway when the internal forces that keep swallowing 
developmental gains, blocking progress and conditioning the state of sub-Saharan 
African economies are not restructured. 
The truth is, true enduring and sustainable prosperity of Africa can only be 
achieved by "building an investment climate that facilitates [private sector led] 
investment and growth and empowering poor people to participate in that 
growth"(Stern, 2002). According to Stern (2002, pp. 12-13) these embody the 
enactment of sound and sensible macroeconomic and trade policies, the 
installation of quality infrastructure including power, water, transport and 
telecommunication, efficient Government institutions and behaviour (including 
limits on bureaucratic harassment, especially in administering taxes and 
regulations); the strength of financial institutions; the rule of law, including 
enforcement; and the control of corruption and crime. 
All these conditions are internally generated. This reinforces the point that the 
development of Africa is above all the responsibility of African governments and 
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the people of Africa. It is within their grasp to deal with the internal forces that 
militate against these conditions while the international communities address the 
external forces. With heightened global commitment to abate the external 
bottlenecks underway, systematic inquiries into the bottlenecks that have led to 
the persistence of the African crisis is indispensable. This is an investigation whose 
time has come. There is no use clamouring for more external development support 
when the internal forces that are militating against development have not been 
properly identified and isolated. The question that should guide discussions 
around the African problem then is; what are these impediments, their nature, 
sources and panacea? In the 1980s Mabongunje like many other eminent 
development economists identified governmental systems and interventions as the 
impediments that created the less dignified and unsatisfactory conditions for a 
substantial proportion of the third world population (Mabogunje, 1989). More 
recently, the UN Millennium Project (2005, p. 31) in exploring the reasons for the 
apparent failure of the MDGs establishes similarly: 
Economic development stalls when governments do not 
uphold the rule of law, pursue sound economic policy, make 
appropriate public investments, manage a public 
administration, protect basic human rights and support civil 
society organisations... 
This identifies again government and its governance machinery as the core of the 
formidable forces that impede the development of sub-Saharan Africa. To make 
progress thus, there is the need to primarily focus inquiries on eliminating or 
abating development impediments inbuilt in African governmental systems. This 
also implies the need to subject the activities of these governments and their 
governance machineries in the various sectors of respective sub-Saharan African 
economies to serious systematic and rigorous questioning. It is naive, anyway, to 
presume that these inquiries have neither been done before nor remedies 
attempted. Nonetheless, the persistence of these problems as exemplified above 
suggests that the solutions proposed so far have failed to persuade African 
governments to abandon practices and systems that undermine development in 
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these nations. The impediments still prevail. This is the core of the problem that 
concerns this study basically from the real estate policy point of view. 
Perchance governments of sub-Saharan Africa would be persuaded if they are 
confronted with a sector by sector scale of the harm these impediments presents in 
more practical and objective terms. The tradition of pointing out the overall 
gloomy economic picture rather than sector specific issues may be making the 
problems look insurmountable to politicians and those in the hem of affairs. They 
may be thus seeing the African problems as manageable rather than remediable 
leading them to renege on their efforts at addressing the problems. That said, such 
sector based inquiries would be more useful if, they are concentrated for now, on 
the strategic sectors whose malfunctioning are likely to cause comparatively more 
damage to economic lives. This calls for a means of identifying the strategic sectors 
of the African economies. Thankfully, the UN-HABITAT(2004, p. 11) has done 
some work in this direction and identifies urban governance as "the single most 
important factor for the eradication of poverty for prosperous cities". The World 
Bank (2000a; 2000c) drew similar conclusions. 
This reinforces the strategic imperative of urban economies and their governance 
to the quests for poverty eradication and development in Africa. Urban 
development and governance objectives according to Ortiz and Bertaud (2001) 
translates to: creating an efficient spatial urban structure; improving the quality of 
the environment; increasing housing affordability; decreasing commuting time; 
avoiding congestion in the city centre; increasing employment opportunities 
among others. Thus, if sub-Saharan Africa is able to capitalise on the energies and 
opportunities of the urban environment to achieve these ends significant progress 
in development could be realised. The accomplishment of these ends it is 
established require three important inputs; (1) adequate land use and real estate 
policy, (2) infrastructural investments and (3) fiscal policies (Ortiz and Bertaud, 
2001, p. 239). That these are not being accomplished in urban sub-Saharan Africa is 
well illustrated by the relevant statistics. 
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1.3 URBANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
That cities and towns are at the forefront of the development campaign is an oft- 
rehearsed thesis in international development discourses of recent times (see for 
instance World Bank, 2000a). It is now well established that scarcely is 
development realisable if development efforts are concentrated exclusively on the 
rural sectors. This is because, increased productivity in rural sectors is sustainable 
only when the urban centres which function as nodes for the requisite processing 
industries for agricultural raw materials and markets for food crops from the rural 
areas are well performing (see further Mabogunje, 1989, p. 151). 
To this point, a strong correlation between urbanisation and industrialisation 
(World Bank, 2000b) or at least significant progress towards industrialisation, 
services and commerce (Davis, 1965) have been identified. Consequently the 
World Bank (2000a) estimates that "the industrial and commercial activities that 
are primarily located - and serviced, marketed and financed - in urban areas 
account for a half to four-fifths of GDP (gross domestic product) in most 
countries". The World Bank (2000c) estimates further that urban areas in low 
income countries account for 55 percent of Gross National Product (GNP), 73 
percent in middle income countries and 85 percent in high income countries. 
However, this correlation between urbanisation and economic development does 
not appear to apply in Africa (Kamete, Tostensen et al., 2001). Given the strategic 
importance of urban governance to the whole development question, this could 
explain a significant proportion of the economic problems of the region. 
For instance the urban population of Africa and South Asia have been almost 
identical since 1950 to 2000 (United Nations, 2002). Yet whiles income per capita 
has increased in South Asia markedly, they have stagnated or even declined in 
Africa (World Bank, 2000d). Again, the World Bank (2000a) estimates that while by 
2025 two-thirds of the poor in Latin America and Europe & Central Asia will be 
found in the urban areas, almost half of the poor in Africa and Asia will reside in 
cities or towns. With this comes the many dimensions of urban poverty in Africa - 
"cumulative deprivation, squalid living conditions; risks to life and health from 
poor sanitation, air pollution, crime and violence, traffic accidents and natural 
disasters; and the break down of traditional family and community safety nets...; 
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exclusion of low income groups from employment opportunities; basic services, 
political representation, legal and social protections and amenities" (World Bank, 
2000a, p. 3). The UN-Habitat (2003) estimates that as much as 72 percent of the 
urban population of sub-Saharan Africa dwell in slum ( see also UN-HABITAT, 
2004, p. 2). In Ghana it is estimated that 800 new land litigations are filed at the 
high courts every month (Hatch Associates, 2002) most of which emanates from 
the urban areas. All of these bring into serious questioning the appropriateness of 
existing real estate policy frames in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This means also that a vast majority of the population of sub-Saharan Africa live 
under conditions that are far from dignifying, secure and harmonious. Fig 1-1 
provides a pictographic of selected urban slums of Accra, Ghana. 
Fig 1-1: A View of Selected Urban Slums in Accra, Ghana 
The World Bank (2000c) in 1994 estimated that across the developing world 
including sub-Saharan Africa, 220 million urban dwellers lacked access to clean 
drinking water; almost twice as many had no access to even the simplest latrines, 
between a third and two thirds of the solid waste generated went uncollected 
piling up on streets and in drains contributing to flooding and the spread of 
disease. According to the John Hopkins University School of Public Health also, 
over 600 million people in the cities of developing countries cannot meet their 
basic needs for shelter, water, food, health and education (PIP, On-Line, 2002). As 
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observed in the course of the field survey for this study, in Accra most urban 
dwellings in these slums are constructed with the most basic of materials with 
doubtful durability and structural soundness. 
In Agbogbloshie, otherwise called Fadama or "Sodom and Gomorrah", Accra- 
Ghana, residential buildings are no more than four timber truncheons placed at the 
four ends of the ground space of about eight feet by six feet and covered by 
wooden claddings. Such is the typical house for households of between eight and 
12. These structures are regularly erected on sensitive and often dangerous land 
sites such as edges of huge open and heavily silted natural culverts. This makes an 
increasing number of urban inhabitants vulnerable to natural disasters such as 
floods and epidemics. Besides, many of these communities lack adequate vehicular 
access and in the event of fire outbreak, for instance fire tenders have effectively no 
way of getting into the localities. 
What makes the squalor conditions of the slums starker is the presence of a 
minority (about 28 percent) affluent urban locality usually within the same city 
and sometimes separated only by motor roads. Fig 1-2 provides a comparable 
pictographic of typical affluent communities in Accra, Ghana. 
Fig 1-2 A View of Selected Affluent Urban Areas of Accra, Ghana 
These affluent sub conurbations, contrary to what pertained in the slums, are often 
provided with improved amenities such as piped water, a regular supply of 
electricity, telephones, good road networks and pedestrian passages. Clearly the 
state of cities and towns of sub-Saharan Africa is undesirable. They insinuate 
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flawed urban governance or policies that are disrupting the expected benefits from 
the urbanisation of sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank (2000c, p. 2) perceives 
flawed real estate policies as the critical source of such disruption and argues 
"policies affecting urban land use and housing investment have major 
ramifications for households, businesses and the nation as the recent crises in East 
Asia demonstrated". This observation tallies with the recent growing awareness 
that land tenure and property ownership is "one of the most important keys to 
reaching the (Millennium Development] goals... " (UN-HABITAT, 2004, p. 1). Yet 
across the developing world it is estimated that 924 million people are presently 
living without secure tenure in urban areas. This is estimated to increase to 1.5 
billion by 2020 and 2 billion in 2030 unless urgent action is taken (UN-HABITAT, 
2004, p. 1). Thus until this trend is remedied it will be difficult for governments of 
sub-Saharan Africa to harness the energies and development potentials of 
urbanisation to achieve economic development and poverty reduction. 
The foregoing indicates unequivocal pleas for systematic scrutiny of existing 
government machineries and interventions in the urban land and real estate sector. 
Such scrutiny according to Devas (1999, p. 6) is often missing in Africa. It is this 
problem that this study is designed to tackle. 
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE CORE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa are now at the centre of intense national 
and international debate (Hammond, Antwi et al., 2004). This has resulted in the 
polarisation of the existing literature on ideological lines between market 
advocates (Coldham, 1987; Feder & Feeney, 1991; Migot-Adholla, Hazell et al., 
1991; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; Payne, 1997; Antwi, 2000; Quart, 2000; Kasanga, 
2002; Antwi and Adam, 2003) and interventionists (Dornor, 1972; World Bank, 
1975; Harrison, 1977; Asiama, 1980; Platteau, 1992). While market advocates blame 
government interventions for all the problems of the land and real estate sectors in 
these countries and have thus called for their outright removal, the interventionists 
view the customary tenure institutions as problematic, and have called for 
stringent state regulations and dominance over their operations. Most of these 
studies are largely qualitative and their findings have tended to be laden with 
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value judgments, ideological orientations and aspirations of particular researchers 
involved. 
These contradictory results in the existing research stemming mainly from the 
rather doctrinaire stance of researchers appear incessant, sending confusing signals 
to policy makers and governments in the region. Due to this divergence of opinion 
on the true economic merits of these policies it has not been easy to point out 
clearly which policy strands are causing harm and which ones are doing well. This 
has produced stalemate in policy decisions and progress is being sought through 
costly experimentations with policy reforms and ideologies (see Chapter 2). This 
impasse could only be resolved for purposes of proper guidance to policy making 
when a means is found to make an objective assessment of the true costs, benefits 
and impacts of current regimes of real estate policies in the region. 
The problem is, while many studies have attempted to evaluate the impacts of 
these policies; the results have seldom been expressed quantitatively (Antwi, 2000; 
Ortiz and Beraud, 2001, p. 240). Yet as Ortiz and Beraud (2001, p. 24) observes, "... 
in the absence of quantification of the problem, measurement of effectiveness of 
any proposed remedy will be difficult". This lack of quantitative measures of the 
true impacts of these policies is doubtlessly a testament to the misunderstanding 
or understatement of the real impacts of these policies on economic lives and 
development prospects of these nations. The insights from these qualitative works 
notwithstanding, the time has come for these policies to be subjected to objective 
and quantitative assessments devoid of ideological and value judgments. The 
purpose of this study is thus to ascertain in quantitative terms the true economic 
impacts of urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa by comparing their 
social costs and benefits dimensions. 
1.5 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
At a time when the full impacts of existing policies are less understood, across sub- 
Saharan Africa, there are waves of reforms in the legal arrangements that regulate 
and records ownership of land rights, land uses, land transactions and 
management. These reforms are taking place in more than 20 of the 48 sub-Saharan 
African countries (see Alden Wily, 2003). Whether these reforms and their 
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resultant policy regimes are the most appropriate option remain equally unclear. 
The problem is, if it tends out that these ongoing policy reforms are inapt as their 
predecessors have now been found to be after several decades of experimentation, 
the affected countries in the end stand to lose the already scarce developmental 
funds and resources invested in promulgating and enforcing the policies. Beyond 
that, the generally impoverished taxpayers in these poor countries become 
obligated to repay these wasted and misdirected resources. In the end not only will 
the impoverished in these countries be cheated out of developmental benefits, they 
will be left to repay the resultant resources wasted in the process and bear the full 
brunt of the constraining effects imposed by inapt policies. This will inescapably 
aggravate poverty and slow down the development of the region immensely. 
The extant economic conditions of Africa south of the Sahara are such that further 
delays in taking decisive actions to put the respective economies on fast track for 
development could easily lead the region into a situation of economic bankruptcy, 
international development supports notwithstanding. This means that those at the 
helm of affairs in these nations would have to be confronted with the explicit 
repercussions of the policies they are in charge of, objectively ascertained, if timely 
decisions would have to be made by them. To this end the ongoing debates and 
discussions among donor and international development agencies, national 
governments, traditional landowners, real estate developers, academics and 
investors as well as purchasers and recipients of real estate policies are welcomed 
and healthy. But this is so only as far as they help evaluate existing policies and 
practices objectively. It is from this perspective that this study is justified. 
1.6 THE RESEARCH QUERIES 
The questions that naturally arise from the above discussions for coherent inquiry 
are: 
(1) What are the ranges of real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa? 
(2) Are there relationships between the historical origins of these policies 
and their economic consequences? 
(3) What is the quantitative balance between the costs and benefits of these 
policies? 
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(4) What is the magnitude of the impacts of extant sub-Saharan Africa 
urban real estate policies on the economic welfare of real estate market 
dealers and the broad economy? 
(5) What are the relationships between the real estate policy types and the 
scale of the economic impacts they reproduce on market dealers and the 
broad economy? 
(6) How do these impacts materialise? 
(7) To what extent are the enforcement institutions and processes 
contributing to the impacts of these policies. 
The existing body of research have insufficient responses to these pertinent 
questions. 
1.7 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The research is aimed at deriving quantitative measures, through appropriate 
modelling techniques, of the economic impact of urban real estate policies in sub- 
Saharan Africa. Based on the outcome of the inquiry, conclusions will be drawn 
and recommendations for policy reforms made accordingly. The specific objectives 
of the study are to: 
1. Analyse the main economic considerations that have informed urban real 
estate policy formulation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
2. Estimate systematically and in a methodologically consistent way the 
magnitude of the net change in the social welfare of market dealers and the 
broad economy attributable to particular real estate policies. 
3. Ascertain the level of accountability and economic efficiency in the use of 
resources on the part of the public institutions and staff in charge of real 
estate policy enforcement in the region. 
4. Provide explanations as to why policies that are reproducing social welfare 
losses are still in place. 
5. Draw attention to important policy lessons learnt from successes and 
failures of particular policies to enable the development of appropriate 
policy. 
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1.8 METHODOLOGY 
Given the research problem and aim of the study, which is to provide quantitative 
indications of the economic impacts of urban real estate policies in the region, the 
quantitative research methodology provides the most appropriate paradigm for 
this thesis. By adopting the quantitative research methodology as the means for 
generating and analysing the data for this study, the study presumes that the 
"truth" about the economic impacts of real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa, is 
measurable facts that exists in the real world and that their quantitative 
dimensions can be objectively and independently measured using specific 
quantitative methods and frameworks (Creswell, 2003b). To this end, this thesis 
formulates a replicable quantitative model for measuring the economic impacts of 
urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) giving due regard to the 
region's acute data limitations. Based on the quantitative framework, appropriate 
theoretical constructs are devised and operationalised for the quantitative 
measurement. 
The empirical data on the operational variables required for the devised 
framework are collected through field survey and participant observational 
methods using purposively designed research instruments comprising two 
questionnaires and a data spreadsheet. Data generated from the field survey is 
analysed using the framework to derive the quantitative measures of the urban 
real estate policy impacts. In keeping with the theoretical position of the study (see 
Chapter 3) the samples for the survey are drawn from the population of real estate 
(1) Purchasers; (2) Suppliers and (3) Market Intermediaries. The details of the 
quantitative research methodologies employed including their philosophical 
underpinning are more fully discussed in Chapter 5. 
1.9 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
The portability of the framework designed for the measurement of real estate 
impacts across sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 5, on page 123) implies that it can 
be employed in most sub-Saharan African countries. Ghana has thus been 
purposively sampled for the empirical survey for a number of reasons. First, 
Ghana is one of the most urbanising countries in Africa with an average urban 
population (as a percentage of total population) of 36% compared to the regional 
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average of 31.12% (World Bank, 2003). The urban challenges are thus more likely 
to be profound in Ghana than in most sub-Saharan African countries. Secondly, 
the essential features of the customary land tenure system in Ghana epitomises the 
general land rights and policy trends in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Whereas in 
most countries in the region (as Chapter 2) urban land rights have been entirely 
transformed into Western forms, the urban land market in Ghana embodies a dual 
character comprising both the Western and customary tenure forms. Thus, Ghana 
provides a unique environment for a comparative analysis of the government 
policies that have brought about the Western tenure forms on one hand and the 
customary tenure forms that would have pertained in the absence of government 
interventions. This will help establish explicitly the economic influences (costs and 
benefits) that government policies have brought about and give an idea of what 
would have occurred had government policies been absent. 
Thirdly, though there may be variations in the institutional arrangements and 
contents of specific policies in different countries, Ghana has probably the most 
extensive and wide-ranging policy regimes in the region. For instance, the Ghana 
land policy document (MLF, 1999) lists 166 wide ranging land legislations together 
with some 18 different institutions regulating land and real estate market activities 
in Ghana. There is thus the high probability of encountering all the various forms 
of policies in the respective countries of the region in Ghana even if not in the same 
form. The country thus provides the potential and opportunity for a more 
comprehensive testing and evaluation of sub-Saharan Africa urban real estate 
policies. This choice will thus enable the study to provide a representative picture 
of the consequences of government policies in the region objectively measured. 
Finally, the researcher's eleven years work experience as a land expert successfully 
established sufficient understanding of the workings of the Ghanaian real estate 
market and policy environment. This helped save a great deal of time as re- 
learning of the fundamentals of the Ghanaian system was not required. This 
experience was also handy during the data collection phase, more particularly in 
negotiating access to data within the public sector. 
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1.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Presently empirical studies surrounding the sub-Saharan African real estate 
markets have generally approached the issue from four main perspectives. One 
group (Bruce, 1986; 1987; Mattingly, 1993; Larbi, 1994; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 
1994; Larbi, 1995; Platteau, 1996; 2000) approached the issue using qualitative 
research design and methodology and hence were unable to measure, in 
quantitative terms, the impacts of these policies. Another group (McAuslan, 2000; 
Antwi, 2000; Quart, 2000) concentrated on the customary land sector without an 
evaluation of the economic costs and resource wastage associated with the 
government bureaucratic machinery responsible for policy implementation in 
these economies. Yet, others (Mattingly, 1993; Brandao and Feder, 1995; de Soto, 
2000) have looked at the sector within the broader context of Third World or 
Developing countries and hence have not provided a focused view of the sub- 
Saharan Africa real estate market situation. There are also studies that 
concentrated on the rural land markets per se and have not focused attention on 
the urban land and real estate market (Platteau, 1992). This study is able to; 
perhaps for the first time, provide quantitative evidence of the unique economic 
impacts of the respective strands of real estate policies, an important knowledge 
for prospective policy decisions and analysis. 
The study essentially found the origins of these policies to be political rather than 
economic and found further that the scale of the impacts of real estate policies in 
Ghana is not entirely negative as often imagined. Different policies generate 
different levels of impacts depending on their regulative, distributive or 
redistributive attributes. Additionally, while the study found significant inbuilt 
extraneous costs in the modalities for delivery real estate policies in Ghana, it was 
not possible, given the very nature of these costs and data paucity to compute 
quantitative indices for these extraneous costs. Nonetheless, the results of the 
study and the devised quantitative framework by which they have been measured 
provide an important knowledge base for improvement in practice and further 
research. 
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1.11 LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY 
Owing to the focus of the empirical aspect of the study exclusively on Ghana as the 
only case study site the survey sampling may not be sufficient to support 
generalisation of the empirical findings beyond the specific case study country, 
Ghana, from where the samples were drawn. However given the similarities of the 
kinds of real estate policies established across the region as established in Chapters 
2 and 3, it is assumed that the results of the empirical analysis are likely to be 
similar across the region as well. Besides, as much as possible extraneous variables 
were controlled to help assure that respondents answered the survey questions 
with candour for the results to be both valid and reliable. It was however 
impossible to ascertain whether respondents indeed answered the questions with 
the required candour. Thus if in reality respondents did not answer the questions 
with honesty and to the best of their abilities as envisaged then the results of the 
empirical analysis may not reflect the opinion of all members of the target 
population. Again, contingent valuation of a typical land parcel size of 0.23 acres 
was used to deduce the economic benefits of the respective policies. The reliance 
exclusively on only one plot size made it impossible to ascertain whether 
variations in plot sizes do also influence the relative benefits from the policies. But 
this limitation is not considered to be considerable given that majority of land 
transactions in the study area involves plot sizes of 0.23 acres. Though transactions 
involving different plot sizes do occur, they are not typical and thus at the margins 
of the market. This means the results obtained using the 0.23 acre plot size though 
not reflective of entire range are typical and hence reliable enough for the purpose 
of the study. 
In the contingent valuation, only valuers were interviewed to gain insights on their 
stakeholders' valuation of the benefits of the policies. The truth is that, represents 
only one group of the entire range of stakeholders of real estate policies. Ideally, 
data should have been triangulated by surveying the valuation of the other 
stakeholders such as landowners and purchasers among others. The weight of 
evidence suggests that if every stakeholder who is looking at the benefits of 
policies from different angles values the benefits of the policies then that valuation 
provides more reliable measure of the true benefits of the policies. Besides 
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methodological triangulation could have also been used by employing multiple 
quantitative methods to study the responses from the survey to help reinforce the 
validity of the study particularly if the conclusions drawn from each method are 
the same. But these triangulation methods require more resources to gather the 
data from different stakeholders and more time to analyse the data obtained from 
these different stakeholders using different methods. Nonetheless, the resources 
and time limitations of the study did not make it possible for these triangulation 
approaches to be used in the study. These have however been proposed as an area 
for further study. 
1.12 ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE STUDY 
Chapter 2 contains the review of related literature and research related to the 
problem being investigated. The theoretical perspective from which this study 
proceeds is outlined in Chapter 3. The policy processes and political economy out 
of which the policies have emerged is examined in Chapter 4. The quantitative 
framework for measuring the impacts of the policies under consideration is 
presented in chapter 5. The methodology and procedures used to gather data for 
the study are presented in Chapter 6. The results of analyses and findings from the 
study are contained in Chapters 7 to 9. Chapter 10 contains a summary of the 
study and findings, conclusions drawn from the findings, and recommendations 
for practice as well as for further study. 
The hypotheses verified in the study are: 
Hl Regulative real estate policies will have lower compliance costs than 
distributive and redistributive polices. 
H2 Redistributive real estate policies will have higher compliance costs 
than distributive policies. 
H3 Regulative real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than distributive and redistributive real estate policies. 
H4 Distributive real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than redistributive real estate policies. 
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H5 Regulative real estate policies will have higher benefits than 
distributive and redistributive policies. 
H6 Distributive real estate policies will have higher benefits than 
redistributive real estate policies. 
H7 Regulative real estate policies will have positive economic impacts, as 
their associated social welfare costs will fall short of their 
corresponding social welfare benefits. 
Hs Distributive and redistributive real estate policies will have negative 
economic impacts, as their associated social welfare costs will exceed 
their corresponding social welfare benefits. 
H9 Redistributive policies will yield higher economic deficits than 
distributive policies. 
Hio The direct costs of enforcing respective categories of real estate 
policies in Ghana are not significantly different and are also not 
excessive. 
Hypotheses Hi to Hs are tested in Chapter 7 whiles hypotheses H6 to H9 are 
tested in Chapter 8. The final hypothesis, Hio is verified in Chapter 9. 
1.13 SUMMARY 
This chapter has laid the foundation for the thesis. It introduced the research 
problem and research questions. Then the research was justified, the contribution 
of the study was briefly stated, the methodology employed also briefly described 
and justified. The report was also outlined and the limitations were given. On this 
foundation, the thesis proceeds with the detailed discourses of the research. 
The economic impacts of real estate policies in this study is defined as the social 
marginal benefit less the social marginal costs. The social marginal costs of real 
estate policies is the sum total of the marginal welfare costs produced by the 
enforcement of the policies together with the administrative expenses incurred in 
enforcing the policies. The study found among other things that the average costs 
of real estate policy compliance borne exclusively by complying market dealers is 
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about 54 times Ghana's average monthly wage. In particular the paper estimates 
that the marginal social costs of land policies in Ghana range from a minimum of 
Q32,600,000 (i. e. US$3,600.00 or £1,900.00) to a maximum of 062,433.00 (i. e. 
US$6,800.00 or £3,600.00) depending on the regulative, distributive or 
redistributive contents of the policy. The average social costs is about 
Q45,347,000.00 (i. e. US$4900.00 or £2,590.00) per typical transaction Extra-legal 
expenses, such as costs of delays, travel and unofficial payments to staff of the 
enforcement agencies to expedite action on the compliance processes incurred by 
complying market dealers contribute between 35% (minimum) to as much as 68% 
(maximum) of the social costs of the policies, the average being 55%. On the social 
benefit side the paper found that distributive policies produce a benefit of 
4383,000,000 (£225,290.00 or $188,560), redistributive policies on the other hand 
produce benefits of x85,000,000.00 (£50,000.00 or $26,300.00) whiles regulative 
policies produced benefit of 0101,320,000.00 (£59,600.00 or $31,370.0). This shows 
that the marginal economic impacts of redistributive and distributive policies are 
V50,122,000.00 (£205,954.12 or $108,396.90) and 42,256,600.00(£1,330.00 or $700.00) 
respectively whiles regulative policies produce negative economic impact of 
439,091,000.00(£23,000.00 or $ 12,000.00). There is however potential for reducing 
the social costs of these policies as they stand thereby improving their respective 
economic impacts by installing costs reducing measures of servicing 
documentation requests in ways that will largely circumvent the extra-legal costs 
which are contributing the largest share of the social costs. But these would have to 
be accompanied by stringent performance targets for the agencies and a review of 




Urban Land Tenure Reforms and Development in Africa: A Survey 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 laid out the foundation and basis for this study. The task of this Chapter 
is to relate the thesis to the larger focal dialogue by employing economic analysis 
to review the rather growing body of works germane to sub-Saharan Africa urban 
real estate policies in general. The grand aims of the review include, in particular, 
the discovery of the ways in which the problems of the region's real estate markets 
have been formulated, the policy responses installed to remedy these perceived 
problems, the economic outcomes of these policy reforms, how these outcomes 
have been measured and the emerging and immediate surrounding economic 
questions and concerns. Before turning to the real estate issues, the urban context 
within which these policies function is examined. 
2.2 THE URBAN CHALLENGE 
The truth is that sub-Saharan African is the fastest urbanising economy of the 
World today. The United Nations (1991) estimates that the population of sub- 
Saharan Africa grew from about 225 million in 1960 to 527 million in 1990. This is 
projected to increase incredibly to 1.4 billion by 2025. This contrasts sharply with 
those of Latin America projected to increase from 448 million in 1990 to 757 million 
in 2025 and that of Asia from 3.1 billion to 4.9 billion in the same period. Following 
this trend, the number of people living in urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa grew 
rapidly. As shown in Table 2-1, by 1950 Africa was the least urbanised in the world 
with a total urban population of 32 million (4.3% of world total). 
Table 2-1: Selected Comparative Population Size and Growth 
Midyear Urban Population (Millions) Growth Rate (Percent) 
1950 1975 2000 2030 150-1975 1975-2000 2000-2030 
Africa 32 102 295 787 4.6 4.2 3.3 
Latin America & Caribbean 70 198 391 608 4.2 2.7 1.5 
Asia 224 592 1,376 2,679 3.5 3.4 2.2 
diddle and Low Income Countries 392 981 2,165 4,156 3.7 3.2 2.2 
High Income Countries 359 562 697 4,981 0.8 0.9 0.6 
Europe 287 455 534 540 1.8 0.6 0.04 
World Total 751 1,543 2,862 4,981 2.9 2.4 1.8 
Source: World Bank (2002) and United Nations (2002) 
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This is in comparison to 70 million (9.3% of world total) for Latin America and 
Caribbean and 224 million (30% of world total) for Asia. 
From this meagre size, the urban population of Africa increased at a sharp growth 
rate of 4.4 percent to 295 million (i. e. by 12 fold) by 2000. This occurred at a time 
when the world urban population growth rate was approximately 2.7 percent. 
Actually, during this period, the growth rate of sub-Saharan Africa was much 
higher than the 3.5 percent average of Asia, Latin America and Caribbean and the 
Middle and Low Income Countries respectively. By some estimates, the urban 
population of sub-Saharan Africa doubles every 12 years (see Njoh, 2003). The 
predictions (see Table 2-1) are that by 2030 the urban population of Africa would 
exceed those of Latin America by some 179 million and Europe by 247 million. 
This, it is estimated to imply that 52 percent of Africa's population will be living in 
towns and cities by 2025 (Kamete, Tostensen et al., 2001). This rather high 
urbanisation rate in sub-Saharan Africa has been attributed more to an increase in 
rural to urban migration and a high birth rate (National Research Council, 2003). 
Until recently, however, such rapid urbanisation was regarded as an antithesis of 
development (Njoh, 2003). To this view, such rapid growth rate in sub-Saharan 
Africa would have been a great threat to the development pursuits of the region. 
Following recent works, nonetheless, this view has changed and urbanisation is 
now perceived as imperative for economic development and hence no longer a 
course for alarm for the region's development as earlier thought (National 
Research Council, 2003). Nonetheless, the question that needs posing is - How has 
rapid urbanisation combined with urban land tenure and institutions to promote 
or atrophy economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa? 
2.3 INSTITUTIONS, LAND TENURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Theories of economic development take as their expository starting point the 
doctrine that all humans are essentially selfish and do "everything with a view to 
gain enjoyment or avoid pain"(jevon, 1856). It is the net of the enjoyment and pain 
attained by individuals under particular economic order that constitutes the 
quotient of the magnitude of welfare brought by the prevailing economic order to 
the individual. Economic development is thus simply the aggregate of the 
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achieved welfare quotients across all individuals in the particular society. A deficit 
overall welfare quotient indicates generally a decline in economic development 
whiles surplus quotient indicates growth. To achieve the desirable surplus welfare 
quotient, the institutions that regulates the use of each of the trio of development 
resources; land, labour and capital must offer incentives and liberties so that they 
can be channelled into activities that will produce this surplus. For land, the 
applicable institution is the land tenure system. The land tenure system is thus the 
basis for the productive use of land and property for development and growth. 
While much has been written on economic development, it is only in 
comparatively recent times that this link between land tenure, urbanisation and 
development is being appreciated. In point of fact, the primary disposing function 
of urban land -a basis for shelter, workplace and space, factor of production and 
sustenance of economic life - is well known. Yet this recognition has all along been 
bolted on the presumption of abundant (Eicher and Baker, 1982) and problem free 
(Falloux, 1987) land endowment across sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier neoclassical 
economic theory essentially perceived land tenure, the conditions under which 
land is held (Meek, 1949; Bruce, 1987), like all other social institutional forms 
(Bardhan, 1989) as a subject matter that falls beyond the ken of economic analysis 
(1981; North, 1990). This derives from the fact that in earlier neoclassical economic 
theory "there are no organisations or institutions except for markets that form the 
theoretical core of neoclassical paradigm"(North, 1981). To the earlier economists 
thus, land tenure was better taken as given (Warriner, 1964) as they can be ignored 
in economic analysis because they play no independent role in- economic 
performance (North, 1981). 
With such underappreciated economic imperative of land tenure, even lead 
International Development agencies as the World Bank and its compatriots 
avoided the land question in their development support programmes considering 
it to be "too political" (Falloux, 1987). As a result, land tenure issues were often not 
mentioned at all or were only given cursory attention in economic development 
discourses (Platteau, 1992, p. 22). The fundamental outcome from this is the long 
dearth of an adequate economic analytical framework to tackle land tenure issues 






judging for himself. This moral torpor, which takes possession 
of him, likewise takes possession of his fellow citizens, and we 
have seen entire nations fall in this way into disastrous inertia 
(Bastia, 1850). 
To avoid this pattern, economists now widely concede that since only individuals, 
of all known agents, have the precise knowledge of their personal circumstances it 
is they alone who can tell what would best improve their welfare quotient It is 
thus rational for these incentives and liberties to be entrusted to individuals so that 
they are tasked to propel the deployment of their foresight, industry and 
experience and to channel their economic efforts into activities that would 
successfully maximise their own welfare quotients. This arrangement will provide 
the best grounds for economic growth. That said, when these liberties and 
responsibilities are vested in individuals without rules of coordination, 
cooperation and interdependency the desire to maximise surplus welfare quotients 
would invariably and rationally result in anarchy in its many dimensions of gross 
violation, externalities, overexploitation, waste and rent dissipation (Fisher, 1923; 
Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Hardin, 1968; North and Thomas, 1973). To overcome 
this the tenure system must ensure that individuals are not simply vested with 
incentives and liberties but as well exclusive rights to use their land (also their 
labour, capital and other resources) as they deem proper and they alone should 
possess the right to transfer their resources to other actors of their choosing on 
agreed terms (Coase, 1960; Posner, 1977; Pejovich, 1990; 1997). To provide the right 
incentive to channel these liberties into productive activities, the tenure system 
must also facilitate cooperation, reward industry, creativity, productivity and 
success whiles penalising torpor through social and commercial relationships 
(Smith, 1776). 
For economic efficiency, the tenure system must additionally ensure the provision 
of a 'level playing field' including fair and general rules for social and commercial 
relations. It must also lower the impediments to the full and productive 
deployment of these liberties by providing vital infrastructure and services as - 
roads, highways, water, telecommunications, police service, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, mechanisms for internalising externalities (Pigou, 1962), information 
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supply systems (Arrow, 1963) among others. These are so vital that, where the 
tenure system on its own is unable to provide comparatively cheaply, fairly and 
adequately, which is often the case, it will be the legitimate duty of government to 
step in with these provisions either exclusively or in partnership with the tenure 
system. When all these are in place as Posner (1977, p. 10) explains "individuals 
will endeavour by cultivation or other improvement to maximise the value of 
land" (see also Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Hardin, 1968; Becker, 1977; Ault and 
Ruthman, 1979; Feder & Feeney, 1991; Besley, 1995; Payne, 1997; Bromley, 1997; 
Cousins, 2000). 
In sub-Saharan Africa however, the conventional view is that, the region's land 
tenure system promotes incentives for rent dissipation, externalities, gross 
violation among others thereby constituting an eminent threat and constraint on 
productivity and growth. This review argues on the contrary that it is rather the 
land reform policies that were premised on this conventional view over time that 
are incentivising and rerouting economic efforts of actors into activities that 
constitutes a threat and constraint on growth and development. To establish this 
argument it is worthwhile to draw on historical policy events to establish the 
contributions they continue to make to the many policy issues which present 
themselves today. But first, a clearer view of the nature of the indigenous land 
tenure regime of sub-Saharan Africa will provide a solid basis for appreciating the 
consequences of these policy events. 
2.4 THE MAJOR LAND TENURE THEORETICAL POSITIONS 
Many studies have enriched our understanding of the disposition of the land 
tenure system of sub-Saharan Africa. These studies have however progressed 
along divergent paths producing in the process an uneasy mix of consensus, 
contradictions and controversies (van den Brink, 2003). The two main positions in 
this dialogue are termed in this chapter: The Structural and Evolutionary 
theoretical positions respectively. Though these positions have so far been treated 
in the literature as contending theories, a critical look shows that they are indeed 
the two ends of a single continuum of land tenure evolutionary processes. The 
scenario that gives legitimacy to these theoretical positions and their policy 
consequences is briefly looked at in the light of the above discussions. 
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2.4.1 Structural Theory of Land Tenure 
There is now a shared set of conceptions or doctrines that can be referred to as the 
structural theory of land tenure. This theory explains the land tenure system of 
sub-Saharan Africa in its basic terms and takes as its expository point, the model or 
structure of the pre-capitalists African tenure system as given. It takes the 
customary rules that govern the tenure system also as codified and immutable. 
Accordingly, the structural theory builds together, from this expository point, the 
intricacies between the spiritual, normative codes, behavioural, cultural beliefs and 
organic structures of the pre-capitalist indigenous African era, to develop 
understanding and meaning of the region's land tenure system. It reaches this 
position by placing considerable weight on the kingship and lineage communal 
structures and land relations of African societies (Bruce, 1986; Woodman, 1996; 
Gyekye, 1998). 
A pivotal thesis of this theoretical position is that land in Africa is a sacred 
resource. It is regarded as "a preserve of major deities, the sacred soil of the 
ancestors, an object of the most important rituals, the origin of royal power, the 
basis for health and prosperity; indeed, it was widely looked upon as the source of 
life itself"(July, 1975). Polanyi (1944 p. 178) for instance perceives land as an 
element of nature inextricably interwoven with man's institutions. Le Roy et al. ( 
(1996, p. 52 cited in Lund, 2001) argues further in reference to Francophone Africa 
that land "is not only riches but also at times "a person" (in the traditional sense) 
which can be made to talk (like the dead). It was also (at least sometimes) a deity 
holding vital powers which should be dealt with precaution". While it is very 
difficult to establish the origins of these sentiments, they invariably resonate the 
view that land is more than a factor of production, basis for shelter or an economic 
good. Actually they reinforce the view that land is a priceless possession that no 
one individual could own as in the western sense (see further July, 1975). It is to be 
owned corporately by a group, clan, family or lineage including the dead, the 
living and unborn (see Nana Sir Ofori Atta cited in Ollenu, 1967, p. 4; see also 
Meek, 1949). The dead or ancestors are part of these rather vertical corporate 
communities as, it is argued, "land [is] the sanctuary for the souls of the departed 
ancestors (Asante, 1975, p. 3) and hence "belongs to the ancestors" (Busia, 1951, 
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p. 44). The unborn generation are also incorporated into this community because it 
is argued, to carry on life without land is much the same as being born without 
hands and feet since land is tied up with the organization of kinship, 
neighbourhood, craft and creed- with tribe and temple, village, gild and church 
(Polanyi, 1944 p. 178). 
The implication is that the living actors of society are essentially caretakers with 
beneficiary interest, not really exclusive owners. To make this position clearer, 
advocates of this position describe the land rights of the living actors as 
usufructuary rights (Ollenu, 1967), a term derived from Roman law, meaning "the 
right to use a thing belonging to someone else or rent it to others but not to sell it 
or change its quality" (Pejovich, 1990, p. 28). Accordingly rights in land in Africa 
are spoken of as co-owned (Donor, 1972; World Bank, 1975; Harrison, 1977) 
essentially by the vertical community or even "as a regime not of tenure at all, and 
worse, one with no socio-spatial boundaries - that is, a regime of open, or public, 
not private access" (Alden Wily, 2000) with unrestricted rights (World Bank, 1975). 
The tenure system is thus presented as placing greater restrictions on the extent to 
which rights and liberties regarding land use can be entrusted in individuals for 
growth. Actually it reproduces the idea that the tenure system is prone to 
rerouting economic efforts into ventures that promote waste, rent dissipation, 
gross violations and mass externality. 
To this position, the expected preoccupation of the living economic actors under 
this theory is to ensure that ownership of the land does not pass out from the 
community. Besides, the use and benefits from the land must also be restricted to 
the membership of the corporate community. It is therefore only the membership 
of particular communities alone who can capture benefits from the land (Pejovich, 
1997, p. 4) either individually (Mol and Wiersum, 1993) or jointly (Lund, 2001; 
Shakleton and Tapson, 2005). Accordingly the tenure system, from this position, 
forbids commercial land transactions altogether either among the membership or 
between the members and non members. This is because, according to Asante 
(1975, p. 4), in particular, land is "the most valuable heritage of the whole 
community, and could not be lightly parted with" or sold (Gough and Yankson, 




... not simply a question of alienating reality, notoriously it 
[is] a case of selling 
a spiritual heritage for a mess of pottage, a veritable betrayal of ancestral trust, an 
undoing of the hope of posterity". Thus the commercial relations that need to be 
promoted by compatible tenure systems are explicitly outlawed. This also 
reinforces the view that access to land cannot be determined under any 
circumstances by the forces of demand, supply, foresight, industry and 
entrepreneurial abilities but only by membership of the community (see further 
Migot-Adholla et al, 1991). This position is in reality toughened by the argument 
that to separate land from man and organise society in such a way as to satisfy the 
requirements of real estate markets, is "the weirdest of all undertakings of our 
ancestors" (Polanyi, 1944). The usual explanation to this position is that "the 
creation of land market ... eliminates all claims on 
land originating in kinship or 
neighbourhood organization and could lead to landless peasant" (Mabogunje, 
1989 p. 79). Such is the asserted proscription of commercial transfer of land rights 
that although families may have secure and inheritable land holdings, these are 
said not to be freely traded on the market (IIED, 1999). With these stressed inferior 
incentive structures it is little wonder that Africa is pervasively spoken of as "a 
special case precisely because traditional land tenure systems which do not allow 
private land rights to be fully recognised still predominate" (Platteau, 1992, P. 83; 
Degnbol, 1996). If this theoretical position is valid, then the overwhelming 
conclusion is that unless the workings of the tenure system are fundamentally 
restructured to entrust individuals with liberties and exclusive rights to land use, 
transfer, benefits and costs, it will remain incompatible with economic growth. 
There are very serious problems with this theoretical position and it is a wonder 
how it came to be a conventional wisdom. A few of these will suffice. Even if it is 
taken for granted that the arguments represent the truth, which is unlikely, the 
fundamental flaws in their underlying logic bring them into serious questioning. 
For instance it is self evident that if the living actors are to preserve the land in 
trust for the future generation they would require a means of sustenance. The land 
resource alone is not sufficient for that. It has to be effectively combined with 
capital and labour. So, where capital and labour are lacking it is naive or illogical 
to expect the living actors to sit aloof, watch over the land resources for the dead 
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and unborn generation and perish prematurely. Indeed if they do so, the unborn 
generation in time will also become the living and the present day living will 
become the dead and the cycle of premature perishing and destitution will be 
perpetuated in the region. How can it be that institutions evolved by men, not by 
the Creator, for themselves could be so constraining as to make poverty and 
underdevelopment a perpetual feature of society? Surely, any doctrine, however 
emotive, that seeks to perpetually impoverish a group of people, is not only 
questionable and illogical but as well illegitimate. Indeed if the position is correct 
then the living actors of Africa are caught in-between an incompatibility of 
realities. On one hand they are expected to sustain their livelihoods to preserve the 
land resources of the community for the unborn and ancestors, yet on the other 
they are denied the very means to do so. Surely, self interest maximisation will 
generously lead living members of society to so rampantly flout the custom that it 
will lose its meaning in no time. Possibly, the actual rationale behind this sacred 
characterisation of land is not to trap living actors in this sort of incompatibility of 
realities but to inculcate into the African society, by means of legends, a sense of 
sustainable and judicious use of land. 
Then again, these theories originate from pronouncements and writings of certain 
people and thus hold their validity to the accuracy and open-mindedness of these 
earlier writers. In reality, serious doubts have been placed on the credibility of at 
least some of the statements and works of these persons. A fundamental discovery 
of Berry (1993, pp. 39-40) for instance is that these earlier writers have not always 
approached the subject with neutrality and have constantly redefined these 
normative codes "in order to take advantage of commercial or political 
opportunities". Firmin-Sellers (1998) also studies the complex political processes 
by which property rights are defined and enforced in colonial Ghana using 
rational choice theory. The study found that prominent and politically influential, 
wealthy and mostly Western educated individuals in Ghana were the key players 
in the debate and renegotiated what constitute customary rights for their own 




Perhaps the greatest failing of the structural theory, from the economic 
perspective, is its almost fanatical reliance on non-economic basis, spiritual myths, 
to make claims on an institution, the land tenure that is as well economic in nature. 
Given that land tenure is cultural as well as an economic institution, it is a 
reasonable expectation that, for objectivity, theories surrounding them both 
historically and presently are culturally and economically situated. The inability to 
do this demonstrates that this theory explains, if valid, only a part, the non- 
economic part, of the tenure system and thus lacks the merits to form the basis for 
economic analysis or policy. For a complete view there is the need to also situate 
the theory in economic principles as it exists in reality; an end to which the 
evolutionary theory is directed. 
2.4.2 Evolutionary Land Tenure Theory 
This theory illustrates clearly from empirical observation that the tenure system of 
Africa has incredible potential to offer incentives to channel economic efforts into 
productive ventures if permitted to evolve endogenously. The expository starting 
point is that, the world over, land was originally abundant and hence regarded as 
a resource of limitless supply for private exploitation by all and many. Land was 
thus owned by no one in particular ( see further Hobbes, 1651; Demsetz, 1967; 
North and Thomas, 1971; North, 1997; Pejovich, 1997). This derives from the 
argument that, 
... if we are all here by equal permission of the 
Creator, we are 
here with equal title to the enjoyment of his bounty - with an 
equal right to the use of all that nature so impartially offers 
(Henry George quoted from Ofori, 1992). 
Karl Marx (Marx, 1974): 
... the earth and the fullness thereof, were in the original state 
of nature, the common property of all mankind, so that every 
child born into this world had, ipso facto, an inalienable right 
to an equal share in the common inheritance... 
Thus the cardinal element of man's relations to land was originally the right to use, 
usufruct, rather than ownership and access was unrestricted. Each member of the 
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community had the right to use as much land as they could develop. This open 
access situation in the primitive state of society the world over including sub- 
Saharan Africa naturally led invariably to widespread resource captures. Each 
community or family developed or cultivated portions of the land until they 
abandoned the land or gave it out to another group. With time land use became 
rivalrous in that if one individual or family captured and used a portion of the 
land, that portion would no longer be available for others. Thus individuals and 
families, in the bid to protect their investments and development in particular 
portions of the land, established an organic relation with the land. This helped in 
identifying members of community and defines their social or political importance 
(July, 1975). Self-interest maximisation expectedly encouraged overexploitation 
which was to lead to rent dissipation (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955). Every capture 
reduces the available land stock. Nonetheless, whiles land was still in abundance 
with no scarce value, supply problems were nonexistent and thus overexploitation 
was less problematic (Pejovich, 1990). In situations like that there would be "no 
positive value to society of creating clearly defined property rights in land" 
(Johnson, 1972, p. 271). Any theory based on this stage of development of society is 
likely to arrive at conclusions analogous to those of the structural theorists. This 
confirms also that the structural theory and the evolutionary theory are not distinct 
theories as often portrayed but a continuum, explaining the initial and subsequent 
development of the land tenure system. 
It soon became apparent that land was not to remain forever in excess of demand. 
Scarcity of land in Africa was occasioned by growth in cultivation of commercial 
crops, primarily oil palm, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton and coffee (Sender and Smith, 
1986, p. 158; Migot-Adholla, Hazell et al., 1991), population growth (Feder & 
Feeney, 1991; Binswanger, Deininger et al., 1995), increased trade (Sender and 
Smith, 1986), social and economic changes, new technologies, natural calamities, 
migration, subordination, war and litigation (Field-Juma, 1996). This propelled the 
need for more precise demarcation of captured land holdings (Brandao & Feder, 
1995 see also Demsetz, 1967), which also came with widespread land disputes (see 
Meek, 1949) as was to be expected. As land became scarce the marginal costs 
imposed on other individual users as results of land capture by others began to 
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hurt the economic well being of society. In every society, it is this condition that 
spurs the "emergence of new property rights.. . in response to the 
desires of the 
interacting persons for adjustment to [these] new cost responsibilities" (Demsetz, 
1967, p. 350). This commences a transition from open access or group ownership 
towards a private property rights system (Demsetz, 1967). Eventually the goal of a 
private property system would be reached but over a considerable period of time 
as the experiences of the western world demonstrates (Buell, 1965; North & 
Thomas, 1973; De Soto, 2000). 
In Africa this transition commenced when those who first discovered (Bruce, 1987) 
and continuously exploited, maintained, defended and protected particular 
portions of the land together with the development thereon (Sarbah, 1897; Ollenu, 
1967; Meek, 1949; Woodman, 1996; see also [Ohimen V. Adjei (1957) 2 West Africa 
Law Report, 275) established for themselves use (usu), beneficial (fructus) and 
perpetual rights in those particular portions. The land rights so acquired have been 
noted for all practical purposes to be equivalent in every respect to private 
property rights or freehold interests in land as known to English land law (Bruce, 
1986; Rimmer, 1992; ; for the nature of English freehold see Megary and Wade, 
2000) The Chief or headman of the community exercises political (July, 1975) and 
administrative (Bruce, 1986) control over the pockets of unapportioned or un- 
captured portions of land within the territories of the community for and on behalf 
of the entire group of which the Chief is also a member (Rimmer, 1992; Gyekye, 
1998). 
When the customary freehold in all the land within the territory of the community 
is completely taken up either by members or through sale, the radical or allodial 
rights held by the community in common and administered by the head is reduced 
to mere administrative rights over the land (for instance Pogucki, 1950; Okoth- 
Ogendo, 1982; Bruce, 1986; 1987; Dickerman, 1987; Feder & Feeney, 1991; Migot- 
Adholla, Hazell et al., 1991; Platteau, 1992; Sjaastad Espen and Bromley Daniel W, 
1997; Payne, 1997; Antwi, 2000; Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Quan, 2000; Platteau, 
2000; McAuslan, 2000; Cousins, 2000; Gough & Yankson, 2001). At this stage in the 
development process it would be incorrect to describe land rights in Africa as open 
access resource since it is only by the sanction of the community or original 
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acquirer that access could be obtained (Berry, 1993; 1994; Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; 
Alden Wily, 2000). 
Perhaps what may have confused some observers is the fact that ownership 
boundaries over specific parcels were and still are usually physically non-existent 
except in some urban areas. These boundaries, however impermanent or invisible 
they may be, were known, accepted and respected by all in the pre-capitalist days 
and hence sufficient to indicate limits of ownership. As Buchannan (1975, p. 20) 
explains, societies begin to consider precise definition of rights and drawing of the 
limits of ownership more carefully only when the tolerated limits are exceeded, 
when previously accepted boundaries are crossed. While this tolerated limit 
remains unbroken attention was focused more on building solidarity among 
neighbouring original acquirers to strengthen kinship ties and form the 
communities. This solidarity served the indigenous Africans in many respects; 
socially, economically and politically. A fundamental objective for the formation of 
this community was to make it possible to pool together resources and redistribute 
risk in times of war, drought or pestilence (Field-Juma, 1996) and to provide 
common labour resources for agricultural cultivation (Bruce, 1986). Further, this 
solidarity according to Okoth-Ogendo (1994) also: 
... was meant to guarantee security of opportunity for all who 
had access rights to those resources. If there were a possibility 
that some of these rights would be taken away, the tenure 
system assured that these would occur only in exceptional 
circumstances, and only upon a collective decision made at the 
highest level of social organisation. Second, it was designed to 
ensure equity between and across generations. ... Third, [it] ... 
also determines important land use decisions... and the nature 
of resource preservation or conservation measures, where 
these required collective action by the community. 
As a symbolic gesture to cement this solidarity, the founding individuals or nuclei 
family units of the community agreed to a privileged association of their acquired 
land rights with their newly formed communities. The privileged rights that 
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accretes to the community, the allodial rights, as Meek (1949, p. 179) establishes 
amounts to what "would be described in English law as a right of reversion- a 
right which cannot be lost by prescription". The right to the economic use and 
exploitation of the land remained vested in individual members of the community 
(Mabogunje, 1992). Thus when land in Africa is spoken of as commonly held it 
could only be in reference to this notional radical title in areas where the 
customary freehold has been acquired (Bruce, 1986; Woodman, 1996). 
To date boundaries remain unclear in most areas. But these socio-economic 
changes and their accompanying fundamental changes in land prices led to some 
"natives claiming ownership in the soil" which in turn increased the sale of land 
by one native to another and then from native to non natives (Buell 1965, pp. 761- 
762) as far back as in 1860. This marked the break from the structural era towards 
the fully fledged private property era. Initially, in keeping with the then value of 
the land, particularly during the pre-colonial era, the customary freehold were 
sold for small symbolic gifts, such as "a few yams or a tin of palm oil" (Berry, 1975, 
p. 95), locally brewed drinks (Ollenu, 1967), beer, produce or livestock (Kitching, 
1980). With time, these symbolic payments transformed to substantial cash 
(Clarke, 1980) or other forms of payments (Berry; 1975; Kitching, 1980, p. 290-291) 
such as several years of labour (Woodman, 1996). Now, land rights in sub-Saharan 
Africa have taken on a more profound economic, social and political character. 
Thus though land is spoken of as inalienable under the structural theory, there is 
now sufficient authority to support the view that sales of land was, even before the 
introduction of government intervention, possible, and now common. 
2.5 THE CURRENT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA URBAN REAL PROPERTY FRAMEWORK 
At a national level, urban property markets in sub-Saharan Africa are now diverse 
and depict a polarised patchwork of highly matured and vastly fledgling sub 
markets. These reflect the strengths of the respective national economies and 
country specific policy hindrances. Table 2-2 shows the pattern of maturity of 
selected African real estate markets as ranked by Knight Frank (2003). 
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Table 2-2: 2005 African Real Estate Market Strength Forecast 
city Office Retail Industrial Total Score 
Johannesburg 1 1 1 3 
Lagos 3 2 2 7 
Gabarone 2 6 5 13 
Kampala 4 5 4 13 
Dar es Salaam 5 7 3 15 
Nairobi 6 4 6 16 
Lusaka 8 3 7 18 
Harare 7 8 9 24 
Blantyre 
L . 4- 
9 9 8 26 
Source: Knight Frank (2003) 
According to the Table there are marked differences in the maturity stages 
between the respective selected countries as well as local differences in maturity 
between the different sub sectors of the property market. Presently, the degree of 
maturity of a country's real estate market in Africa seems to be a strong correlate 
of the size of the international participants and business community on that 
country's real estate market. International participants in this sense comprise both 
citizens who are normally resident in the West or expatriates in African countries. 
By far the South Africa real estate markets are the most matured in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using house price indices the Economist (December, 9 2004 edition) rated 
the South African housing markets as the first in the world. This is reported in 
Table 2-3. 
Generally house prices in South Africa are rising even above inflation. This is 
attributed to the high concentration of international buyers in the South African 
residential markets (Grubb and Ellis and Knight Frank, 2003). 
Apart from South Africa no other African country featured in the top class list. In 
Zimbabwe the significant growth in the residential lettings market over the last 
three years with rental rates rising above inflation is attributable to the high 
presence of international buyers drifting from outright ownership markets to 
letting markets due likely to the ongoing political insecurity in the country. 
So also, in Kenya and Tanzania where the high quality of the residential market is 
directly linked to overseas corporate investment particularly in Dar es Salaam 
(Grubb and Ellis & Knight Frank, 2003). 
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Table 2-3: The Economist's House- Price indices: % Change on a Year Earlier 
No. Country Q3- 2004 Q3-2003 1997-2004 
1 South Africa 35.1 20.9 227 
2 Hong Kong 31.2 -13.6 -49 
3 Spain 17.2 16.5 149 
4 New Zealand 16.4 21.2 56 
5 France 14.7 11.5 76 
6 Britain 13.8 11.0 139 
7 United States 13.0 6.0 65 
8 Ireland 10.8 14.8 187 
9 China 9.9 4.1 No 
10 Sweden 9.8 5.5 81 
11 Italy 9.7 10.6 69 
12 Belgium 9.3 5.5 50 
13 Australia 8.2 17.6 112 
14 Denmark 7.3 3.4 50 
15 Canada 6.7 6.5 43 
16 Netherlands 3.3 1.9 76 
17 Switzerland 2.2 2.4 12 
18 Singapore nil -2.3 No 
19 Germany -1.7 -4.5 -3 
20 Japan -6.4 -4.8 -2.4 
Source: The Economists 
This means that economies that are relatively well performing with serious 
business opportunities and sufficient guaranteed security for expatriates are likely 
to be comparatively attractive to expatriates and mature faster. 
It is possible to attribute this situation in which international participants and 
business persons drive the progress of property markets in these economies to two 
main factors. Firstly both the supply and demand for developed urban properties 
in general entail front heavy capital investment This is typically above the means 
of the majority of the population of these African countries given the generally 
low-income levels in most of these countries (refer to section 1.2). As in the 
western economies, in situations like this a strong mortgage market provides good 
relief. However in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of few countries such as 
South Africa, Uganda and Kenya (Grubb & Ellis, 2004) with a fairly developed 
mortgage markets, most countries are characterised by very weak and ill 
developed financial and mortgage markets. Most of these countries are faced with 
high mortgage rates making it very expensive to borrow for property development 
(Grubb & Ellis, 2004). Even in the case of Zambia, the mortgage market is said to 
have disappeared all together (Grubb and Ellis & Knight Frank, 2003). 
42 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As a result, the majority of Africans rely on funds from informal credit, 
remittances, personal savings, rotating credit associations, social clubs and 
institutions (Rakodi, 1997) to buy a house or land to construct their own houses 
incrementally. The comparatively long gestation period of property development 
particularly when funded this way means that in the end the real costs of 
constructions tends to be higher than it would normally have been. This is 
contrary to what is expected of a poor country where money is difficult to come 
by. Osondu and Middleton (1994) estimates for instance that in Enugu, Nigeria 
about 78 percent of housing stock are built by the owners directly and of this only 
35 percent had access to formal institutional credit. This shortage of formal credit 
appears to have also slowed down investments in commercial estate development 
in Africa thereby producing stagnation in these markets. Still the relatively small 
class of commercial estate development companies in these countries also tend to 
rely on funds usually obtained from a combination of sources ranging from bank 
credit, informal credits, personal savings or inheritance. 
As a consequence, there is a wide variation in the proportion of urban residents in 
respective countries who achieve home ownership depending on their personal 
circumstances and hindrances posed by government policies (Grubb & Ellis, 2004). 
UNCHS/World Bank (1993) suggests that these variations range from around two- 
thirds in Tunis, Johannesburg, Ibadan, and Dakar to under half in Algiers, Rabat, 
and Harare, one-third in Lilongwe and Cairo, little more than a quarter in Dar es 
Salaam, Nairobi, and Accra, and only one-fifth in Abidjan. At such rates, it will 
take several decades for many of these markets to attain internationally efficient 
performance levels. Those who cannot afford to own houses, as is the case 
everywhere, rent their housing needs. The rental markets in Africa have developed 
their own sophistications that have no analogy in western economies. Owing to 
pervasive inflation and possibly insidious landlord and tenant policies landlords 
in the rental markets tend to demand key money or several months or years rent in 
advance on entry to offset subsequent decline in real rents (Rakodi, 1997). Those 
who cannot afford to honour these payments are then shunted to the slum where 
rental conditions are less onerous. 
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All this demonstrates that the tenure system is potentially compatible with the 
requirements for economic growth as it admits to allocating rights to individuals 
to facilitate social and commercial cooperation. It thus has the potential to propel 
industry and foresight as well as to channel individual economic efforts into 
productive activities for growth. It has not however progressed to perfection. 
Perhaps the more interesting question is how government land tenure reform 
measures have helped in reaching this goal? 
2.6 THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA LAND REFORM POLICIES 
To address this question there is the need for a viewpoint about what the ends of 
land reform policies in sub-Saharan Africa should be considering the fledgling 
evolutionary state of the tenure system. Clearly what is required is a mechanism to 
facilitate the independent evolutionary processes so that it can fully and more 
perfectly entrust individuals with exclusive rights to use, transfer and capture 
benefits and costs from the land resource. As discussed (supra) the endogenous 
land tenure evolutionary process is a direct response to fundamental changes in 
exogenous, socio-economic conditions, including increases in business 
transactions, commerce, export trading, competitive credit markets and general 
growth in wealth. Thus the most important way to facilitate this evolutionary 
process is to trigger positive changes in these exogenous forces by lowering the 
obstacles that are impeding their growth. Fundamental to this is the removal and 
restructuring of bottlenecks in export trading including customs procedures, 
lowering of the entry barriers for credit institutions, fair rules and incentives for 
business and commerce, among many others. It will also be the legitimate duty of 
government to legitimise and accord individualised rights under customary tenure 
all the incidences of private property rights in accordance with the applicable 
customary law including the immunisation of right owners against 
uncompensated expropriation. Besides, to ensure rational commercial relations, 
government will have to provide a mechanism to collect, collate and supply 
relevant market information to market dealers at economical costs. Government 
would also have the added responsibility of providing a framework to facilitate 
internalisation of land use externalities and land ownership disputes. The question 
is how have land reforms in Africa faired so far in these terms? 
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2.6.1 The First Generation Land Reforms 
This first generation land reform occurred during the European colonial encounter 
with Africa roughly between 1880 (Rodney, 1985) and 1956 (Morgan, 1992). Indeed 
systematic research has established that all efficient economic outcomes from these 
policies were essentially by-products of activities intended to promote any of the 
threefold interests of the colonizers(Kaniki, 1985; Mabogunje, 1989). These interests 
are "firstly... to provide raw materials (agricultural products and minerals) to feed 
the machines of the industrial imperial power. Secondly... to import manufactured 
goods from the imperial power and thirdly... to be self-supporting" (Kaniki, 1985, 
p. 328). This necessitated the synchronisation of indigenous economic systems of 
Africa in line with these ends (Reyna and Down, 1987, p. 1). The key resources 
required from Africa to accomplish this were land and labour. However since "the 
strict definition of the ownership of land seemed to be the master key to African 
labour" (Lonsdale, 1958, p. 752 quoted from Sender and Smith, 1986, p. 22) land 
policy became the masker key to the accomplishment of these goals. Even so, while 
it was clearly possible to mobilise land through commercial relationships under 
the indigenous tenure, that approach, like all commercial dealings under the price 
system entail costs. The relevant costs being, the costs of information regarding 
ownership and customary rules, costs of negotiating contracts with the manifold 
landowners likely to be involved and the costs of enforcing contracts in a regime 
where land capture was rife and ownership was largely unrecorded. 
To be self-supporting, not necessarily for the economic good of the market, these 
costs were to be circumvented or lowered. These were accomplished through 
various means. One of these was the drafting of indigenous Chiefs and leaders, the 
repositories of local knowledge and information, into the administrative and 
legislative setups of the colonial order under the British indirect rule (Noronha, 
1985) and French doctrine of Association (Betts, 1961; 1985). So important was this 
organisation to the whole purpose of colonialism that even in communities where 
chieftaincy institutions did not exist; chiefs were literally contrived for this 
purpose and recalcitrant Chiefs were deposed (see Platteau, 1992). In the end some 
transaction costs were circumvented, but this approach perverted "the whole 
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fabric of pre-colonial African societies" (Platteau, 1992, p. 103) at great expense to 
the then land tenure evolutionary processes. 
These Chiefs became the junior partners to the colonial regime and exercised 
authority only by the sanction of civil government not necessarily by customary 
norms. Thus rather than acting as custodians of custom to facilitate the tenure 
evolutionary processes, the Chiefs became rather the conduits through which the 
perversion of the tenure arrangements was subtly and tacitly brought to bear. For 
instance by granting these Chiefs the right to allocate land (see Platteau, 1992), the 
legitimate economic rights of the customary freeholders were extinguished and 
transferred to these Chiefs. This merged in the Chiefs both the Allodial and 
customary freehold rights, an arrangement never contemplated by customary law. 
In essence this arrangement promulgated the doctrine that landownership in 
Africa derives rather exclusively from the Chiefs (Feder and Noronha, 1987) and 
the customary freeholders are "tenant[s] of the tribe" (Bates, 1984, quoted from 
Platteau, 1992, p. 100 see also Amodou Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Provinces, 
Nigeria (1989)). 
Such perversion conveniently afforded the colonial regime the needed opportunity 
to by pass the forces of demand, supply and custom to regulate, land allocations 
from behind (Bates, 1984). Some of the infamous land tenure distortions achieved 
were the despotic imposition of restrictions on competitive exploitation of the land 
resource with and among the expatriate merchant firms. This phenomenon, which 
would have expedited the land rights evolutionary processes, was advertently 
suppressed (Rimmer, 1992, p. 41). Another was the prohibition of "land sales not 
only between Africans and non-Africans, but also among the Africans themselves, 
unless explicitly approved or undertaken by the appointed chiefs"(Platteau, 1992 
, p. 100). Yet another was the insurance that "Africans were often forbidden to 
cultivate certain export crops to avoid competition with white export markets" 
(Bruce, 1987, p. 31). All these were significant interventions that disrupted the 
evolutionary processes. 
Perhaps the most significant disruption of the tenure system occurred when in the 
bid to mobilise land freely (Buell, 1965) for the intended large commercial farms 
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(Bruce, 1987, p. 30) the administration sought to transfer land allocation authority 
from the community level to the governmental level. This quest necessitated the 
application of "legal, administrative and commercial rules already developed in 
European countries" in these African countries (Mabogunje, 1989, p. 83). For the 
British colonial dependencies, the received legal order was the "Reception Clause" 
which made the common law, the doctrine of equity and statutes of general 
application already developed and applying in England equally applicable in 
British colonial dependencies (McAuslan, 2000). Similarly for Southern African 
dependencies (currently Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, Namibia) 
the received law was the Roman-Dutch law. The Portuguese laws were introduced 
in Mozambique and the French speaking half of Cameroon (McAuslan, 2000 p. 76). 
The French Code Civil became the received law in French colonial dependencies 
(Delville, 2000). 
Backed by these laws, large indigenous land rights, particularly in Eastern, and 
Southern Africa were forcefully taken over by the state (Okoth-Ogendo, 1982; 
Munro, 1984; Kaniki, 1985 ; Okoth-Ogendo, 1994; 1998; McAuslan, 2000; Delville, 
2000; Okoth-Ogendo, 2000). It was only in West Africa, that this free expropriation 
was largely checkmated by local resistance movements (Meek, 1949; Toulmin & 
Quan, 2000; McAuslan, 2000). Even so, in West Africa though the administration 
owned only such lands as they actually acquired at full price (Meek, 1949; Okoin, 
1999; Stamm, 2000) the conquered territories such as Benin in Nigeria and Ashanti 
in the Gold Coast as well as lands in both Northern Nigeria and the Northern 
Territories of Ghana were held by the administration in trust for the indigenes of 
the respective countries (Meek, 1949). These policies did not just disrupt the tenure 
process but rather replaced them altogether with government allocation systems in 
many African societies. 
These were accompanied by a series of land registration laws aimed essentially at 
gradually abolishing indigenous land rights by insisting on transactions to 
conform to European tenure requirements (Meek, 1949; Brobbey, 1991; McAuslan, 
2000). In Uganda for instance the Registration of Title Act of 1922 provided for the 
registration of mailo lands and subsequent transactions after registration was to 
follow English or statutory requirements as opposed to customary practices. 
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Kenya was probably the first country to have a real brush with the Torrens system 
of Title Registration in sub-Saharan Africa in as early as the 1950s following the 
1908 registration law designed to streamline titles in the Coastal strip leased from 
the sultan of Zanzibar. The law was deliberately modelled on the 'new' 1925 
English land law, suitably adapted and simplified for the circumstances of Kenya 
(McAuslan, 2000). Observance of the requirements of these European registration 
laws meant for instance that new regimes of transaction costs previously unknown 
under indigenous legal order came increasingly to bear on land market dealers. 
The then simple and almost instantaneous land rights deals were immediately 
tempered by these complex European legal requirements and covenants. As a 
consequence, transaction and information costs faced by landowners and 
indigenous purchasers heightened rather than lowered. This position has since not 
changed, indeed now compounded. It is the circumvention of these added costs by 
market dealers that led in those days (Noronha, 1985) and presently to large 
informal transactions (Antwi, 2000). Information relating to all these transactions 
remains outside the domain of the main information supply systems thereby 
denying the market the relevant feedback mechanisms required for rational 
decisions and transactions. 
Clearly these systematic and fundamental interventions deviate considerably from 
what is expected of efficient government interventions. They brought instead 
significant, largely irreversible, disruptive and material changes to the fabric of the 
indigenous tenure systems in particular and the economic systems of Africa as a 
whole (see further Frank, 1969). It is not surprising that the quest for remedial 
measures to deal with the inequities, injustices; inefficiencies; waste; unproductive 
client-patron arrangements; economic disruptions, market malfunctioning and 
rent seeking activities originated by this generation of policies continue to dictate 
current policy thinking and debate across the region. 
2.6.2 The Second Generation Land Policies 
This regime of land policies occurred during the immediate postcolonial era. This 
was an era of euphoria and great expectations for Africa and the newly liberated 
economies were poised to demonstrate their capabilities to manage their own 
affairs, overcome the undoing of the colonial era and rapidly making up for lost 
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development decades. To accomplish this it was contended that a "critical 
minimum effort" or "big push" was required through a massive increase in the 
ratio of investment to national income (Killick, 1978, pp. 17-18). Premised on the 
then development economics principles that venerated central planning 
(Leibenstein, 1957; Killick, 1978; Stern, 1989a), this kind of development was to 
come by way of state directed modernisation (Arrighi, 1970; Harris, 1975) through 
industrialisation (Nurkse, 1953). For, "after all, the process by which the countries 
of Europe modernized their economies is called industrial revolution" (Killick, 
1978, p. 20; Sender and Smith, 1986). 
The indigenous economic system was thought to be inadequate to offer support 
for the big push as "a ceiling existed on the level of attainable output per head" 
they could produce (Rostow, 1960). The agenda presumed however the existence 
of a large reservoir of unemployed labour (Lewis, 1954) and abundant land 
resources. As such capital formation was exclusively stressed as the only missing 
element in the big push equation (Killick, 1978 , p. 19). This was not without 
theoretical support from the then dominant Harrod (1948) and Domars (1957) 
capital-output ratio. 
Yet the mobilisation of large tracts of land by the state was a key requirement for 
the successful execution of such level of state led and directed investment push as 
envisioned. Without the state owning large tracks of land, the vast industrial 
establishments, farms, industries and extensive bureaucracies could not be 
established and the vision would fail. Thus in the absence of any explicit 
incorporation of land mobilisation strategy, the respective states had to decide 
their own land mobilisation paths. This necessitated two main commitments by 
postcolonial governments that would have far reaching implications for the land 
tenure system of the region. Both commitments in essence meant that the 
disruptions and reversals of the land market development processes initiated by 
the colonial regimes were to be perpetuated together with their adverse 
consequences. 
First was the retention and expansion of the statutory controls inherited by the 
colonial administration which subjected land transactions to a number of 
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bureaucratic approvals, permissions, consents, regimentation and registrations 
(Brobbey, 1991; Hatch Associates, 2002). This provided a measure by which 
postcolonial governments maintained constant control over the growth and 
expansion of the market to ensure that the state at all times outpaced the market in 
the development arena. The second commitment was the consolidation of 
government's grips on the large reservoirs of colonial public land holdings 
bequeathed to the new postcolonial governments (Meek, 1949; Bruce, 1986; 
Shipton, 1987; Platteau, 1992; Platteau, 1996; Payne, 1997; Quart, 1997; Antwi, 2000; 
Toulmin & Quart, 2000; Quan, 2000; Platteau, 2000; McAuslan, 2000; Delville, 2000; 
Okoth-Ogendo, 2000; Cousins, 2000; Palmer, 2000). This was followed with the 
adoption of the ideology and practice of gaining free or cheap access to land 
through compulsory land expropriation or nationalisation to support what some 
have described as "propaganda projects" (see for instance Quan, 2000). 
The result was that in countries as Senegal for instance the State administered 
property law of 1964 (Domain National) retained the principle of state ownership of 
all unregistered land introduced by the colonial administration. In Tanzania 
following the colonial land policy, Land Ordinance 1923, which vested all 
unoccupied lands in the governor, the immediate postcolonial administration in 
1962 expanded the domain of this policy to cover all lands in the country. In 
Uganda, the Land Reform Decree of 1975 sought to convert all land rights in 
Uganda into public land (Okoth-Ogendo, 2000). The situation is no different in 
Kenya where lands are still held by statutory trustees rather than directly by 
indigenous owners (Okoth-Ogendo, 2000). In Nigeria where the colonial 
government failed to nationalise vacant lands, the postcolonial administration 
passed the Land Use Act of 1975 to nationalise all lands in the country. In other 
countries where land has not been unequivocally nationalised by postcolonial 
administrations such as Ghana, eminent domain policies and extensive statutory 
controls have been enacted to give government the power to freely acquire or vest 
lands in the government for all manner of purposes (see Chapter 4 for details on 
Ghana). 
Following these commitments thus, it emerged that by the 1980s half of the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa had nationalised lands and extinguished private 
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property rights all together (Mabongunje, 1992; Gough & Yankson, 2001). In these 
countries, to date, private property rights guaranteed by the indigenous tenure 
system remained largely abolished in favour of the state and the tenure 
evolutionary process completed atrophied. But these came at costs which laid 
largely in the socialisation of the economy with the proliferation of bureaucratic 
controls. 
By acquiring the authority to distribute land from the centre, the state accordingly 
acquired the power to discriminate between "particular needs of different people 
and allowing one man to do what another must be prevented from doing" (Hayek, 
1944, p. 82). Since the distribution of land is a physical representation of wealth 
distribution, this arrangement meant that government had overwhelming 
influence over wealth distribution in these countries. It implies that in 50-percent 
of sub-Saharan African countries only beneficiaries of state lands could bring their 
land resources and industry into competition to generate further wealth and 
improve their welfare. Wealth from land is thus likely, under this regime of policy 
reforms, to circulate largely within this defined group of beneficiaries of state 
allocations. In selecting these beneficiaries, it is the state bureaucratic machinery 
that decides who among the range of potential users must be given the 
opportunity to make such use of the land by employing rationing almost at will 
(Okoth-Ogendo, 2000). Given that public officials in charge are, like all rational 
economic agents, self interested persons subject to enticements, bribery and 
corruption (Pigou, 1962) it is unsurprising that they have not maintained entire 
impartiality in their selection of beneficiaries of state land allocations so far across 
sub Saharan Africa (see for example Quan, 1997; Antwi, 2000; Toulmin & Quan, 
2000; Quan, 2000; Delville, 2000; Okoth-Ogendo, 2000; Palmer, 2000). 
Thus it will be, for most of these countries, only the few who are able to make the 
required investment in lobbying and competitive bribing that, most likely, will 
benefit from these state allocations. In any society it is mostly the already wealthy, 
politically powerful and influential who are able to make such investments. The 
result is that land is allocated to the wealthy few and circulates within them 
creating a lopsided distribution of land resources and wealth in African societies. 
Thus apart from the disruptive effects this regime of policies furthered on the land 
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tenure development process, it promoted a situation in which economic growth is 
driven by only a few. These few are also the beneficiaries of the gains from 
economic growth leaving a large proportion of the population in poverty with lost 
opportunities. 
For sustainable and meaningful growth to occur this pattern has to be reversed. 
This was widely acknowledged by the major players in the land reform debate, led 
by the World Bank. This recognition prompted the promulgation of the third 
generation land policies in sub-Saharan Africa, the structural reform policies as 
corrective measures. 
2.6.3 The Third Generation Land Policies 
The 1980s was an era of structural adjustments, which reflected in the 
promulgation of third generation land reform policies in Africa. By the early 1970s 
the big push development approach adopted by the immediate postcolonial 
administrations in sub-Saharan Africa had combined unfavourably with the 
general international economic instability and rapid succession of global economic 
shocks to produce results that diverge starkly from satisfactory outcomes ( see 
Dixon, Simon et al., 1995). These economic failures were blamed on the legacy of 
deep-seated structural imbalances including poorly developed markets (World 
Bank, 1988) such as the land and real estate markets. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) together with other bilateral donor agencies 
prescribed structural adjustments programmes and lending to facilitate the 
restructuring process (Cleary, 1989). 
The structural adjustment programs were in essence aimed at, as Wardham (1989 
, p. 210) summarizes (1) getting prices right; 
(2) letting markets work, (3) reforming 
public institutions, (4) tight fiscal controls and financial discipline (Slater, 1993), (5) 
mobilization of domestic resources; (6) policy reforms to increase efficiency; (7) 
generation of foreign exchange earnings from non-traditional sources; and (8) the 
establishment of a non inflationary role of the state (Dixon et a1,1995) and (9) to 
overcome "the asserted shortcomings of indigenous tenure" (Bruce, 1987,35). For 
details see World Bank (1981; 1989b). Yet by this time economists, policy makers 
and international development agents had shied away from land matters in sub- 
52 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Saharan Africa leaving the field almost exclusively to historians, lawyers and 
anthropologists (see Asiama, 1980; Platteau, 1992). 
McAuslan (1985) argues in reference to the developing world in particular that 
land tenure is a subject fraught with potential minefields and therefore 
governments have tended to shy away from trying to exert control over the 
process. Mattingly (1993, p. 102) also confirmed that "in undertaking interventions 
which urban management demands, most developing countries' governments 
have had little regard for urban land markets" (Mattingly, 1993). Even as recent as 
March 2005, a report by the UK's Commission on Africa, remarked "Land reform 
is an intensely political issue in Africa and many donor countries have pulled back 
from addressing it in recent decades" (Our Common Interest, 2005, p. 46). 
However, in the light of the structural adjustment programs, the World Bank 
exceptionally conceded, "improving land tenure/land use is priority adjustment 
required in the economy of many of [World Bank] ... 
borrower countries where 
the agricultural sector is predominant" (Falloux, 1987). Thus the Bank led a 
structural adjustment land policy campaign and approved between July 1987 and 
June 1999 a total of 156 land related projects, forty six (46) of which were in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (Byamugisha and Zakout, 2000). The 1975 "Land Reform Policy 
Paper, " of the World Bank published ahead of the disbursement of the structural 
adjustment loans in 1980 provided a blue print land policy reform framework that 
was compatible with the tenets of the structural adjustment program. Mainly the 
policy promoted almost exclusively the (1) desirability of smallholder agriculture 
from an equity and efficiency perspective and (2) the desire to facilitate efficiency- 
enhancing transfers of land to better users through commerce facilitated by land 
reform (Deininger and Binswanger, 1998). 
This is not without theoretical basis from the 19th century theory of inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity (Platteau, 1992). This theory 
suggests a relative level of efficiency of farm production by large numbers of small 
producers than for small numbers of large farm sizes. This theory is also 
compatible with the World Bank's agenda under the structural adjustment 
program for export-oriented agriculture to service the debts of these countries and 
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improve their current accounts. Rather oddly, the central thesis of this policy 
framework was predicated on the structural land tenure theory and concludes that 
land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa are impediments to individualization of 
land rights and hence the creation of markets in land (World Bank, 1975, p. 18; 
Deininger and Binswanger, 1998). Clearly the policy turned a blind eye on the 
evolutionary processes that had commenced over a century ago and this omission 
later became the undoing of the policy framework. 
The policy document proposed a conversion of the so perceived communal tenure 
system to a form "that would allow land to be dealt with as a commodity" (Bruce, 
1987, p. 35) in order to improve land productivity and broaden the distribution of 
benefits (World Bank, 1975). In plain words, the goal was to promote the creation 
of private ownership using cadastral surveys, registration of titles and similar 
tools. The two main variants of land reform policies suggested under this rubric 
are: (1) land reforms that seek to individualise landholdings and (2) land reforms 
that seek to nationalise landholdings to enable the state, the radical owner, to 
redistribute the land to individuals or groups of individuals (Bruce, 1987; 
Dickerman, 1987; Okoth-Ogendo, 1998; 2000). This it was hoped would clarify 
rights and make them more secure, ensure egalitarian land ownership patterns, 
facilitate access to credit, stimulate investment in agriculture (Delville, Ouedraogo 
et al., 2002), curb landlessness and contribute to flourishing land markets 
(Deininger and Binswanger, 1998). This private ownership was regarded 
"fundamental aspects of the market economy and common in most Western 
countries" (World Bank, 1975, p. 11). 
That said, it is worth mentioning that many studies (Ravallion and Binayak, 1994; 
Besley and Burgess, 1998) have indeed found landlessness, landownership 
inequalities and absence of individualised rights to go hand in hand with poverty 
particularly in some rural areas of the developing world. These studies argue 
essentially that landlessness undermines the capacity of landless actors to access 
credit using real estate as collateral. Such actors thus rely on their generally 
meagre incomes to survive and thus unable to make substantial, bulk and long- 
term investments. This situation consequently makes it difficult, even impossible 
for landless people to escape the poverty trap (Galore and Zeira, 1993). Besides, a 
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clear relationship has also been found to exist between equal distribution of 
landholdings and other assets, and higher levels of economic growth (Quan, 2000 
, p. 40). For instance, Tyler et al (1993) investigated the impacts of reduction of land 
concentration on economic growth and poverty. Data from 21 developing 
countries were analysed in this study. The results indicate that growth in 
agriculture can cut poverty by 50% in 60 years but a 30% reduction in land 
concentration combined with the same level of growth could achieve the same 
results in just 15 years. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also studied the relationship 
between equality in landownership and income on one hand and economic 
growth on the other using the gini coefficient. The results show that a one standard 
deviation increase in equality in land ownership and income increases growth by 
more than one percentage point. Further, Deininger and Squire (1996) and Li et al 
(1998) studied the disincentive impacts of income inequality on one hand and asset 
inequality on the other on economic growth. The results reinforce the fact that 
asset inequalities have impacts that are more profound on subsequent growth than 
income inequalities. 
True as these results are, there are clear dangers in reaching the goals of 
individualized land rights hurriedly. The problems are, the system of private 
ownership in the western world, which is intended to be cobbled onto the land 
markets of sub-Saharan Africa, was not created by force of law as this generation 
of land reforms sought to do. They evolved in response to fundamental economic 
changes and Buell (1965, p. 750) could observe, whiles "the western world worked 
out its own destiny, unimpeded by an impatient taskmaster from without .... the 
people of Africa however do not have the same opportunity". Seeking to create 
such rights forcibly in sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to yield the same premium as 
those of the western world as their informing processes are different. The reason is 
that because private rights emerge in response to economic factors they must at all 
times be preceded by these economic factors. Unless these economic preconditions 
are equally contrived, forcibly created private rights are bound to lack the requisite 
economic environment to thrive. Unfortunately, these economic preconditions 
cannot be contrived easily and hurriedly given the scale of resources and 
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information required to contrive them. This alone makes the forceful creation of 
private rights in land inevitably unsustainable. 
A prime justification for the contrivance of these rights is that once they are in 
place the necessary economic order will evolve rapidly to support them. For 
instance it is argued that once private rights are created credit supply will emerge 
to meet expected growing demand for credit ( see further Platteau, 2000). But the 
empirical evidence does not support this assertion. Evidence from Kenya where 
the earliest instance of force individualization occurred in Africa for instance 
shows that the poor tend to perceive a high risk of losing their land through 
foreclosure and hence are reluctant to use their property as collateral (Shipton, 
1987; Platteau, 2000). This constitutes significant demand failure. Conversely, 
credit supply depends on a large plethora of factors of which individualised rights 
is only one. These factors include the performance of the land and real estate 
markets, available alternative investment opportunities, political stability, political 
interferences in the credit institution's decision-making processes and the level of 
competition in the banking and credit sector. In addition to these factors are, the 
nature of the financial regulatory regime, the credibility of the judicial system, the 
costs of foreclosure, the level of social stigma attached to foreclose properties, the 
willingness of people to purchase foreclosed properties, and the risk taking 
character of the credit organization. Many of these factors are not dependent on 
private rights and thus cannot be expected to be brought forth favourably by the 
creation of private rights. Thus until these other factors are already favourable it is 
unlikely that a credit market will emerge simply because titles have been 
individualised. Besides, lessons from the western world show that banks are now 
readily lending money increasingly on the basis of regularity of income. So, 
private property rights may no longer be even the prime collateral as 
conventionally presumed. Perhaps the availability of alternative means of regular 
income could more easily and conveniently be the basis for access to credit for the 
poor in Africa rather than making them simply "landfull". These major supply 
weaknesses place considerable doubts on the potential for individualised titles 
alone to promote the development of land markets, growth and poverty reduction. 
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Their creation can not thus be said to be supportive of the tenure development 
process. 
Better still, other studies point to the fact that land holdings in sub-Saharan Africa 
are relatively equitable under indigenous tenure (Quan, 2000). Much of the 
reported cases of land concentration in sub-Saharan Africa stemmed from 
government interventions (Bruce, 1987) or ethnic conflicts and conquests as in 
Rwanda, Nigeria and some areas of Kenya (Bruce, 1987; Dickerman, 1987, Shipton, 
1987). Nevertheless, Quart (2000) has lately noted "there is no clear correlation 
between the development of land markets and increasing concentration of land in 
few hands". On the contrary evidence abounds in countries like Kenya and parts 
of Uganda that land distribution has indeed become more equitable with the 
establishment of land markets (Quan, 2000). In another vein Migot-Adholla et al 
(1991) employed a cross sectional data from Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda in 1987-88 
to explore whether indigenous land rights systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are a 
constraint on productivity as claimed under the World Bank blue print policy. The 
study shows that very little empirical support exists for this view. Actually Bruce 
and Migot-Adholla (1994) shows that the main purpose for people, particularly 
farmers seeking formal title was generally to protect themselves and their 
investments from threats from the state (Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997, p. 549). 
On the question of subdividing and distributing government land holdings as 
proposed under the policy, the reality is that much of these lands were already in 
the hands of European settler farmers particularly in Southern and Eastern Africa 
and hence do not lend themselves to easy subdivision. The only way to break up 
such holdings into smaller holdings is for government to reacquire all those lands 
for redistribution or employ force to evict these beneficiaries as is happening in 
Zimbabwe both of which have proved more problematic than aforethought. The 
additional expropriations by postcolonial administration proved even more 
difficult to revert to customary holders. The vesting policies of Ghana and the 
Land Use Acts of Nigeria are good instances of this. 
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Clearly because this policy framework cuts adrift from the peculiar legitimate role 
of land reform policies (see supra) it ended up worsening the already policy 
induced distorted land tenure situation. 
2.6.4 The Fourth Generation Land Policies 
So far no policy regime has given the indigenous tenure system the chance to 
evolve; it has either been disrupted or reversed. This recognition has prompted a 
campaign from the 1990s to allow the indigenous system to gradually flourish on 
its own with non-intrusive support from government. The current prime ideology 
is that "rather than trying to replace local land-tenure systems with a "modern 
system of registration and title of ownership" local rights are to be recognised and 
controls of land handed back "to local communities" (Delville, Ouedraogo et al., 
2002). This new policy thinking has led to widespread enactments of new national 
policies and legislation in many African nations (IIED, 1999; Alden Wily, 2000; 
2003). The source of this fourth generation policy ideology is the reawakening to 
the fact that indigenous tenure offer a more cost effective solution to land market 
problems than freehold titles and subdivisions (Deininger and Binswanger, 1998). 
Potentially this new regime of policy represents the very first attempt after more 
than a century of disruption to give the indigenous tenure system opportunity to 
flourish and to confine government to its legitimate roles (Deininger, 2003). 
But this should never be perceived as easy to achieve in reality. Indeed there is 
every reason to urge caution not to repost too much confidence in the indigenous 
tenure system than it could actually deliver particularly when they have seen such 
material transformations through the long contact with formal policies. There is in 
fact the need to subject these new liberal policies to comprehensive ex-ante 
evaluation to ascertain their potential impacts in particular tenure context before 
implementation. This will prevent a situation where faults will only be detected 
several years after their implementation as has happened to their predecessor 
policy reforms. 
Even so, the success of this new wave of policy thinking depends on the resolve of 
national governments to undo the ills of all the three past land reforms. 
Government acquired lands for which compensation had not been paid has to be 
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returned to the rightful indigenous owners or due compensation paid for them. 
Else, this new policy thinking will lack real merits in countries as South Africa 
where as much as 87 percent of lands are currently held by the government. This 
means that in South Africa, under the current land holding arrangement this 
current liberal policy ethos can only realise a maximum of 13 percent of its 
potential impacts. 
Again, if the goal is to legitimise indigenous tenure forms then the focus must be 
on legitimising the rights of customary freeholders and their assigns whiles 
confining Chiefs also like the government to their administrative functions under 
applicable customary laws. In other words, the right to transfer the customary 
freehold must be legitimised as the exclusive rights of the customary freeholders 
not the Chiefs. The Chiefs must be prevented from unduly intermeddling with 
these rights. Both the releasing of government land and the de-vesting of Chiefs of 
their land allocation powers are clearly difficult impediments to remove, 
particularly as they struck at the core of the economic interest of the powerful, 
wealthy and influential. Surely, without any superior incentives there is very little 
reason to expect this to be accomplished. Then again to keep the indigenous tenure 
flourishing as expected, there is the need for a general macroeconomic stability as 
well as sensible and sound policies to provide the necessary preconditions for 
responsive evolutionary processes. However, with government still in possession 
of a large fragment of land holdings, particularly in countries where lands have 
been nationalised, widespread poor macroeconomic environments and Chiefs still 
in control over customary rights there is no denying the fact that, gains from these 
liberal policies are likely to remain greatly restricted. 
2.6.5 Policy Outcomes and Deficiencies in Past Studies 
For the reason that urban real estate policies are key to economic development of 
sub-Saharan Africa, the consequences of these policies have been extensively 
explored by researchers from academia (Asiama, 1980; 1984; 1990; Antwi, 1995; 
1996; 1998; 2000; 2003), the international donor community (Bruce, 1986; Bruce & 
Migot-Adholla, 1994; Hatch Associates, 2002) and policy practitioners (Larbi, 
1994). A number of outcomes of these policies have been pointed to in the 
literature. For instance the argument that land title and registration would 
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facilitate the development and economic efficiency of land markets is corroborated 
by many studies. 
Some studies have explored the linkages between titling and access to credit. Wai 
(1957), Dornor & Saliba (1981) and Feder et al (1988) found for instance strong 
correlation between land titling and access to credit. Others have looked at the 
absence of secured title and productivity and investment. Mosher (1966) for 
instance found that tenure security is an important source of low productivity in 
agriculture. Yet again, Salas et al (1970) also discovered a positive correlation 
between degree of ownership security and farm investment per unit of land. The 
link between titling and land values has also been looked at in the urban context. 
Jimenez (1984) for instance studied the impacts of titled urban housing and 
untitled urban housing in the city of Davao, the Philippines, using a sample of 
3344 households and found the value of titled houses to be 58% higher than 
untitled otherwise identical units. Some have found negative impacts of titling and 
registration in the developing world context. For instance Bruce (1988) establishes 
that in many African countries the most detrimental equity implications of titling 
programmes came about not through the operations of the land market but 
through land grabbing by influential individuals during the titling process. This 
means that formal title has often caused rather a great deal of insecurity. 
With regard to land expropriation or nationalization, some studies have found 
serious injustices meted out by these genre of policies with rights-holders in some 
cases losing access to vital resources, without compensation, sometimes to the 
benefit of other "social groups or urban elite" (Delville, Ouedraogo et al., 2002). 
There is ample evidence to show that in allocating or distributing such 
government landholdings the poor, vulnerable and marginalised have often been 
discriminated against in the interest of the politically influential, powerful and the 
rich (Brobbey, 1991; Larbi, 1994; Platteau, 1996; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; 
Antwi, 2000; Toulmin & Quart, 2000; Kasanga, 2002). Njoh (1985) for instance in an 
investigation of the rationale for land law reform as well as their implications for 
different societal groups in Cameroon established that policies such as land 
nationalisation are always skewed in favour of political and bureaucratic elites, 
entrepreneurs and the salaried at the expense of women in the informal sector, 
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ethnic minorities and the poor. Thus in Cameroon this has accentuated socio- 
economic inequities in the country (Njoh, 1998). Amanor (1998 p. 2) in a study of 
Structural Adjustment Programs and the changing political economy of land in 
West Africa discovered also that such policies have been "widely abused by the 
state organs to appropriate land for bureaucratic elites and their close business 
associates". Other studies have also concluded that the overriding objective of 
contemporary land redistribution policies is political and the economic 
considerations are often given less weight (Quan, 2000). 
Despite the increased interest in the economic implications of real estate policies in 
recent times, it is surprising that so little quantitative research has actually been 
conducted on the subject. This is not to presume that no quantitative assessment of 
the full economic impacts of these policies in sub-Saharan Africa has ever been 
undertaken. The literature hints in fact that the direct costs of these policies to the 
respective governments are not trivial. Toulmin and Quan (2000) for instance, 
found that in South Africa the annual costs of setting up and running the 
institution required by the Draft Land Bill is estimated at US$ 30 million. In 
Uganda, estimates of the program envisaged by the Land Bill came to US $400 
million. In Ghana, a Land Administration Project, currently underway, sponsored 
by the World Bank, DFID and other multilateral donor and credit agencies are 
estimated to cost US $55 million. These evidences of the direct costs to government 
could be just tips of a huge iceberg. A whole range of indirect costs associated 
with, for instance, misallocation of financial resources in the enforcement of these 
policies and programs, rent seeking waste and loss of opportunities to market 
participants remain unevaluated. So also are the direct and indirect costs that 
market participants will have to incur in complying with these programs and 
policies. 
Also while it is established that existing urban land and real estate policies in the 
region are contributing to reduced efficiency with negative equity implications 
(Brandao & Feder, 1995; Wily and Hammond, 2001) the real costs of these effects 
are unknown. What is known at the moment is that these policies are imposing 
very high and unrealistic compliance standards and requirements on market 
participants (Larbi, et a, 2003) resulting in high transaction costs (Antwi, 2000) and 
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lost opportunities say when market participants fail to or are unable to bear the 
costs of compliance with these policies. 
The recent quantitative study of urban land markets in sub-Saharan Africa by 
Antwi (2000) has produced an authoritative account of the legal impediments, and 
economic waste that existing sub-Saharan African urban real estate policies are 
imposing on customary landowners and market participants. De Soto (2000) has 
also estimated the total value of real estate held but not legally owned by the poor 
of the Third World and former communists nations to be at least US$9.3 trillion. 
This figure, it was intimated, is about ninety- three times as much as all 
development assistance from all advanced countries to the Third World in the past 
three decades (De Soto, 2000, p. 35). Yet, the true costs of these phenomena in sub- 
Saharan Africa per se remain unevaluated and unknown. Even more so the deeper 
costs they bring on individuals in these societies (Hammond, 2004). It will 
however be too simplistic to presume that the mere existence of extra costs to be 
met in land and real estate transaction by virtue of state policies necessarily make 
such policies economically unwise. It is only when these costs fall short of the 
benefits they bring that judgment of failure can be passed on such policies. 
Then again, although the costs of these policies appear very high their economic 
benefits alike remain largely unevaluated and unknown (Kasanga 2002). In 
practice, policy makers in the region are often lulled into a state of false confidence 
by the assumption of full cost recovery, poverty alleviation and economic growth 
through improved land tenure security and the establishment of an efficient land 
market (Mattingly, 1993; Hatch, 2001). Whether these benefits, which have formed 
the basis of huge investments in government policy interventions, are tangible, 
requires quantitative assessment. If these benefits were not to occur then it would 
bring into serious questioning the very need for the direct and indirect costs 
incurred on account of these policies and beg a further question whether these 
public and private funds could not have been put to better uses. This is even more 
critical in the light of the realisation that policies change the incentive structures of 
market participants and have overarching influence on the behavioural patterns of 
economic agents as regards the productive allocation and use of land resources, 
which will inexorably reflect in social welfare and economic growth (North, 1997; 
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Williamson, 1996). Consequently, when costs of these policies outweigh the 
benefits, they are likely to induce behavioural patterns that may undermine 
economic growth and poverty reduction. It is to bridge these gaps that this study 
is designed. 
2.7 SUMMARY 
The chapter commence with an examination of the growing urbanisation trends in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This was followed with a review of the place of land tenure in 
the development dialogue in Africa. The state of the real estate market of Africa 
was also reviewed in the light of the growing divergent views on the nature of the 
land tenure system in Africa. The chapter reviewed as well the policy instruments 
so far installed to deal with perceived problems of the tenure system. Yet the 
literature remains devoid of the quantitative evidence of their impacts. This thesis 
is an attempt at bridging this gap. The theoretical framework within which this 
thesis is driven is provided in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
The Theoretical Perspective 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 1 and 2 have established that full liberal and unregulated real estate 
markets are no longer in existence in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular Chapter 2 
establishes that the existing body of research attests to inadequate understanding 
of the full repercussions or economic impacts of these existing urban real estate 
policies in the sub-Saharan Africa region, objectively ascertained. What is 
commonplace in the literature is the growing malaise and dissatisfaction with 
existing policy frames in sub-Saharan Africa among researchers, international 
development agencies and policy experts. Even so, little universally acceptable 
conceptual work appears to exist within which the economic impacts of urban real 
estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa can be more systematically and consistently 
analysed with implications for reforms rationally derived. 
Without underpinning real estate research with a consistent set of robust and 
appropriately testable theory or conceptual works, it is unimaginable how deeper 
insights into the full economic implications of existing policies can be acquired. It 
is only when the evaluation of these policies are driven within such conceptual 
works that meaningful headways can be made in knowing the true economic 
consequences of existing policies and to come to a decision on the need for their 
expansion or contraction. A prerequisite for such a conceptual framework is its 
aptness in providing an appropriate model within which rational human 
behaviours and desirability of real estate policies can be appraised. In providing 
such a conceptual framework, the Coase Theorem is deemed a most useful 
prototype in view of its strength to offer a testable theoretical perspective from 
which greater insights into the economic impacts of current urban real estate 
policies in sub-Saharan Africa can be gained. The Coase theorem derives from the 
price theory. 
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3.2 APPLICATION OF PRICE THEORY TO URBAN REAL ESTATES 
The basis of economic theory is that commercial transactions are the prime drivers 
of economic growth such that the more frequently transactions take place the 
higher the potential for economic growth. The duty of the price system in urban 
real estate markets as in other markets is thus to facilitate transactions using price 
signals and in the end allocate real estate resources among the various competing 
uses and actors using property pricing as the main instrument of resource 
allocation (Balchin and Kieve, 1977; Balchin, Bull et al., 1995). Urban real estate 
markets are thus efficient if they perform these functions aptly. 
The price system deploys the ideas of spontaneous forces, competition, liberties 
and rational human behaviours to promote efficiency in resource allocation, 
reserving a limited role for the state on occasions when the free interplay of 
spontaneous forces are likely to lead to harmful or undesirable consequences 
(Friedman, 2002). While in essence, the price system had remained the main trunk 
of economic thought since ancient and medieval times (Dobb, 1963; Marx, 1964; 
Cameron, 1989; Blaung, 1997; Parsons, 2001) it was in the work of Adam Smith in 
1776 that the theory was first more coherently outlined. Following insights from 
Smith (1776) the remit of the theory has now practically widened making it even 
more apt for comprehending the ends to which government interventions in any 
economic field should be directed (Hayek, 1944; Coase, 1960; Pigou, 1962; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Mill, 1968; Keynes, 1968; Hartley and Tisdell, 1981; 
Friedman, 2002). 
The price system works on the thesis that everywhere, improvements in welfare 
and livelihoods are contingent on the efficiency with which scarce economic 
resources of society are allocated (Simon, 1979; Pejovich, 1997). It is imperative, to 
ensure economic growth, thus, for every society to possess the means by which its 
scarce resources can be most efficiently allocated. The real estate sector is one such 
sector where efficiency in the allocation of real estate related resources is critical to 
economic growth and a decent standard of living (Brandao & Feder, 1995). The 
collapse of socialism both in ideas and in application (Buchanan, 1995) has 
precipitated an emergent consensus among economists that the price system offers 
the best potential for resources allocation in all economic fields (Smith, 1776; 
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Pigou, 1962; Coase, 1966; Tisdell, 1974; Arrow, 1985; Feiwel, 1985; Pejovich, 1990; 
Connolly and Munro, 1999; Friedman, 2002). With reference to the real estate field 
the price system comprises all the opportunities of exchanging real estate interest 
for money which are known by all participants in the market situation to be 
available to them and relevant in orienting their attitudes to prices and to 
competition (Weber, 1964 p. 173). 
Like any other market, the price system in the real estate field operates in response 
to the interplay of the forces of demand and supply (Farvacque and MacAuslan, 
1992) to govern the exchange of real property rights. The price system is fairly 
active throughout Africa (see Chapter 1) and comprise the buying and selling of 
freeholds, leaseholds, rentals, pledging of property for credit, mortgaging land 
pooling and other arrangements between individuals, private companies and 
public institutions (Quan, 2000). The price system works on the assumption that 
the free interplay of spontaneous economic forces could lead invariably to the full 
employment and efficient utilization and distribution of resources thereby 
promoting the public interest better than any other means (Smith, 1776). 
Though what constitutes an efficient allocation of resources may be fraught with 
uncertainties and debate, economist largely agree that an efficient allocation of 
resources turns ultimately on whether particular resources are put to the use, that 
of all the feasible uses, offer the most benefit to society (Harberger, 1959; Leftwich, 
1973; Balchin & Kieve, 1977; Hallett, 1979; Arrow, 1985; Harvey, 1987). This 
connotes the idea that an allocation of a resource is regarded efficient, if the worth 
(benefits) of the alternative uses forgone at all times fall below the benefits derived 
from the selected allocation (Coase, 1972, p. 313). For example, land employed in 
the production of housing is efficiently allocated if the worth of the foregone uses 
say agriculture falls below that of housing. Economists usually adopt the Pareto 
criteria as a standard economic yardstick for measuring the allocation of resources 
in any particular society. As applied to real estate, the Pareto criterion posits an 
allocation of real estate resource to be efficient if it improves the welfare of at least 
one person in society without making another person worse off. By this index, an 
allocation of real estate resource is optimal if beyond what has been accomplished 
it is no longer possible to improve the welfare of any individual in society (in his 
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personal view) without making another person in the society worse off (in his 
personal view) (Tisdell, 1974; Connolly & Munro, 1999). Thus if by providing 
housing for one person in societies another person is made homeless or deprived 
health services then Pareto efficiency is not attained. 
Even so, the true state of a person's welfare is a subjective question. No one else 
apart from the particular individuals concerned can adequately tell by how much 
their welfare has been improved by virtue of particular allocation of real estate 
resource (Hayek, 1944). Thus it is only when the individual or individuals in 
particular societies agree that their welfare has been improved or been made worse 
off by a particular real estate resource allocation or decisions that one can pass 
judgment on the efficiency of the allocation. The importance of individual 
decisions concerning real estate can therefore not be overemphasised in the quests 
to understand the impacts government intervention that regulate or enfeeble such 
individual choices. 
That said, what better way can there be to truly improve the welfare of individuals 
in any society than to equip them, remove all impediments and restrictions on 
their path and to allow them to select from a range of options the real estate 
resource allocation that in their own judgement will better improve their well 
being. The price theory contends, because humans are essentially rational and 
mostly influenced in their decisions and actions by their innate inclination to better 
their welfare rather than diminish them, when given the opportunity are likely to 
choose the option that offer them the best utility rather than those that in their 
judgment will give them pain and displeasure and hence make them worse off 
(Smith, 1776; Jevon, 1856; Arrow, 1985). 
If well equipped and unrestrained when real estate market participants are 
confronted with such opportunity, they are likely to make such exchanges of their 
possessions (money or real property) that will be most beneficial to them. They are 
likely to desist or discontinue with particular exchanges they anticipate will most 
likely make them worse off. It is thus rational according to the price theory to 
expect real estate purchasers to pay just as much for a property as they perceive its 
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worth. Price thus serves as an index of the worth of a property to both the 
purchaser and the seller. 
The price that a purchaser offers for a property however is a composite figure 
implicit in it is the prices of all the important attributes that contributes to the 
perceived aggregate utility that it offers (Balchin & Kieve, 1977; Hallett, 1979; 
Harvey, 1987; Antwi, 1998). The utility that particular real estates offers vary 
according to the variations in location, size, materials of construction and 
workmanship among others (Von Thunen, 1826; Isard, 1956; Beckman, 1957; 
Alonso, 1964; Mutt, 1969; Mills, 1972; Balchin & Kieve, 1977; Hallett, 1979; Miyao, 
1981; Harvey, 1987; Kivell, 1993). So also are their prices. Thus for an urban 
property with utility influencing attributes of say: (1) location (LOC), (2) 
Neighbourhood (NEI), (3) Taste and Preference of purchaser (TAP), (4) Price of 
comparable properties (PCOMP) (5) the income of the purchaser (IOP), (6) the 
expectations of purchaser regarding future income prospects from the property 
(EXP), and (7) subsisting property rights (PPR) among others, the price that 
purchasers are willing and able to pay (demand price) can be represented 
functionally as: 
DI, =f (LOC, NEI, TAP, PCOMP, IOP, EXP, PPR... N) [1] 
In which Dp is the Demand Price. 
Similarly, owners of real properties will normally sell their properties only at a 
price (supply price) equivalent to the value they place on the property (Coase, 
1960; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Demsetz, 1967; Harberger, 1972; Hartley & 
Tisdell, 1981; Parsons, 2001; Harberger and Jenkins, 2002). Given that the factors 
that influence their decisions include: (1) the quantity of property available (QA V), 
(2) Cost of construction of property (COC), (3) Profit margin (PM), (4) Investment 
risk (IR) (5) Price of comparable properties (POCP) and, (6) subsisting property 
rights (PPR) among others, the supply price function can be represented as: 
Sp =f (QA V, COC, PM, IR, POCP, PPR... N) [21 
In which Sp represents the Supply Price 
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Ideally, equilibrium urban property prices Ep, the price at which real property 
resources are most efficiently allocated will be achieved through voluntary 
haggling they will eventually bring equation [1] in line with equation [2] (see 
Smith, 1776; Coase, 1937; 1960; Tisdell, 1974; Arrow, 1985; Friedman, 2002). That is, 
demand price will ultimately equal supply price in the ideal world. 
Ep =Dp =Sp [31 
In which EP is the equilibrium price. This is represented graphically in Figure 3-1 
below. In the Figure take SS to be the aggregate supply function for particular type 
of real estate and DD as the demand function. The equilibrium or stationary price 
EP will be established at the point where SS = DD and at that point the social 
optimum quantity (Q) of that particular property type will be produced and sold. 





At this point, the highest value or usefulness of the property to purchasers 
becomes equivalent to the highest value that suppliers place on the property. This 
equilibrium price indicates the highest value that purchasers place on the 
property. If the sale is concluded at this price, it becomes an indicator of the value 
that both purchasers and sellers alike place on the property. That said, in many 
economic fields including the urban real estate field particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the price system is vulnerable and highly susceptible to failure in many 
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respects. It is this shortcoming of the price system that has given rise to the need 
for government involvement in real estate resource allocation. 
3.3 ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC POLICY IN REAL ESTATE MARKETS 
To begin with, the efficiency of the price system is contingent on an assumption of 
availability of full information equally accessible at no cost to all market 
participants (Friedman, 2002). As Simon (1957) however established, it is 
impossible in the real world for market participants to be in possession of perfect 
knowledge of all market events at the same time in view of the bounded 
rationality of the human mind as well as the costs differentials in procuring such 
information. Thus, market transactions are inexorably carried out with incomplete 
information thereby making it difficult for equilibrium prices to be accomplished. 
Moreover, in any market, there are often income disparities between transacting 
parties and market bids may tend to be driven more by income constraints than by 
utility (Arrow, 1985). Thus in such situation the person with a higher income 
position usually assumes a position of strength and power and can easily influence 
the outcome of market transaction to the detriment of other less resourced 
transacting parties thereby reducing the chances of achieving equilibrium prices. 
Moreover, people may own property rights for non-economic reasons and may 
simply be unwilling to trade those rights away due probably to the strong 
emotional and sentimental ties they may have with particular properties thereby 
withholding those properties from the market for non-economic reasons. Besides, 
the nature of institutional framework within which land and real estate is held 
may allow the exploitation of owners of property rights by certain privileged and 
influential actors. In sub-Saharan Africa for instance, traditional authorities 
owning land in trusteeship are spurred on by economic incentives to dispose of 
these lands at the expense of the beneficiaries who loose their lands and gain in 
most cases very little from the sale. This leads to social injustice and exacerbation 
of income inequities. 
Even so, without a well-clarified and enforced property rights system, urban real 
estate markets cannot function effectively. This is essentially because by definition 
urban property rights sets the limits for the degree of freedom and liberty that a 
person has over particular property as well as the rules for trade (Davis and North, 
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1971). They prescribe behavioural rules, constrain activities and shape expectations 
of market participants (Keohane, 1988). Property rights also "facilitate 
coordination among people by helping them form expectation which each person 
can reasonably hold in dealing with others" (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984). Urban real 
property rights thus offer property owners the incentive, opportunities and reward 
for productive use of urban land resources. However in sub-Saharan Africa, 
indeed the developing world in general property rights in land are mostly in 
defined and ill-enforced (Feder & Feeney, 1991; Platteau, 1992; Brandao & Feder, 
1995; Deininger, 2003) making the workings of the price system problematic. 
Finally, real estate markets like most markets when allowed to operate 
unrestrained tend to promote market monopoly, the production of negative 
externalities, the inadequate supply of public goods and the exacerbation of 
income inequities (Smith, 1776; Richardson, 1960; Pigou, 1962; Tisdell, 1974; 
Hartley & Tisdell, 1981; Williamson, 1986; Friedmann, 1987; Hodgson, 1988; Kivell, 
1993; Sawyer, 1994; Denyer-Green, 1998; Connolly & Munro, 1999; Friedman, 
2002). 
The existence of these shortcomings of the price system has been conventionally 
adduced as justification for government intervention because their mere existence 
makes market competition, improbable, significantly restricted, practically 
impossible or harmful (Richardson, 1960). These shortcomings cause not only a 
failure in the establishment of equilibrium prices but in addition cause instability 
in real property prices. When this occurs the price system is unable to allocate 
resources efficiently in the Pareto sense with associated telling consequences. As 
exemplified instead of establishing equilibrium price PD at point E, the existence of 
these elements of market failures ensure that either the demand prices or the 
supply prices or both constantly gravitate away from point E to such points as b, c, 
d, e, f, g or h in Figure 3-2. 
If for instance the demand function Do, is shifted to say Di while the supply 
function (So) remains unaffected the equilibrium position distorts to say c forcing 
the equilibrium price to move upward to P2. The true magnitude of the distortion 
is indicated by PoP2 c M. accordingly, resource allocation efficiency is distorted that 
much. Conversely if the failure causes the demand function to shift leftwards of 
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the equilibrium to say D2, a distortion equivalent to say PoMePi occurs. On the 
supply side, if the failure resulted in a shift in the supply curve from its 
equilibrium position So to say S1 with demand remaining unchanged; a shift in the 
equilibrium condition equivalent to say PoMePi occurs which will accordingly 
reduce the efficiency of resource allocation. 








Moreover, if the elements of market failure cause a shift in the supply curve to say 
S2 a consequential distortion in resource allocation equivalent to say PoP2aM will 
ensue. In extreme situations, these elements could precipitate a shift in both the 
demand and supply functions at the same time and this could cause a shift in the 
equilibrium position to any point say b, d, f or h. It is worthy of note that this is a 
highly simplified version of what pertains in reality. In practice, these elements of 
market failure could result in hundreds and thousands of points of distortions in 
the equilibrium position for particular types of real estate commodities. The wider 
away these points of distortions from the equilibrium point (E) the higher the 
degree of inefficiency that is introduced into the allocation of resources. 
Microeconomic theory suggests that if such market distortions occur or there is 
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strong evidence to suggest that they are likely to occur, a means has to be found to 
either suppress them or eliminate them altogether by dealing with the 
shortcomings that are reproducing them. Such an improvement according to the 
Pareto criteria should improve the welfare of at least one person in the society 
without loss to any one else. To implement such a change or improvement, it may 
be necessary to conjecture that the net gainers from the improvement can at least 
compensate the net losers (Buchanan, 1995). 
Conventional view based on (Pigou, 1962) perceives government interventions as 
the most rational potent and independent entity which is better positioned to deal 
with these problems. This view accordingly suggests that government 
interventions have the capacity to pull all instances of distortions to point E in 
Figure 3-2 without making any one worse off or with the guarantee that the sum of 
gainers will exceed the sum of the losers. To the extent that government 
interventions are directed towards and are able to accomplish this objective, the 
interventions are considered economically worthwhile and it is only by such 
criteria that government policies in real estate market in sub-Saharan Africa can be 
considered worthwhile from microeconomic perspective. Successful government 
interventions must succeed in mopping up all existing deviation in the demand 
functions such as abde and ahfe respectively and that of the supply functions such 
as cdfg and ghbc. This will ensure that the aggregate demand and supply functions 
in these markets are pulled (see direction of arrows in Figure 3-3) permanently to 
coincide and stick with Do and So respectively. 
3.4 THE SHORTCOMINGS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 
The design of appropriate government interventions can be problematic to the 
extent that on occasions it brings into serious questioning the very suitability of 
government interventions as the only option in correcting market failures (see for 
instance Coase, 1960). The manifold recorded instances of government failures in 
urban sub-Saharan Africa real estate markets, indeed the developing world (De 
Soto, 1989) bear evidence to this assertion. Brandao and Feder (1995, p. 191) have in 
fact come to the conclusion that, "land market... regulatory 
constraints... significantly affect the operation of the market and equilibrium prices 
and sales, contribute to reduced efficiency and have negative equity implications". 
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Microeconomic theory provides insights into the practical events that undermine 
chances of securing optimal or appropriate government interventions in most 
economic fields. 
Firstly, to be able to devise interventions that could induce a desirable shift in the 
points of market distortions there is the need for a vast amount of information 
(Simon, 1957). For instance in Figure 3-3 (see the direction of the arrows) 
information on all occurrences of market distortions say points b, c, d, e, f, g or h, 
the precise location of these distortions in reference to the equilibrium position E, 
measured extents of the deviations from the equilibrium abde, cdfg, efha or ghbc, 
the elements of market failures at play and the avenues through which they distort 
the market. 







The information requirements are vast and not easy to come by in practice. 
Moreover, the dynamism and spontaneity of human behaviour (Smith, 1776) 
imply that information in markets changes so frequently that they have a very 
short life span. To be most useful, when the right information is procured (if at all 
possible), it is argued (see Parsons, 2003), that the information needs to be 
quantitatively and thoughtfully analyzed in a way that would ensure that 
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predictions of desirable future events on markets can be accurately foretold and 
undesirable future events pre-empted. For all that has been written about market 
failure, the literature is still devoid of any positivists or post-positivists means of 
achieving this information and analysis. This is because in practice as Hayek (1944) 
and Simon (1957) points out it requires the mind of omniscience to be able to 
accomplish that and since governments are far from omniscience, there is very 
little reason to expect government policy experts to be able to devise rational 
policies to correct market failures in the Pareto sense. 
Worse still, public choice scholarship (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) has more 
forcefully confirmed in recent times that politicians who are the initiators and 
custodians of government interventions are often impatient in waiting for the 
rather long period of time required to gather sufficient information (even for what 
they are worth) for second best policy solutions to be devised (McNutt, 2002). 
Meanwhile public policies and government interventions emerge out of a complex 
decision making process in which the respective participants have different and 
often conflicting ideological orientation, interest and values. They thus often 
disagree with what may be causing particular market failures or what indeed the 
solution should be. They each influence policies in the direction of their ideological 
orientation, interest and value rather than towards the correction of market failure 
per se. Thus policies tend to be rarely value neutral, neither are they usually 
devised on pure economic considerations as expected of market failure oriented 
policies. Instead, they are often creations or instruments designed to meet 
particular interest or ideological ends (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). When policies 
happen to be market failure focused, it may be because the most influential agenda 
setters in the policy process have rightly perceived market failure as an urgent 
problem for the government to tackle or mere coincidental. However, such 
occasions appear to be very rare in practice (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Thus, it 
is more likely to be the case that policies emerge to serve private interest rather 
than to address market failure. 
It is now well known in microeconomic theory that policies designed to serve 
specific private interest or based on doubtful information rather than addressing 
market failure often end up concentrating benefits on a few while diffusing the 
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costs on the larger society (Wilson, 1972). This in effect leads to the divergence 
between the private and social costs thereby accumulating huge overall social costs 
than benefit. On this score, Coase (196o, p. 118) argues, "direct government 
interventions will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be 
solved by the market or firm". Pigou (1962, p. xix) went even further to state that. 
The mere failure of private industry, when left free from 
public interference to maximise the national dividend does not 
of itself warrant interventions; for this might make things 
worse. 
This potential harmful side effect of government interventions is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 3-4. Take line PMC to represent the private marginal costs 
borne by the small (Politician, political parties, interests groups, voters, 
bureaucrats, etc) in whose favour particular policies are designed to serve. In 
addition, SMC is the social marginal cost incurred by society on account of the 
policy. Line MB represents the marginal benefits of the policy. As Lipsey (1993) 
asserts governments are slow in admitting mistakes even when they are aware of 
them. This is because, it is often politically easier to go on spending money on a 
project that has turned sour than to admit fault. This often leads to the reliance on 
wrong policies or enforcement methods arising from initial mistakes in the choice 
of policy or methods of enforcement or because market conditions have changed 
while policies remain the same. The potential economic problems associated with 
that are illustrated in Figure 3-4 . The costs of every improvement 
brought about 
by such policies exceed its benefits by the amount BAD. In such situation the result 
is worse than no intervention indicated by C1CA. While the best possible 
intervention could have produced a net gain, wrong policy choice and methods of 
enforcement can produce a net loss. 
Wrong policies choices could convert the gains from intervention into losses. MB 
represents the marginal benefit achieved from particular policy. Assume that this 
is at constant prices. MCl represents the marginal costs of introducing and 
enforcing the policy. For all units up to q, marginal costs exceed marginal benefits. 
The optimal level of policy is thus q1, where MB = MCl. Total net benefits are 
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OCBgl. Suppose government specifies a method or policies that lead to a shift in 
marginal costs to MC4 when costs shown by MCl could have been achieved using 
different policies or methods of enforcement the optimal improvement in the 
market performance could reduce to q4. The net benefits are then reduced to 
C1CA14. This failure could be compounded if this high costs methods or policies 
continue to dictate proceedings on urban real estate markets. 
The costs of every improvement brought about by such policies exceed its benefits 
by the amount BAD. In such situation the results are worse than no intervention 
indicated by C1CA. While the best possible intervention could have produced a net 
gain, wrong policy choice and methods of enforcement can produce a net loss. 





q4 41 Market improvement 
Adapted from Lipsey (1993, p. 416) 
Besides, public choice scholarship demonstrates that by far the most important 
causes of government failure arise from the nature of the government as a policy 
making and enforcing entity. Figure 3-5 depicts the way externalities can occur in 
policy formulation. The x-axis represents the policy levels whiles the y-axis 
indicates the benefits from policies. Functions MB, PMC and SMC represent the 
marginal benefits, private marginal costs and social marginal costs associated with 
policies respectively. Policy agenda setters seeking to maximise their private self- 
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interest or accomplish particular ideological ends by securing a policy in their own 
favour could push for policies that would ensure their optimal satisfaction (P°). 
At this level the benefits of the policy to them is (B1) whiles the private costs is (c). 
Yet, the social cost borne by society in view of this policy could be as high as point 
B, which is far above the costs borne by the agenda setters as well as the benefits 
derived from the policy. The result is thus that benefits are concentrated on a few 
whiles the costs are widely spread on larger segments. The divergence between the 
social marginal benefits and the social marginal costs (B-C) provides an indication 
of the negative impacts that such policy is likely to induce. 








Such policies are likely to result in a social welfare loss equivalent to triangle ABC, 
representing the externality, associated with such private interest centered policies. 
Yet, if policies had been designed at say (Pl) the price system would have been 
able to ensure societal benefits of say (B2) which would have been equivalent to the 
costs of the policy to society. The economic implication here is that by devising 
policies to serve the private interest of agenda setter (clients) as opposed to 
correcting market failure society is often made worse off by a margin of (Bi -B2). 
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3.5 THE COASE THEOREM 
The Coase Theorem controverts the conventional view that posits government 
interventions as the potent panacea to all forms of market malfunctioning (Pigou, 
1920; Arrow, 1985). The Coase Theorem was more coherently enunciated in Coase 
(1960) even though its essential ingredients were first formally laid out in Coase 
(1937). The theory has since been popularised and applied in many economic fields 
(see Stigler, 1966, p. 113; Calabresi, 1968, p. 68; Posner, 1993, p. 195). Transaction 
costs in this regard comprise the costs of discovering relevant urban property 
prices and ownership status, costs of negotiating and concluding separate urban 
real estate contracts (Coase, 1937 ), costs of policing and enforcement of contracts 
as well as surveying and measuring valuable attributes of urban properties. It also 
includes the costs of protecting property rights as well as the opportunity costs of 
non-fulfilment of an efficient transaction (Dahlman, 1979, p. 148; North, 1990, p. 27; 
Rao, 2003, p. xvi). 
Following its earliest formulation, various authors have reframed the theorem to 
place it in particular contexts. The theory states: 
In a regime of zero transaction costs [and rationality], 
negotiation between the parties would lead to those 
arrangements being made which would maximise wealth and 
this will occur irrespective of the initial assignment of rights 
(Coase, 1992, p. 717). 
In other words, if market dealers behave rationally, real estate markets would 
perform efficiently if the costs of real estate transactions are zero regardless of who 
owns property in particular societies. It is worth emphasising the point that, the 
theory is not oblivious to the fact that in the real world transaction costs are rarely 
zero, certainly not in the real estate arena. Indeed, it recognises that on occasions 
transaction costs could be so high as to prevent transactions from occurring 
altogether (see Rao, 2003). The theory postulates instead thus, in every economic 
field, the lower the transaction costs the higher the potential for efficient outcomes. 
This implies that rational commercial transactions are the single most important 
engine for economic growth such that the more frequently they occur, the higher 
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the chances of realising economic growth and efficiency. Markets distort and slow 
down transactions because they are impeded by the existence of transaction costs 
in the real world. Thus to promote frequent transactions, societies must be in 
possession of means to drive down transaction costs as low as possible. Such a 
means could be from the private sector or governmental sources such as 
government interventions or policies (Coase, 1966, pp. 442-5). From an efficiency 
standpoint the choice between the government and the private sector would have 
to be made purely on the basis of their abilities to make considerable progress in 
driving down transaction costs having regard to the transaction costs they also 
bring about in their strides. Thus the economic gains associated with the selected 
means are the extra transaction costs savings they engendered. Alternatively the 
economic gains can be in terms of the extra benefits they bring about. 
Thus that government interventions have a role to play in real estate market 
functioning within the ken of the Coase Theorem derives from the common 
knowledge that on occasions they are better placed to drive down transaction costs 
in comparison to the private sector. Coase (1992, p. 718) for instance points out that 
government interventions could legitimately reduce transaction costs through the 
clarification of laws and by making legal requirements for market transfers less 
onerous. There is evidence that government interventions formed on this basis 
have infused trading confidence into otherwise problematic trading relations (see 
for example Goldberg, 1976 and Zucker, 1986). Williamson (1996, p. 268) also notes 
that provided the regulatory framework is appropriate, both the public bureaux 
and their customers "would be able to make investment in specialised assets on 
better terms than they would in the absence of such regulations". To this view, 
such government interventions must neither be inconsistent nor replace the use of 
the price system (Hayek, 1944; Coase, 1966, pp. 442) but rather prop it up for its 
smoother performance. As Coase (1988, p. 27) puts it, "the aim of economic policy 
is to ensure that people when deciding which course of action to take [will] choose 
that which brings about the best outcome for the system as a whole". 
3.6 FRAMEWORK FOR REAL ESTATE POLICY EVALUATION 
As applied to urban real estate policy analysis, three main lessons can be drawn 
from the above analysis. (1) Though the price system offers the best potential in 
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allocating urban real estate resources more efficiently, it is not a perfect system and 
on occasions could experience failure with attendant harmful consequences. (2) 
Yet, government interventions, which are the only known panacea to such market 
shortcomings, are also not perfect either. They are prone to failure with attendant 
undesirable consequences. Some economists have argued that government failure 
even causes more damage to societal wellbeing than market failure (Coase, 1960; 
Calabresi, 1968, p. 68). (3) The Coase Theorem contends that markets can 
internalise their own shortcomings had transaction costs been zero. The presence 
of transaction costs in the price system presents formidable impediment for 
markets to self correct their failures. 
Thus changes in transaction costs on account of particular policies serve as the 
explicit proxies for estimating the economic impacts of particular real estate 
policies. In addition to the transaction costs mentioned above government 
interventions also come at costs, which also have to be factored in the calculation. 
The most notable costs associated with government interventions include the costs 
of establishing and running policy enforcement institutions (see Coase, 1960, p. 44; 
Arrow, 1969, p. 48). To test the validity of the Coase Theorem in urban sub-Saharan 
African real estate policy, it is important to compare the change in transaction costs 
with the change in benefits associated with the policy. Accordingly, for urban sub- 
Saharan Africa real estate policies to be declared efficient, they should not push the 
extra transaction costs incurred on account of the policy beyond the extra benefits 
generated by the policy. Alternatively, benefits forgone due to the policy should 
not exceed the transaction costs saved on account of the policy (see further 
Harberger, 2002). 
The benefits of particular policies are inclusive of the measure of the improvement 
in welfare of individuals affected by the policy. To evaluate urban real estate 
impacts however the three basic postulates of welfare economics (Harberger & 
Jenkins, 2002) can be deployed and made more relevant to real estate markets. The 
postulate stipulates: 
1. The voluntary (competitive) demand price of an urban real estate policy 
represents the value of the policy to individuals affected by the policy 
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2. The voluntary (competitive) supply price of a policy represents the value 
placed on the policy by the supplier of the policy 
3. To obtain a measure of net benefits or costs for an aggregate or individuals 
or for SSA society as a whole, one simply adds up (across the individuals 
in the relevant group) the costs and benefits measured according to 1 and 
2 
In Figure 3-3, the x-axis denotes the benefits that affected individuals derived from 
urban real estate policies, P. The y-axis denotes the transaction costs associated 
with particular urban real estate policies. DD and SS represent the demand and 
supply for policy P respectively. Assume that the level of transaction costs 
pertaining on particular urban SSA real estate market before the introduction of 
the policy concerned is TCm with the associated benefits of Bm. If the policy raised 
transaction costs to say TCi the benefits derived from policy, P will be say B1. 
Accordingly, the extra transaction costs attributable to the P can be measured as 
OTCm minus OTC1. The extra transaction costs generate a reduction in benefits from 
OBm to OB1. 





Benefits from policy (demand price) 
The scale of the benefit forgone on account of the policy is equal to OBm minus OB1. 
At these levels of costs and benefits, since extra transaction costs brought about by 
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P is far higher than the associated benefit, (negative benefit) the policy is inefficient 
by the criterion of the Coase theorem. At such a high transaction costs policy 
suppliers will be oversupplying policy at a level that should be generating benefits 
of B51. Since the actual benefits received from the policy, Bi is far less than the 
expected benefit, B51, it implies that the resources used in the supply of the policy 
are not all translating into efficient or tangible benefits. Some level of waste of 
resources will thus be occurring in the course of supplying the policy. Conversely, 
if the policy reduced transaction costs from its original level of TCm to TC2 the cost 
saved on account of the policy is given by OTCm minus OTC2. The benefit or 
demand price implication of this phenomenon is that, an extra benefit of up to OB2 
is generated. The actual scale of the benefit can be measured as OBm minus OB2. By 
the Coase Theorem criterion since the policy induce savings in transaction costs as 
well as increased benefits beyond what existed before the policy, the policy is 
worthwhile. At this level rationality suggests that policy suppliers may be 
unwilling to supply in a sustainable manner, policies at this benefit and 
transaction costs levels. They will thus be most willing to supply at benefit levels 
B52. In a competitive environment the interplay of demand and supply forces will 
ultimately lead to a policy, demand and supply level at which at least the 
transaction costs equates the benefits. That is at a level where supply price equals 
demand price. 
Having outlined the conceptual dynamics a means has to be found to measure the 
actual demand and supply prices associated with particular urban real estate 
policies in reality. This will enable an understanding of the actual level at which 
the concerned policies are being supplied and consumed together with their 
welfare implications. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
The Coase Theorem as presented in this paper is a proposition that provides a 
systematic view of the ends to which urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa should be directed by specifying the relations between transaction costs and 
economic outcomes. It presents transaction costs as the focal variable for 
measuring the efficiency of urban real estates. In employing insights from the 
theorem to analyse urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa adequate 
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understanding of the true economic impacts of particular policies can be gained. 
The theorem will also ultimately help in identifying urban real estate policies that 
are, in fact, to the best interest of particular sub-Saharan Africa economies. Before 
turning to the analysis of these policies it is vital that these policies are examined in 
more detail to establish their nature and intended objectives. This is the end to 
which Chapter 4 is directed. 
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Chapter 4 
The Political Economy of Sub-Saharan Africa Real Estate Policies 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In seeking to provide indications of the quantitative measures of the economic 
impacts of real estate policies section 1.6 of Chapter 1 raised seven key research 
questions for inquiry in this study. The task of this chapter is to address the first 
two of these questions notably: (1) what are the range of real estate policies in sub- 
Saharan Africa? (2) are there relationships between the historical origins of these 
policies and their economic consequences? To accomplish this, the Chapter draws 
on insights from transaction costs, the theoretical framework for this study 
(Chapter 3) and public policy theories to explain the historical origins of these 
policies and make predictions about their potential consequences. The Chapter, on 
the basis of this analysis derives a generic taxonomy for empirical evaluation of the 
economic impacts of these policies which gives due regard to the copious nature of 
real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa and the region's peculiar data limitations. 
The taxonomy devised is employed subsequently as the basis for evaluating 
impacts of real estate policies in Chapters 7 and 8. 
It is well established in contemporary economic theory that real estate policies, like 
all forms of government interventions are desirable only on occasions of true 
market failures and excessive transaction costs. Yet in reality, extensive research 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984b; Rose, 1986; Nakamura, 1987; Stone, 1989; Jenkins- 
Smith, 1990; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Stone, 1996; Dye, 1998; Sutton, 1999; 
Parsons, 2003) have established that policies, whether in sub-Saharan Africa or in 
advanced capitalists economies, are determined largely on political considerations, 
albeit a few are devised on economic grounds. The indications from this realisation 
are that, in any particular economic field, there could be as many and diverse 
policies as there may be economic ends, political ideologies, values and interests. 
Whiles such influences pervade all policy environments across the world it is the 
scale of their influence on real estate policy formation and outcomes in sub- 
Saharan Africa that give cause for concern. It is thus pertinent, under the current 
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climate of poverty alleviation and economic development to appreciate how these 
variables have transmuted into economic costs and benefits to dictate the economic 
well being of respective sub-Saharan Africa economies. It is self-evident that, the 
acquisition of such understanding cannot be suitably accomplished without first 
devising a handy classification of these real estate policies in a way that ensures 
the derivation of maximum information about their economic impacts without 
necessarily bringing each one of them into the calculus. 
The starting point for this formulation is to establish a definition of what is 
perceived as real estate policies. Following this, an examination of the policy 
processes that have shaped real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa is conducted. 
Based on this examination the social costs of the monopolistic nature of the policy 
environment in sub-Saharan Africa are also examined. This is then followed up 
with the formulation of taxonomy to provide a generic basis for real estate policy 
impacts measurement in sub-Saharan Africa. As shall be explicated in the Chapter 
such taxonomy is crucially needed if a more comprehensive and yet simplified 
evaluation of sub-Saharan Africa real estate policies can be attained. The Chapter 
ends with concise conclusions drawn from the detailed discussions. 
4.2 REAL ESTATE POLICY DEFINED 
In Chapter 1a tentative definition of real estate policy was provided with a 
proviso that a more formal definition will be derived in this Chapter. This formal 
definition is vital to clarify what real estate policy means in order that the 
succeeding discussions can be appropriately contextualised. Public policy as such, 
whether in the field of real estate or any other discipline is not a self-evident term 
(Heclo, 1972) and does not lend itself to easy definition. The concept is nebulous in 
that it connotes different things in different contexts. Hogwood and Gunn (1984, 
p. 13-19) for instance identified 10 different contexts in which the term has been 
employed in recent times. Added to its inexactness is the diverse disciplinary 
perspective from which the term has been explained in recent times. Dror (1989, 
pp. 320-326) for instance listed some twenty-three different disciplines and 
perspectives from which the definition and analysis of policy can be approached. 
These have culminated in many assorted definitions of the term in the literature 
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(Gunn, 1966; Heidenheimer, Heclo et al., 1975; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984b). Heclo 
(1972) provides a comprehensive review and critique of these repertoires of 
definitions. That said, this Chapter draws insights from the definition offered by 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 23-24), which was itself based on a review and 
synthesis of a number of different versions of definitions of the term, to provide a 
working definition of real estate policies. This definition is found most suitable 
because it is all encompassing. It crystallises into one framework the most eminent 
definitions of the concept in the policy literature giving due cognisance to their 
peculiar emphasis and diverse perspectives. It thus offers a much more generic 
outlook of the concept which is supportive of the generic approach to real estate 
policy evaluation advanced in this Chapter. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 23-24), defined public policy as: 
"... comprising a series of patterns of related decisions to 
which many circumstances and personal, group and 
organizational influences have contributed [and] must to some 
degree have been generated or at least processed within the 
framework of governmental procedures, influences and 
organisations". 
In working towards a definition for real estate policies in this study three other 
crucial attributes of policies not explicit in the definition offered by Hogwood and 
Gunn (1984) needs noting. Firstly it is imperative to recognise that public policies 
are decisions that emanate from and are in some instances enforced exclusively by 
governmental agencies. Secondly, public policies are often contained in legislation 
or government authoritative documents or papers. Thirdly, in this Chapter real 
estate is conceived of as including land and all its immovable appurtenances. 
Putting all these together, this Chapter defines real estate policies as: 
All government sanctioned and legally enforceable related 
decisions emanating from and implemented by governmental 
agencies, exclusively or in partnership, contained in 
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enactments, edicts, authoritative documents, procedures and 
influences that regulates real estate market proceedings. 
Having established a working definition for real estate policies taxonomy for these 
policies as they exist in sub-Saharan Africa they can now be formulated based on 
their particular attributes. However since attributes of policies are the end results 
of a rather long policy processes, it will be instructive to deduce the classes of real 
estate policies from the operative policy process in sub-Saharan Africa. To this end, 
the ensuing section provides an account of the nature of the policy process in sub- 
Saharan Africa and how they have shaped the classes of real estate policies in the 
region. This will draw attention to the true ends of extant real estate policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa, their intended benefits and costs of the policies, those on 
whom benefit are intended to be concentrated as well as those intended to bear the 
costs of the policy. 
4.3 THE POLICY PROCESS 
Policy processes vary from society to society and from one political systems to 
another (Cobb and Elder, 1972; Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). 
However, conventionally, the analyses of policies have emerged essentially along 
two main paths: (1) the rationalists approach and (2) the pluralists approach. The 
applicability of these two approaches in addressing the above research questions 
together with their costs and benefits inferences is explored in this section as a 
basis for the formulation of the taxonomy. 
4.3.1 The Rationalists' Policy Process 
The rationalists approach to policy analysis evolved essentially from the 
neoclassical economic tradition. The approach views policy processes as consisting 
of a comprehensive and systematic series of activities starting with problem 
identification, agenda setting, definition of objectives, options, decisions and 
consequences (Laswell, 1956; Simon, 1957; Mack, 1971; Jenkins, 1978; Hogwood 
and Gunn, 1984a, Rose, 1986). Policy formation is thus perceived in this model as 
identical to the systems approach to decision making (Dye, 1998; Peters, 1999; 
Rushefsky, 2002) and rational problem solving (Carley, 1987). The approach 
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proceeds on the assumption that policies are independent variables devised 
through objectively established rationalists procedures to address an objectively 
identified problem (Merton and Nisbet, 1961; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977 p. 37). To 
this end, policies are rational value-neutral instruments objectively devised to 
correct market failures and inequities, lower excessive transaction costs and to 
promote the public interest in a Pareto efficient manner. This implies that real 
estate policies, for instance, will only be enacted on occasions of apparent or 
reliably predicted market failures and excessive transaction costs. Policies enacted 
under this model are thus regarded potentially Pareto efficient with invariable 
positive net benefits (Carley, 1987). Thus when such policies fail to accomplish 
Pareto efficient outcomes it may be owed to incorrect problem identification, 
wrong selection of policy objectives, the use of unreliable data, the employment of 
inappropriate methods of analysis and the wrong choice of solution. 
While this process is theoretically and conceptually logical, systematic research has 
recognized that in practice, this approach is seldom followed even in developed 
economies where the information and technological means for using the approach 
are readily available (Cobb & Elder, 1972; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). The approach 
has also seen very little practical application in the context of sub-Saharan Africa 
(see Glickman, 1988). Gulhati and Yalamanchili (1988) for instance attributes the 
non practical application of this approach in Africa to "the acute scarcity of 
professional skills and institutional capacity for (1) clarifying policy objectives; (2) 
diagnosing policy distortions; (3) detailing specific measures and taking legal or 
administrative action to implement them; and (4) monitoring the results of the new 
policies with a view to obtaining feedback for the next instalment of reforms". 
Based on its limited application in practice, the rationalists approach serve only 
theoretical purposes and has been described as "a dignified myth, which helps the 
researcher towards a comfortable life" (Gordon, Lewis et al., 1977). The approach 
thus offers very little help in trying to provide an understanding of the forces that 
have shaped real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa and to classifying and 
explaining the nature of real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa. This is even 
more so, given that in Africa the political system, rather than rational analysis, has 
been accredited as the paramount determinant of public policies (Findlay, 1991). 
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The pluralist model is thus viewed as most appropriate in explaining the sub- 
Saharan Africa real estate policy process and this is considered below. 
4.3.2 The Pluralists Policy Process 
The pluralists approach views public policies as the outcome of free competition 
between ideas and interest of many actors involved in the policy decision-making 
process in particular societies (Parsons, 2003). The composition of the actors in the 
policy process varies from society to society and may consist of public opinion 
(Gunn, 1989), the media, experts and professionals including think tanks (Wilding, 
1982; Friedson, 1986), bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1984), interest groups (Sutton, 1999) 
and politicians and voters (Downs, 1957). Each policy actor holds peculiar 
ideologies, values and interests that are often in conflict with those of others (Dahl 
and Lindblom, 1953). Policy formation accordingly turns on pluralism, mutual 
adjustment, consensus seeking and incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 
1980; Nakamura, 1987; Stone, 1989; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Lindblom & 
Woodhouse, 1993). Progress is made in the pluralist's policy process only when 
there exists a means of resolving conflicts of values, interests and ideologies 
between policy actors in a way that ensures the formation of Pareto efficient 
policies. 
Public policy studies (McKean, 1965 , pp496-505; Haveman, 1976b , pp. 235-250) 
suggests that in a pluralists process optimal outcome in policy formation is 
achievable when all actors involved are fully equipped with relevant knowledge 
and are willing to negotiate and build consensus on policy choices that offer the 
ultimate means of maximising individual and societal welfare. This "implies the 
need for a political process in which the full set of impacts of a decision on all 
citizens, the poor and minority groups as well as those with power, be somehow 
registered with decision makers" (Havenman, 1976, p. 239). The ideal form of the 
pluralists' process thus can be likened to a "smoothly functioning market system" 
in which the full costs and gains of any decision as experienced by individuals 
would be brought to bear on the decision maker Genkin -Smith, 1990, p. 30). Such 
an ideal policy process is based on the assumption of a widely diffused power 
structure in which each participant has equal influence on problem definition, 
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agenda setting and policy choice (Parsons, 2003). It is nonetheless well established 
that such an ideal policy process is non-existent in reality (Jenkins-Smith, 1990) 
because unequal distribution of power between policy actors is a pervasive fact of 
political life (Brams, 1968, p. 461). 
Judging from the configuration of power between policy actors two extreme policy 
processes can be discerned within which many intervening policy processes may 
exist. At one extreme is the competitive policy process in which power is equitably 
diffused among policy actors. At the other end is the monopolised policy process 
in which power is monopolised by a few, usually the incumbent. It is established 
in public policy studies that the competitive policy process akin to the democratic 
political regime offers the best model for efficient policy formation (Dahl, 1961; 
Cobb & Elder, 1972; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Jenkins, 1999). 
Contrary to this view, this Chapter argues based on transaction costs insights 
(Coase, 1960) that both the competitive and monopolised policy process offer 
identical potential for the formulation of efficient policies if transaction costs were 
nonexistent. Any differences in efficiencies between these two policy models could 
thus be attributed essentially to differences in transaction costs that policy actors 
are exposed to. Transaction costs in this case comprise the costs of organising 
formidable and identifiable policy groups, the costs of expressing views, the costs 
of obtaining relevant information and the costs of consensus building particularly 
in the area of problem definition, agenda setting and selection of alternatives. Thus 
the mere adoption of a competitive policy model in place of a monopolised policy 
process offers no real advantage if transaction costs remain unchanged. A 
competitive policy process could thus be even more inefficient than a monopolised 
system if transaction costs in the competitive system are higher than they were in 
the monopolised system. 
The proximate instance of a competitive policy process in reality is the democratic 
policy process in which policy is driven by public demands and opinion (Dahl, 
1961) whiles the proximate instance of a monopolised system is an autocratic 
regime. Both systems are presented with similar transaction costs elements though 
at differing levels. For efficient policies to be evolved it is expected that in the 
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policy process, citizens be regarded as background actors in politics who exert and 
indirectly influence public policy through their efforts to select, support and sway 
elected representatives (Pitkin, 1969; Pateman, 1970; Hardy-Fanta, 1993). The costs 
of selecting, supporting and swaying elected representatives is thus an important 
consideration in determining the efficiency output of a particular policy process. 
Rationally, citizens will only incur such transaction costs when they envisage the 
potential benefits to be at least commensurate with the costs. When transaction 
costs are low or at least commensurate with potential benefits the relationship 
between citizen practice and government policy will run from citizens to 
government policy, passing through the intermediary efforts of elected officials 
who serve as primary actors in politics (Mettler and Soss, 2003). If the transaction 
costs for accomplishing this are unbearable citizens become essentially cordoned 
off the policy process and the process of policy making becomes a game for those 
who can afford. In such a system policy becomes instruments of those who can 
afford rather than an agreed instrument to achieve particular levels of societal 
welfare. 
Meanwhile citizens are often confronted with pertinent costs relating to 
monitoring to ensure that their representatives in the course of the policy debate 
accurately convey their views, the costs of outbidding other citizens, who may 
hold contrary views on particular issues notwithstanding. The costs become even 
more exorbitant when the representatives hold personal views that are in conflict 
with that of their electorates (Popper, 1957; 1976; Parsons, 2003). Yet, whether the 
representative will go along with the views of the electorates or pursue their own 
views turns on the costs and benefits associated. If the benefits outweigh the costs 
it is unlikely even in a democracy that elected representatives will go along with 
the views of their electorate during policy debates and discussions. The immediate 
costs that elected representatives face includes the costs of being voted out at the 
next elections or the costs of going against the party position. In the absence of 
these costs, elected representatives have no real motivations to carry the views of 
their electorates across and citizens will thus have little influence on policy. 
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More important is the costs of negotiation to achieve consensus. Policy making is a 
competitive process which is expected to be based entirely on negotiation with the 
public, within the political party and between political parties (Fuller and Myers, 
1941; Becker, 1963 pp. 8-9). If the costs of negotiation are low relative to the 
benefits, policy actors will engage in negotiation and make reasonable adjustments 
of their views until mutually beneficial policy decisions are reached. However, if 
the costs of consensus building are high relative to the benefits, policy actors will 
not engage in negotiation with those holding opposing views, which could lead to 
inefficient policies. As will be made clear, the African policy process has led to 
inefficient real estate policies simply because the incumbents have permanently 
heightened transaction costs faced by opposition, pressure groups and the media 
in trying to participate in the policy process at various stages in the political 
history of the region. 
4.4 THE EVOLUTION OF REAL ESTATE POLICIES IN SAHARAN AFRICA 
The preceding discussions have established that political forces largely shape 
policies. Though the operational model of political systems: democratic or 
autocratic, have the potential to yield equal levels of efficient policy decisions, it is 
the transaction costs associated with the political system that dictates the types and 
efficiency of policies in particular society. This thesis is employed to explore sub- 
Saharan Africa's real estate policy evolution. This section accordingly examines 
how the monopolisation of power within the African policy process had led to the 
creation of particular types of real estate policies that have tended to be 
economically inefficient and yet impossible or improbable that they will be 
removed if transaction costs in the policy process remain high. 
Persistently, the African political scene has witnessed the concentration of power 
in the hands of a minority either through invasion, as in the colonial era, the 
creation of a one party state, military interventions and despotism in the emergent 
democratic processes. These events have been discussed more fully below. These 
have culminated in exorbitant transaction costs to policy actors in opposition and 
pressure groups since the colonisation of the region. The substantial 
monopolisation of the policy process by incumbent governments gave them 
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freehand in pursuing their private interests, values and ideological ends. Indeed 
empirical research suggests that African policy monopolists have two main 
utilities variably they regularly seek to maximise. First is the protection of the 
interests of those who control the government machinery rather than the need to 
secure the general welfare of society (Schtaz, 1988). The second as Rimmer cited by 
Killick (1978, p. 51) established "the enrichment of the government itself, (i. e. the 
ruler, of Ministers, of party leaders, of top civil servants, and possibly of numerous 
subordinate ranks of the public)". This is corroborated by numerous contemporary 
research works (Scott, 1972; Bates, 1982; Bayart, 1989; Bratton and De Walle , 1994). 
In actual fact it is established that during these periods of monopoly regimes in 
Africa the "economy did not occupy the centre of attention of decision 
makers"(Gulhati and Yalamanchili, 1988, p. 108). 
For instance during the colonial era, the 1895 statement by the then UK Prime 
Minister, Lord Salisbury (cited in Kaniki, 1985) to Parliament exemplifies the main 
concerns of the colonial monopoly administration. Lord Salisbury wrote: 
"It is our business in all these new countries to make smooth 
the path for British commerce, British enterprise, the 
application of British capital, at a time when other paths, other 
outlets for the commercial energies of our race are being 
gradually closed by the commercial principles which are 
gaining more and more adhesion. In a few years it will be our 
people that will be masters, it will be our commerce that will 
prevail, it will be our capital that will rule... this is a 
tremendous power, but it requires one condition. You must 
enable it to get to the country where its work is to be done". 
The accomplishment of this goal meant that the colonial authorities of the 
respective colonies had to make the continent safe for British, French, German, 
Belgium, Portuguese and Italian capitalism (Harris, 1975) and policies were 
enacted to effect this ends. They achieved this by raising the costs of opposition 
from the indigenous African population by precluding them entirely from taking 
part in policy formation through legal means. 
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Accordingly the main beneficiaries of policies evolved by the colonial regime 
including, marketing boards, monopolies, licenses, land and other regulatory 
devices were the minority white settlers, private firms favoured by the metropole, 
and metropolitan central banks (Glickman, 1988 p. 28). A case in point is the land 
redistribution policies in East Africa under the colonial regime in which contrary 
to the well-developed peasant agriculture found in Uganda and other African 
countries at the time of colonisation (Kaniki, 1985), the beneficiaries of the 
redistribution of lands by the administration were the white minority. Such was 
the generosity of the redistribution policy that at one time Lord Delamere, an 
European entrepreneur owned more than 400,000 ha of land in Kenya (Kaniki, 
1985). Similarly, in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), by 1911, Europeans 
owned about 7,700,000 ha and by 1925, they owned 12,500,000 ha at give away 
prices (Kaniki, 1985). Kaniki in fact reported that in Southern Rhodesia "in 1894 
each member of the Victoria and Salisbury columns recruited to crush the Ndebele 
was promised 6000 acres of farm land". Thus according to Harris (1975, p. 11) 
colonialism can best be described as serving the economic interest of a handful of 
companies and capitalists in the colonial metropoles at the expense of the 
population of the colonies. 
In the postcolonial era, the need to enact policies to enable personal 
aggrandisement and distribution of material favour to selected members of the 
respective societies became even more profound. The immediate postcolonial 
policy process was as mentioned earlier characterised by the growing presence of 
emergent African bourgeoisies who have helped to achieve independence. These 
bourgeoisies formed strong social cleavages that are "in extremely favourable 
position to demand and secure access to resources of the state and to open handed 
state support for accumulation" (Sender and Smith, 1986). These demands had to 
be met at all costs and through favourable policies (Harris, 1975). Those located 
strategically within the policy process succeeded in securing policies in their 
favour (Bates and Devarajan, 1999). Thus, Lancaster (undated) in describing the 
postcolonial policy environment of Africa for instance wrote: 
Patron-client relations are important elements in politics 
throughout the world. But since independence, they have 
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come to play an especially prominent role in many African 
countries where leaders are less reliant on open political 
competition and periodic elections to maintain their position 
and more on the continuing support of key groups and 
individuals. ... African government officials, Ekeh argues, will 
be judged by their association in primordial groupings on 
whether they "channel part of the largesse from the civic 
public to the primordial public ... The unwritten law of the 
dialectic is that it is legitimate to rob the civic public in order 
to strengthen the primordial public... " Another long time 
observer of the continent, Goren Hyde, describes an "economy 
of affection" as influencing Africans at all levels of life, 
"network of support, communications and interaction among 
structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, 
community or other affinities... " Hyden goes on to describe 
the economy of affection as imposing social obligations on 
individuals that limit their interest and capacity to support 
public concerns outside their community, however defined. It 
trends to perpetuate a locale-specific outlook, which often 
comes into conflict with the principles on which national 
development is based. '
Indeed contemporary research suggests that those in favourable position entered 
into an ongoing cycle of regular social and political bargain or negotiation in 
which a wide variety of resources can be drawn upon to establish advantage and 
authority (Chauveau, 1997). Thus, those in power live "not by creating a surplus 
but by taking economic advantage-of political power" and businesspersons 
usually have parasitical relationships to governments (Cook, 2001). Such 
behaviours of monopoly policy actors come at costs to society. But how were such 
monopolisation accomplished to influence real estate policies. 
Carol Lancaster (undated) "Thoughts on policy reforms in Africa", typescript, 
Georgetown University. 
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4.4.1 The Colonial Policy Process 
Much has been written about the despotic rule of the colonial administration in 
Africa and how that influenced the determination and definition of problems, 
agenda settings and the choice of policies (Harris, 1975; Sender and Smith, 1986; 
Mabogunje, 1987; Platteau, 1992). Suffice to point out in this analysis that, during 
this period, the exploitative objective of the concept of colonialism (Kaniki, 1985) 
was the driving force behind the autocratic governance structure instituted out of 
which much of the initial real estate policies in the region emerged. The political 
institutions during this time were made up exclusively of the white minority. 
Policy decisions were arrived at without reference to the Africans and the Africans 
could only oppose policies from outside the formal policy making arena. Conflict 
in policy formation was thus between the social system and the formal decision 
making body. This meant that transaction costs faced by the Africans in seeking 
that their views are taken care in the policy process was enormous. It entailed the 
formation of viable countervailing forces with strong opinion leaders whose views 
cannot be ignored in policy making even though they operated outside of the 
formal policy arena. Agenda building and policy formation thus tended on two 
principal transaction costs elements. One is the cost at which the countervailing 
forces could expand issues to gain the attention and support of a wider even 
international interested group and the second being the costs that the colonial 
powers were likely to incur if they ignored the views of the group. 
If the cost of ignoring the views of the expanded audience or international 
interested group was regarded insignificant in comparison to the gains, the 
administration had enough motivation to ignore them. However, where it was 
costly to ignore, the administration was bound to take note of the countervailing 
forces. As Cobb and Elder (1972) explained, in such a situation issues that are 
unlikely to be ignored comprise (1) issues that are more socially significant; (2) 
issues that have long term relevance and (3) issues that lack clear precedent. 
Although, with regard to land policies all these conditions were present, the 
critical determinant of whether the views of the opposing forces would have to be 
taken account of was the abilities of the opposing forces to bear the costs of 
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expanding the conflict beyond the local formal policy arena. This was well 
illustrated when it came to the promulgation of colonial land nationalisation 
policies. In some Eastern, Central and Southern African countries where the 
opposing forces were unable to bear the full costs of issue expansion, their views 
did not represent a significant threat to the colonial administration and hence they 
were conveniently ignored. In these countries, the colonial administration 
successfully enacted policies that vested all property rights in "vacant lands" in the 
government of the day for redistribution (Noronha, 1985; Platteau, 1992). 
Yet, in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Ivory Coast where the opposing 
forces incurred the full costs of issue expansion around the 1890s they were able, in 
the case of Ghana for instance, to go all the way to England to protest to the 
English parliament and monarchy (Rimmer, 1992). Having expanded the issue this 
much, the colonial administrations in these countries could only ignore their views 
at extraordinary costs. They thus could not be ignored (Mabogunje, 1989) and the 
policy of outright land nationalisation that took root in Eastern, Central and 
Southern Africa could not be applied in these west African countries (Rimmer, 
1992). Besides, in countries where the opposing forces could be ignored the 
colonial administration had free hand in dissipating the land resources to the 
White minority and European merchants (Sender and Smith, 1986) as exemplified 
above. Where they could not be ignored the administration gained access only to 
those lands that they acquired at full market prices (Meek, 1949). These policy 
decisions continue to impose economic repercussions on some of these societies 
many years after the colonial era. 
As a result of these policies land ownership structure in Eastern, Central and 
Southern Africa is severely skewed in favour of a few whites or Europeans. This 
has engendered postcolonial clamour for more equitable redistribution of land 
resources by the Africans, which are being honoured through policy reforms at 
great costs (Toulmin and Quan, 2000). In some countries such as Zimbabwe the 
clamour is being honoured through forceful takeovers of lands owned by whites 
leading to violent clashes, loss of lives, political instability and insecurity. 
Meanwhile in West African, the successful opposition presented by the 
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countervailing forces prevented such skewed land ownership structure in these 
countries. Land ownership is thus more proportionately distributed in these 
countries and this has not specifically led to remarkable policy reforms and 
political events. 
Yet across Africa, when it came to policies that regulated the activities and land 
transactions of indigenous land owners, the opposing forces that had successfully 
subverted the earlier land nationalisation policies were benign and presented no 
opposition whatsoever. Having expended many resources in subverting the 
nationalisation policies, the West African countervailing forces appeared to have 
exhausted their resources and could not mount similar opposition. This later 
regime of policies appear to be enacted to ensure state surveillance over the 
activities of land owners with the view to pre-empting and forestalling any activity 
or transaction that is likely to threaten colonial exploitation or breach of the peace 
which was vital for their exploitation. Generally, the central theme of these 
regulative policies followed the recommendations of the West African Committee 
set up to look into the causes of land litigations in parts of West Africa. The key 
recommendation of the Committee was that all transfers of interest in land to non- 
natives, by Africans should be considered invalid unless it were by lease for a term 
of years and were made with the consent of the Governor 2 (Meek, 1949). In Ghana, 
for instance, this recommendation was implemented under section 3 of the 
Concessions Ordinance (No. 19 of 1939) as well as the Local Government 
Ordinance of 1951. In Kenya, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 prohibited land 
sales between Africans and Europeans altogether (Platteau, 1992, p. 97). These 
regulations were intended to curb the emergent litigation emanating from the then 
rampant land sales between African landowners and European concessionaires 
(Platteau, 1992; Woodman, 1996). 
2 The governor would, they suggested, only give his consent when he 
had received a report from the District Commissioner showing the area 
and boundaries of the proposed grant, whether the title properly 
belonged to the community proposing to grant it, whether the 
community fully assented, whether the consideration offered was 
adequate and that the grant would not materially interfere with the 
community's requirements in the matter of agriculture, fishing, hunting 
and the collection of natural products. 
99 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REAL ESTATE POLICIES 
A great deal of the lack of opposition to such policies may also relate to the 
transaction costs faced by the African landowners and countervailing forces in 
obtaining the relevant information to be able to appreciate the full and long term 
implications of such regulations of their rights (see Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; 
Pejovich, 1997). In the absence of such information, opposing forces saw very little 
gain in incurring the costs of opposing as those in West Africa had done 
previously. It is highly probable given the supply of available land that at the time 
the restriction on their property rights did not reduce their earnings from the land 
significantly. As Meek (1949) reveals most of the transactions were informal and 
purchasers were comfortable with any form of receipt or site plans, most of which 
had no bearing with the true triangulations of the land in question. Since these 
regulative policies were only enforceable when transactions were brought to the 
attention of public officials, very few of such transactions were subjected to these 
policies given the state of land documentation. Thus the practical impacts may 
well be very minimal and hence do not warrant the costs. 
Indeed it is possible that eminent opposing forces perceived these policies as more 
beneficial as it enabled indigenous landowners retain ownership of their lands 
even after they have sold the land. Even so, it is clear that these policies 
concentrated costs on the African landowners whose property rights were brought 
under severe regulations and control. In the postcolonial regime these particular 
policies exists in many forms in some sub-Saharan African countries as Ghana. The 
current constitution of Ghana (Government of Ghana, 1992) prohibits freehold 
grants of stool lands as well as more than 50 years leasehold rights to non-citizens 
of Ghana. Since it is only through formalisation of holdings that these genus of 
policies are enforced, it tended to accord formal transactions superiority over 
informal transactions in the eyes of the law. Informal transactions are currently 
regarded in some countries officially invalid ab inito (see 1992 constitution of 
Ghana for instance). They are thus considered risky in credit transactions. 
It is evident from property rights insights (Becker, 1977; Ault & Ruthman, 1979; 
Pejovich, 1990) that had power in the policy process been fairly distributed and the 
costs of transactions including costs of obtaining relevant information and the 
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costs of opposition been low, landowners would have favoured openness to free 
markets. Thus, they would have opposed such trade restrictions that evidently 
reduced their rights to free trade. 
4.4.2 Single Party Postcolonial Regimes 
Contemporary researchers (Hameso, 2002) argue that the autocratic or 
monopolised policy process instituted by the colonial regime became a convenient 
legacy for the succeeding postcolonial regimes. Hameso (2002) for instance argues, 
"the post-independence leaders took over the political kingdom in its enticing 
state". Yet at independence some four decades ago, all postcolonial African 
countries emerged as democracies governed by constitutions framed along the 
lines of what pertained then in the respective imperial countries of the colonial 
authorities (Bratton & De Walle , 1994). Power within the policy process was thus 
diffused and transaction costs were expectedly lower than during the colonial era. 
Soon, "political plurality ... were decried as bottlenecks 
for the project of "nation- 
building" and national unity"(Hameso, 2002). The new African leaders who had 
adopted socialist's ideological stance (Sender and Smith, 1986) faced enormous 
transaction costs in seeking to impose their views and ideologies on society. As it 
turned out, the real rationale for the choice of socialism at the time was two fold. 
First was the need to meet the growing demands of the emergent African 
bourgeoisies who had contributed to the achievement of independence and hence 
were better placed to demand favours from the incumbent. Second was the urgent 
need for the new nationalist governments to consolidate their power over the 
nations' resources to be able to institute central planning and state direction of 
resource allocation in accordance with the then mainstream development 
economics ideologies in vogue (Sender and Smith, 1986). This second agenda also 
gained credence from the then favourable outlook of socialism and state 
interventions in the Soviet Union and England (Sender and Smith, 1986). As 
Young puts it 
development economists, sympathetic to state-led 
development and dominant modernisation theories readily 
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acknowledged that economic development came first with 
democratisation expected to follow later (Young, 1996, p. 54). 
This second rationale also made it more convenient for the first rationale to be 
accomplished through the distribution of favours to the clients of the state after the 
state had gain freehand in the control and allocation of vital resources. Transaction 
costs that the incumbents would need to incur to accomplish these two agenda 
were likely to have been very high in a pluralist's environment, as it would entail 
reaching agreement with all countervailing forces in the policy process as 
explained earlier. Nonetheless in a truly democratic pluralists system where public 
opinion and the media matter in decision making, the costs of maintaining strong 
opposition are on the contrary likely to be low. In Ghana, for instance the choice of 
a socialist's agenda by the first post independent administration led by Nkrumah 
easily precipitated the formation of an opposition group, the National Liberation 
Movement (NLM) who immediately successfully represented an important 
impediment to the socialist's goals of Nkrumah (Killick, 1978). The NLM went to 
the extent of calling for a federal system of government, to whittle down the power 
of Nkrumah. The call eventually led to another election in 1954 (Card, 1975). 
The costs of formulating socialist policies from the perspective of the incumbent 
was thus mammoth and the options left for them was either to incur the costs of 
negotiating with the opposition or incur the costs of eliminating the opposition all 
together. The second option meant that the transaction costs of opposition were to 
be raised so high to make it unprofitable to oppose. Since the outcome of any 
negotiation with the opposing forces particular on the issue of socialist's 
orientation was uncertain and potentially unfavourable to the incumbents the first 
option was unsuitable. The most plausible option left was to raise the transaction 
costs of opposition and to ultimately eliminate the opposition altogether (Rimmer, 
1992). In Ghana the transaction costs of opposition were pegged so high that it 
became practically impossible for the opposition to partake in the policy process. 
The consequences of this on real estate policies would be established shortly. 
This was realisable by transforming the multiparty democratic colonial political 
legacy in which transaction costs were relatively low to a single party system in 
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which the opposition faced virtually all the costs of consensus building. To achieve 
this goal, in the 1960s and 1970s most countries in sub-Saharan Africa transformed 
their political systems from a pluralists multiparty system to a monopolised one 
party system. Such was the concern for policymaking power that during this 
period, thirty-two of the fifty-four African countries converted from a multi party 
political system to a single party political system (Bratton and de Walle, 1997). By 
the end of this conversion period, power to enact policy became almost exclusively 
concentrated on the incumbent with all opposing forces and pressure groups 
substantially cordoned off the policy process. 
Ultimately in countries such as Ghana, this was achieved by removing the 
constitutional provisions that mandated decentralized government structures, 
followed by rapid expansion of presidential powers in tandem with the removal of 
constitutional checks on the executive branch of government and then the 
imposition of a one party state (Daddieh, 2001). Nevertheless, this path to the 
single party state was rugged. The process commenced by discrediting political 
opposition. Indeed political opposition was viewed as despicable (Hameso, 2002). 
In Malawi the leadership argued: "there is no opposition in heaven. God himself 
does not want opposition - that is why he chased Satan away. Why should 
Kamuzu have opposition? "(Decalo, 1992, p. 10). Chinua Achebe painted the picture 
of the conversion process in Nigeria more succinctly as: "all argument should 
cease and the whole people speak with one voice and that any more dissent and 
argument outside the door of the shelter would subvert and bring down the whole 
house" (Achebe, 1967, p. 37). These were only to prepare the ground for what was 
to come. Transaction costs of opposition were to be explicitly heightened. The costs 
of opposition in some countries eventually became literally equivalent to the price 
of human life and to incur it meant to choose death in place of life. In Ethiopia 
opposition was met with physical elimination and liquidation (Hameso, 2002). In 
Ghana, the process was more dramatic and extraordinary and in the event it led to 
the promulgation of land laws whose concealed agenda was to crush the 
opposition. Paradoxically these land Acts continue to form the thrusts of land 
policies in Ghana. The Ghana case is peculiar and needs further elaboration. 
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4.4.3 Single Party Politics and Real Estate Policy Perspectives in Ghana 
Nkrumah, the first Prime Minister of Ghana, devoted the first nine years of his 
administration to eliminating the opposition (Card, 1975). At the time of 
independence, the main leaders of the opposition, the professional elites, had 
strong family or lineage ties with the Chiefs in Ashanti and Akim-Abuakwa 
communities of Ghana (Card, 1975). Chiefs were by custom political leaders of 
their respective communities as well as the custodians of all the land resources of 
their respective communities. They thus commanded great influence. Meanwhile 
their elevated status during the colonial era (Noronha, 1985) placed them in the 
position of parallel opposing political power (Bretton, 1967; Rimmer, 1992; Firmin- 
Sellers, 1996). Given the land resources they controlled, the lineage ties that the 
Ashanti and Akim-Abuakwa Chiefs had with the main political opposition parties 
and the parallel political power they present, they represented an important 
obstacle to the socialist's agenda of Nkrumah. Nkrumah could thus make 
meaningful headway only if the manoeuvres of the chiefs and their allies could be 
quelled or at least make it too costly for them to engage in policy making or even 
to lend financial or other supports to other opposition organs. Nkrumah vowed to 
make sure that some of those who constituted the main obstacle would runaway 
and leave their footwear behind (Kasanga, 2002). Nkrumah pursued this agenda 
by first infiltrating customary law and practices with politics. During these 
periods, there were rampant destoolment (removal) of chiefs that were known 
sympathisers of the opposition in Ghanaian communities such as Kade, Abodom 
in Akim- Abuakwa (Ghana, 1959). These were followed up with legislation to 
remove for instance the Offinsohene (Chief of Offinso) to a place 30 miles radius 
from his state while the Gyasehene of Akim Abuakwa was banned from the state 
and ordered to stay 60 miles away (Ghana, 1959). 
As a follow on, five years ahead of the launch of Nkrumah's first Seven Year 
development plan and barely a year after formal independence, Nkrumah 
launched an arsenal of enactments aimed evidently at crushing the opposition. 
Amid the series of enactments to crush the opposition, ranging from the 
Preventive Detention Act, under which some opposition members were jailed 
without trial and The Sedition Act and the Criminal Act, which provided for the 
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death penalty for political crimes without trial by jury were two land Acts. These 
land Acts were the Ashanti Stool Lands Acts of 1958 and the Akim Abuakwa 
(Stool Revenue) Act of 1958. These Acts indeed heightened the transaction costs of 
the chiefs and the opposition as it essentially took away the fiduciary role of the 
affected Chiefs over their land and thus stripped them of stool land revenue. Stool 
land revenue were alleged to be the main source of finance for the opposition. 
Such was the priority attached to these land Acts that they were enacted under 
certificate of urgency. The motion for the Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act, 
1958 bill presented a telling example. The then Minister for Local Government in 
presenting the bill to parliament for debate and enactment into law stated as 
follows: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Standing Orders 
of this House if by 11.45 a. m. today the motion for the second 
reading of the Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) bill has not 
been disposed of Mr. Speaker do put any question necessary 
to dispose of it. That the Committee stage be taken 
immediately after the second reading; that if by 12: 40 p. m. the 
Committee stage has not been disposed of, the chairman do 
put any question necessary to dispose of it and report the bill 
forthwith; and that if by 12: 50 p. m. the motion for the third 
reading has not been disposed of Mr. Speaker do put any 
question necessary to dispose of it (Ghana Parliamentary 
Debate, 1958). 
By this time the Criminal Acts that came along as a package with these land 
enactments had almost made opposition equal to accepting to be jailed or even 
killed. Such a high transaction costs was evidently unbearable and the opposition 
could hardly subject the Act to any scrutiny. The Act was thus passed by 
parliament in an hour and a half unexpurgated. Subsequently these Acts together 
with other succeeding Acts relating to Stool lands were eventually consolidated 
under the Administration of Lands Act, 1962. Under this new Act the principle 
was expanded to cover all stool lands in the country. This Act is presently in force 
and termed the "vesting policy" in Ghanaian parlance. The accomplishment of 
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these vesting policies in Ghana has been phenomenal. They vest virtually all the 
ingredients of property rights in the affected stool lands in the government of the 
day for redistribution. 
The rights expropriated from the affected stools include the right to: (1) possess (2) 
use (3) manage (4) alienate (5) security of tenure (6) bequeath and (7) mortgage. 
Table 4-1 depicts the Stool lands affected by the vesting policy in Ghana so far. 
Table 4-1: Stool Lands Vested in the Government of Ghana 
No. Location Region Instrument Date Size 
1 Stool Lands in Koforidua Eastern E. I. 195 1/11/61 19.47 km2 
2 Stool Lands in Nkawkaw Eastern E. I. 195 1/11/61 n/a 
3 Efutu &Gomoa Ajumako Lands Central E. I. 206 21/11/61 n/a 
4 Kumasi Part 1 Lands Ashanti Act 123 14/06/62 24.55 km2 
5 Winneba Central E. I. 83 6/6/63 I mile radius 
6 Accra-Tema Greater Accra E. I. 108 18/9/64 n/a 
7 Inchaban Western E. I. 28 20/07/98 n/a 
8 30 Stool Lands in Brong Ahafo3 Brong Ahafo E. I. 46 18/2/61 n/a 
Source: Field survey- compiled from the records of the Lands Commission, Ghana. 
In its current form, the policy gives the government direct control over all incomes 
from the affected Stool lands as well as non-affected Stool lands in the country. To 
this extent Stools in the country have legal rights to only 22.5% of all revenue from 
Stool land transaction. That is to say 77.5% of gross stool land revenue (capital and 
or rental) is deducted at source almost as tax. In this context it is unclear the sense 
in which Asiama (1990; p. 247) argues that the vesting policy "leaves ownership 
substantially in the landowner's hands". 
The Act actually made government through its agencies the managers of these 
affected stool lands and are empowered to allocate these lands to potential 
developers without reference to the expropriated owners and at the discretion of 
the officials in charge. These lands are allocated on leasehold basis at about 90% 
3 The affected stool lands include: (1) dormaa (2) Nsoatre (3) Sunyani s 
(4) Fiapre (5) Odumasi No. 1 (6) Awua Dumasi (7) Acherensua (8) 
Hwidiem (9) Kenyasi (1 & 2) (10) Ntrotroso/Gyedu Wamahinso (11) 
Mehami (12) Goaso (13) Kukuom (14) Mim (15) Kasapin (16) Akrodie 
(17) Sankore (18) Ayomso (19) Pomaakrom (20) Seikwa (21) Nchiraa (22) 
Manji (23) Bredi (24) Branam (25) Subinso (26) Nsawkaw (27) Offuman 
(28) Tanoboasi (29) Booyam (30) Techiman. 
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rental subsidy. Thus, as a bi-product of this Act it made it possible for benefits by 
way of land allocation to be concentrated on the privileged few beneficiaries of the 
allocated lands at the expense of the expropriated owner and a larger segment of 
the non-benefiting Ghanaian taxpayer. It is now well established in the literature 
that the main beneficiaries of lands under these policies are the top civil servants 
and influential figures in the Ghanaian society (Asiama, 1990; Antwi, 2000). To 
underscore the full repercussions of this Act thus it is pertinent that the costs 
imposed on landowners and the taxpayer as well as the benefits from the 
management of the revenue and the allocation of these lands is ascertained. 
Nkrumah's particular interest in crashing the Chiefs to gain exclusive control over 
policy making has led to these policies that discriminated against Stools as 
opposed to family, clan and individual land owners, imposing costs on them. 
Apart from regulating their incomes, Nkrumah enacted policies that subjected 
Stool land transactions only, to government surveillance and scrutiny. This 
regulative policy is referred to in Ghana commonly as "Concurrence policy" which 
was fashioned along the lines of the recommendations of the West African Lands 
Committee. This can be explained in the light of the reasons for enacting the 
vesting policies against the Stools. The concurrence policy has now been given 
constitutional assent in Article 267 (3) of the 1992 constitution though with 
somewhat of a different slant towards land use planning. 
By this time, the costs of opposition had been made practically unbearable and real 
opposition had vanished from the scene (Card, 1975). Nkrumah thus could now 
pursue the socialist's agenda, which as mentioned was itself motivated by the need 
for self-aggrandisement (see further Card, 1975; Killick, 1978). An important land 
policy that underpins socialism is the policy that gives unhindered access to land 
(Buchannan, 1999). The colonial policies on expropriation was adequate as it had 
enough safeguards against abuse of government powers in compulsory 
acquisitions and unfairness in the acquisition process by insisting that all 
government acquisition must receive certification by the Courts. This however was 
too constraining for the Nkrumah regime as it made arbitrary use of power in the 
manner envisaged under Nkrumah's socialist's agenda practically impossible. This 
meant that the transaction costs of implementing socialism in Ghana by the one 
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party regime was high entailing the payment of compensation for every piece of 
land required for socialists production and development agenda or risk hostilities 
and revolts from the populace. The conundrum that such high transaction costs 
presented was made explicit in the speech by Nkrumah in launching the seven- 
year development plan (1963- 70). Nkrumah notes: 
... the state will be controlling on behalf of the community the 
dominant share of the economy. This would have been 
accomplished without ever having to resort to such expedients 
as nationalisation, which if carried out with full compensation 
would only change the ownership of the means of 
production... and if carried out without such compensation 
would inevitably incur such a large measure of hostility as to 
make our development plans very much more difficult to 
achieve (quoted from Larbi, 1995, p. 42). 
With the costs of overt nationalisation clearly unbearable to the government a 
clever and subtle approach to nationalisation had to be found if socialism was to 
succeed. This meant that a new law was required that offered reduced transaction 
costs in state land acquisition. The State Lands Act, (Act, 125) of 19624, was thus 
passed. The memorandum to this Act betrays the true intents of this policy. It 
established that. 
The bill dispenses with the need to obtain a certificate from a 
court to effect vesting of land in the republic, and provides 
that a declaration by the president shall constitute the vesting 
instrument. 
Though this Act did not specifically exempt the state from compensation 
payments, the requirement for compensation payment under the law has been so 
spuriously contrived to make compulsory government acquisition without 
compensation legally possible. Under this policy it became possible to divorce 
4Other expropriation laws such as The Lands (Statutory wayleaves) Act, 
(Act, 186) of 1963 and the Public Conveyancing Act, (Act, 302) of 1965 
were also enacted by the regime along similar lines though they have 
been used infrequently as compared to the State Lands Act. 
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compulsory acquisition from compensation in such a way that it was possible for 
government to acquire land and use immediately and pay the compensation at a 
time of their choosing. Apart from the lack of interest payment on delayed 
compensation payments which is a serious problem in a country where inflation 
and poverty are endemic, it has been possible under this Act for government to 
place embargo on compensation payment altogether since 1973 (Larbi, 1995). Thus 
while all expropriation under the colonial policies were paid for, there is an 
estimated unpaid compensation figure of over 800 billion Cedis as at 2001 
(Kasanga, 2002). 
Thus during the era of single party political economy, the regulatory and 
distributive policies started by the colonial autocratic state became widened and 
strengthened even in countries where due to local oppositions the colonial 
governments took a more cautious approach to land policy. The policies have also 
established a culture in which the distribution of vital resources including land 
during this era became the preserve of the dictatorial regime through coercion 
rather than consensus (Hameso, 2002). Thus with soaring transaction costs of 
opposing looming large in the sub-Saharan African policy process, the policies that 
emerged during this era were those likely to serve the parochial interest of their 
originators at the expense of the wider society. What is more disquieting is that the 
policies enacted during this era have proved immutable and they continue to 
dictate real estate market proceedings in these sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless a 
more far reaching consequence of these political regimes is the insurrections and 
military takeovers that they engendered. 
4.4.4 Military Regimes 
Events of the single party regimes engendered much anxiety among the citizens 
who had anticipated much welfare gains from the achievement of independence 
(Sender & Smith, 1986). If transaction costs were low, political opposition and 
pressure groups with the right incentives would emerge to present alternatives 
and compete for power. This would have led to a change of government at the 
next elections or even a vote of no- confidence. However, given that in most of 
these countries transaction costs of doing that had been made almost unbearable 
and that this had culminated essentially in the criminalisation of opposition, it was 
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impossible for such a process to emerge. What followed was predictable. If 
frustration, dissatisfaction, and grievances are sufficiently prolonged or sharply 
felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain to occur (Gurr, 1993; 2003). This may 
have instigated a spate of military takeovers through force and violent means on 
the continent. Thus a culture of transfer of political power by force in the form of 
military coups, brutalities, warfare, insurrections, mutinies, severe riots and 
significant political assassinations (Zolberg, 1968) became the least expensive 
option. Such was the spate of force power transfers in Africa under this era that 
between 1960 and 1985, there were one hundred and thirty one attempted coup 
d'etats in Africa of which sixty were successful and three countries had 
experienced six successful military coups (Bratton and de Walle, 1997). 
Out of the fifty-four independent African countries, only 6 have not experienced 
attempted or successful coups since independence (Bratton and de Walle, 1997). By 
1970, half of the independent African countries (all of which stated as multiparty 
democracies) had military governments installed through military coup d'etat 
(Bratton and de Walle, 1997). The costs of opposition in these regimes became even 
more unbearable than the two earlier models: colonial and single party regimes, 
discussed above. As Chauveau (1997) noted in the case of Ivory Coast, the state 
could choose at any time to invoke its overreaching rights and did not hesitate to 
enforce its wishes with threats of imprisonment if necessary when it was 
challenged. 
Policies thus became what the sovereign desired and not necessarily, what was 
good for the country. Like the previous autocratic regimes, the real estate policies 
enacted took two main forms, (a) those that gave the government of the day the 
rights to redistribute land resources by taking landownership away from the 
indigenous owners and (b) those that regulated the free trade of real estate 
commodities. An example of (a) is the case of Nigeria, where, like Ghana the 
colonial government could not confiscate land in view of opposition, the then 
military regime successfully enacted the Land Use decree of 1978, which was 
subsequently incorporated in the constitution of 1979 and 1999 respectively of 
Nigeria. The decree required certificates of occupancy to be obtained from the 
government for land held under customary and statutory rights and the payment 
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of rent to the government. In another instance, one of the fundamental results of 
the Ethiopian Revolution was the nationalisation of all urban lands without 
compensation under the Government Ownership of Urban Land and Extra Houses 
Proclamation (No. 47 of 1975) (Asiama, 1990, p. 242). In addition, in countries such 
as Ghana, at the time of the military interventions policies existed and continue to 
exist that gave the government virtually free rights to bring any land in the 
country under their control for redistribution. Many more lands were thus 
confiscated under these policies. By the end of these military interventions twenty 
out of the forty countries in sub-Saharan Africa had nationalised lands and vested 
in the respective governments the power to redistribute these lands (see 
Mabungunje, 1989). These policies were passed without much opposition in view 
of the prevailing soaring costs of opposition. 
Though much of the regulatory land policies enacted under the previous regimes 
remained in force, some regimes had need to enact some more. For instance one of 
the fundamental outcomes of the 1966 military interventions in Ghana by the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) was the promulgation for the first time in the 
country of a regulative land policy that discriminated against foreigners. The 
policy, which has now been given constitutional backing under Article 266 of the 
1992 constitution of Ghana, restricted the length of time foreigners could own land 
in the country at any particular time to fifty years. This policy came as part of a 
range of discriminatory policies by the regime, which proscribed foreign investors 
from engaging in business activities such as, retail and wholesale trade below 
certain turnover, taxi and trucking services, produce brokerage, baking, printing 
and manufacture of cement blocks (Card, 1975). The motive behind this policy 
appears to have been to prevent foreign competition in particular areas of the 
economy as a way of propping up local entrepreneurs to take up the running of 
the economy and to safeguard the country against piecemeal colonisation. Yet it 
imposed significant restrictions on the rights of landowners in the country to free 
trade. Also during the 1981-1992, military intervention led by Ft Lt Rawlings in 
Ghana, the right of chiefs to grant freehold rights in land even to usufruct owners 
who wants documentary evidence of their holding was taken away by the 
government under article 265 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana. These laws have 
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significantly attenuated the rights of indigenous land owners and could be 
festering poverty. 
4.4.5 Emergent Democratic Regimes 
After a long period of monopolised policy process and high costs of opposition, 
there was from 1985 a general trend towards democratisation of the policy process 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It was envisaged by the proponents of democracy for 
Africa, namely the World Bank and other international development agencies that 
such a policy process would entail much lower transaction costs and formidable 
opposition would emerge to provide a check on the arbitrary use of government 
power over the years. In truth if this happens one expects that real estate policies 
will move towards redressing true market failures and excessive transaction costs. 
Inefficient policies would also be recalled to pave the way for the efficient 
functioning of real estate market. Thus understandably the move was greeted with 
great optimism. For Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997, p. 9) writes, "Since 1988, the people of 
Africa have risen to replace one-party and military dictatorships with multi-party 
democracy. From its violent outbreak in October 1985, in the street of Algiers, this 
new social movement for democracy has manifested itself all over the continent, 
changing the rules of the political game and bringing about meaningful reforms in 
the institutions of the post-colonial state". 
After more than a decade of democracy experimenting in Africa, very little 
improvement has been achieved particularly in the real estate policies 
environment. Rather, much of the autocratic policies enacted to crush the 
opposition and to impose restraints on opposing forces have now received 
constitutional backings. Large state institutions and bureaucracies have been 
established with full complement of staff and annual budgets to enforce policies 
that were ad-hoc measures to raise the transaction costs of political opposition. 
The question then is why has democracy failed to achieve any meaningful 
outcome as envisaged? Some argued that, multiparty politics is not the best fit for 
Africa where socio-political structures and potent identification are more of 
ethnicity and less of classes (Hameso, 2002). Others such as UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan have dismissed this idea as unfounded as the African culture admits 
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of consensus building in decision making. Employing some of the insights of the 
discussions above it would appear that democracy has failed to yield a better 
outcome because transaction costs of organising and maintaining viable 
opposition still remain high in most African countries despite the installation of 
democracy in these countries. Most of these so-called democracies are thus 
operating essentially without opposition. This has led to the emergence of 
despotism in democratic systems. Virtually all the then military regimes in 
countries such as Gambia, Guinea Bissau until the downfall of Nino Viera, Guinea 
Conakry, Burkina Faso, Niger under Maina Sara, Chad, Togo, Ghana, Egypt, 
Libya, Mauritania, Sudan and Madagascar metamorphosed quickly to become 
civilian governments (N'Diaye, 2000). In addition those who also gained 
monopolist control over the political system through civil wars and mutiny as in 
Liberia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe managed to get 
themselves elected as democratic leaders. Yet these leaders have openly declared 
their discomfort with democracy as a decision making process. Many of these 
governments have locked in on power and would do anything to remain in power. 
It was logical to expect these leaders to find a way, if possible, to circumvent the 
transaction costs that they were not used to and to maintain a high transaction 
costs structure for the opposing forces. These leaders had one important 
opportunity 
_to 
accomplish that. Being the "last" autocratic regimes, the onus of 
drafting new constitutions for the incoming democracies was on them. This 
offered them the opportunity to set the "rules for the game". Many of them took 
advantage of this opportunity and entrenched the policies that heightened the 
transaction costs of the opposing forces into the new national constitutions. In 
Ghana for instance all the previously enacted land Acts to crush the opposition, 
namely the vesting policy, and the concurrence policy together with the socialists' 
motivated policies found their way into the national constitution. The Nigerian 
Land Use Act of 1978 enacted by the military regime to nationalise all lands in the 
country also found its way into the 1999 Nigerian constitution. Casting these 
policies in national constitutions meant that, the opposition and subsequent 
administration had huge transaction costs to confront if they wished to reform 
these policies. 
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Though democracies in Africa bear substantial traits of a democratic system as 
known in theory (see Dahl, 1989; Przeworski, 1991; Valenzuela, 1992) very little 
changes have occurred in land and real estate policies. The new additions to land 
policies during this era include the spate of land redistribution programmes 
initiated in Southern African and some Eastern African countries to confer on the 
state the power to redistribute land resources with the view to reducing inequities 
in landownership (Quan, 2000). Substantively however, land and real estate 
policies have remained largely the same as pertained under the previous despotic 
regimes. Government retain a large measure of power to redistribute land 
resources and regulate the activities of land market participants. These policies 
have come about because of a severe imbalance in the distribution of power 
occasioned by the prevailing high transaction costs in the African policy 
environment. 
It is established from the above that the policy process of SSA out of which real 
estate policies have emerged are invariably monopolised by incumbent political 
forces. It remains to be understood the actual social costs that such a monopolised 
policy process could be imposing on society. This is considered in the ensuing 
section. 
4.5 THE SOCIAL COSTS OF A MONOPOLISED POLICY PROCESS 
Economic rationality suggests that policy actors are self-interest maximizers whose 
prime concern is to increase their personal gain from policies (Downs, 1957). The 
impact of this rational behaviour of monopolist in the policy environment can be 
illustrated in Figure 4-1. In Figure 4-1take the y-axis to represent the price of 
policies and the x-axis to represent the efficiency policy outputs. MB, MC, SMB 
and SMC represents the marginal benefits of policy to the monopolists, marginal 
costs of policy to the monopoly policy actor, the social marginal benefits of policy 
to society and the social marginal costs of policy to society respectively. Qc 
denotes level of efficiency at which an unregulated real estate market is allocated 
resources whiles QE represents the optimal expected efficiency output of the 
concerned real estate market in Pareto sense. In a well functioning policy process 
with relatively low transaction costs policies will be devised through competitive 
negotiation to push the market equilibrium from its temporary or initial location at 
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point, C, towards the optimal location, F. At this point the highest level of 
efficiency in policy formation is obtained at social marginal costs, SMC1 that 
equates the social marginal benefits, SMB derived from the policy. 
Figure 4-1: Self Interest Maximising Policy Monopolist 
Pric 
iC 
Meanwhile the marginal costs OPEFQE incurred by the monopolists in securing 
policy efficiency at this level exceeds the marginal benefits OPEBQM gained. Given 
the incentive structure of monopolist, self-interest maximisation will lead policy 
monopolist to choose policies that ensure that their private marginal benefits from 
the selected policies do not exceed their private marginal costs. Since such policies 
are expected to ultimately maximise the interest of the incumbent monopolist they 
will be chosen such that the costs of the policies to them does not exceed the 
benefit they expect to derive from the policy. 
Thus, policies under monopolist are likely to occur at point B in Figure 4-1 above 
where MB is the private marginal benefits expected to be derived from the policy 
by the monopolists. At this level the efficiency outcome of such policies are likely 
to fall short of what the market on its own would have produced, which would be 
say Qr& In the figure, the height of the marginal cost curve represents the social 
opportunity cost of the resource expected to be used in achieving efficiency output 
level QE. Yet, whiles the true economic worth of resources likely to be employed to 
achieve the inefficient monopolist output level QM is OPEBQM the costs of inefficient 
behaviours of monopolists which is referred to as X-inefficiency in the economics 
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discourse is likely to lead to, the use of expensive methods, lack of control and 
checks on the use of resources. This wasteful attitude of monopolist will force 
social marginal costs up from SMC1 to SMC2. This implies that under a self-interest 
monopolist policy environment as in SSA, policies enacted will most likely incur 
overall costs of OPMAQM (which is > OPEBQM) to generate an even inefficient 
output of QM. Thus conceptually the difference between OPMAQM and OPEBQM 
represents the potential net social costs of real estate policies enacted under the 
various monopolist regimes in SSA. This in itself creates a "dead weight" loss 
represented by triangle ABF. 
Transaction costs and economic rationality insights discussed above show that 
once such policies are evolved, regardless of their economic damage to society it is 
improbable or at best very difficult to recall or even reform them. This is because 
in the first place these policies came through because the transaction costs 
associated with their subversion was too high. Yet, since they offer the monopolist 
policy actor maximised utility, the monopolist has greater incentive to retain the 
policy than to do otherwise. When the monopolist regime that enacted those 
policies are removed and replaced by another monopolist policy actor, since 
African policy monopolist's exhibit similar incentive structure, these policies are 
likely to become convenient tools with which they can maximise their utility. They 
are thus unlikely to recall such policies. In fact, if at the time of their assumption of 
office the benefits that are offered under those policies have been depleted by the 
previous regime, they are more likely to widen the remit of the policies or even 
pass new but similar laws so that more benefits can be obtained. 
What is more disquieting is that even when the monopolist regimes are replaced 
by a regime that is mindful of the economy and wishes to reform these laws for 
better economic gains, the challenge may not be that easy because of the huge 
associated transaction costs. The relevant transaction costs in this case comprise 
the costs of providing information to convince the general populace of the need for 
the reform, the costs of seeking agreement on the way forward and more 
importantly the costs of convincing and seeking the consent of the existing body of 
beneficiaries some of which may be the clients of the incumbent, to consent to the 
reform of the policies. This existing body of beneficiaries include politicians, 
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bureaucrats, interest groups, clients, the influential and powerful in society among 
others. It is likely that such consent may not be forthcoming leading to the 
continuous existence of inefficient policies even in "democratic" systems. 
Having understood conceptually the söcial costs that monopolist devised real 
estate policies can bring to bear on society, it is crucial to substantiate this assertion 
through empirical measurements. In doing so it is important that the various 
strands of real estate policies that have materialised from these policy regimes are 
bunched up into suitable classes that will aid their efficient evaluation. To 
accomplish this next section concentrates on the formulation of taxonomy of real 
estate polices for sub-Saharan Africa that will facilitate this empirical evaluation 
exercise. 
4.6 TOWARDS A TAXONOMY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REAL ESTATE POLICIES 
The most commonly encountered classification of sub-Saharan Africa real estate 
policies in the existing body of research (Asiama, 1984; Kasanga, 1990; Brobbey, 
1991; Platteau, 1992; Larbi, 1994; Larbi, 1995; Sjaastad Espen & Bromley Daniel W, 
1997; Quan, 2000; Okoth-Ogendo, 2000; Hatch Associates, 2002; Deininger, 2003) is 
in terms of broad labels or stated purposes such as Land Titling Policies, Deeds 
Registration Policies, Compulsory Acquisition Policies, Land Use Policies, Zoning 
Policies, Expropriation Policies and so on. Such classification provides a way of 
subjecting policies to individualistic and detailed scrutiny. However, this approach 
is convenient to policy specific or micro level analysis. The approach becomes 
simply unwieldy at the macro level, the level of analysis envisaged by this 
Chapter. For instance, Ghana alone (1 out of 40 sub-Saharan African countries) lists 
about 166 pieces of real estate policies in the 1999 land policy document of Ghana. 
The use of the conventional classification does not offer much help for macro level 
analysis. Indeed most research works that have followed this classification have 
always suffered from in-exhaustiveness. For instance, Quan (2000) could only deal 
with Land Title Policies and Land Redistribution Policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, reliance on the purpose specific classification is fraught with some 
technical limitations. Some of these limitations include (a) the variability of 
language and the multiplicity of meanings that could be associated with certain 
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words used in particular policies, which may even be subject to change at different 
times and contexts, introduce significant ambiguities and uncertainties in 
identifying the true purpose of policies from its literal construction. (b) As Slapper 
and Kelly (2001) points out, owing to the generality in the application of policies, 
they are invariably written in a way that ensures they can be effectively applied in 
various circumstances without the need to detail those situations individually. 
This means that in practice it may be common to find ambiguities in the literal 
provisions of particular policies regarding how the policy envisaged that 
particular situation would be dealt with when they arise some time in the future. 
(c) As Lindblom (1977) has always maintained, policy elites prefer not to be precise 
in defining the goals of policies so that they can muddle through in the course of 
implementation to suit their changing personal ends. The Administration of Lands 
Act of 1962 of Ghana (discussed above), which empower the state to manage Stool 
and other lands in the country is a case in point. The Act made no attempt to 
define what constitutes management and left that decision in the hands of 
bureaucrats to determine from time to time. In addition, in Ghana what constitutes 
"public interest" under the country's acquisition policies remains ill defined and 
uncertain (see Larbi, et al, 2004). Reliance merely on the literal provisions or labels 
of policies for classification and any analysis thus may be fraught with formidable 
impediments, which could lead to, misleading conclusions. 
It is accordingly indispensable in seeking to understand the true economic impacts 
of particular policies, to go beyond the stated purposes or labels of the policies 
themselves to explore how the policies have actually been employed in practice. It 
is only in understands how the policies have been used in practice that meaningful 
examination of their impacts can be ascertained. This forms the basis of the 
taxonomy devised in the next section. 
4.6.1 The Taxonomy 
As discussed above, the taxonomy is based on the substantive way policies have 
been used in practice rather than their stated literal purposes. It has been 
illustrated in Section 4.5 above in general African policy makers have been 
concerned with the maximisation of two main utility variables namely: (1) security 
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of tenure and (2) personal aggrandisement and the maintenance of strong client 
relationships. It is thus argued that the policies they enact whether in the field of 
real estate or any other area will be those that will enable them to maximise these 
variables. Enacting policies and laws that constrains and regulates the activities of 
those whose activities are considered threats to their security of tenure for instance 
can accomplish the first variable. These policies render such people and their 
activities helpless and ineffective thereby posing very little threat to their security 
of tenure. This class of policies will hereinafter be referred to as Regulative policies. 
In the real estate field, this regime of policies encompasses all policies enacted to 
regulate the activities of market participants such as land use policies, 
Conveyancing and documentation policies. 
The second utility variable can be maximised by enacting policies that will 
legitimise the distribution of material favours to themselves as well as their clients. 
Such policies will give the incumbent free access to the largesse of the state, which 
they can distribute to their clients in exchange for political support. In the real 
estate sector, this can take two main forms. Firstly, the government could acquire 
land and real estate resources on payment of full compensation for distribution. 
These classes of policies are herein after referred to as Distributive policies. In 
another vein, the government could confiscate or nationalise land without the 
payment of full compensation for distribution. Such policies are herein after 
termed Redistributive policies. 
Based on this analysis it can be concluded that real estate policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa fall into three main categories: (1) Regulative policies; (2) Distributive 
policies and (3) Redistributive policies. However, since the definition of policies 
offered in section, 4.2 above comprise policy implementation; the institutional 
frameworks together with their internal procedures established to enforce these 
three main policies is considered a fourth category of policy and will hereinafter be 
referred to as (4) Delivery policies. This is shown diagrammatically Figure 4-2 
below. 
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It is worthy of note that in this taxonomy the potential concentration of costs on a 
few under any policy does not necessarily make the policy unwise nor does widely 
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The real merit of any of these policies depends on the net benefits they foster (see 
Chapter 3). As Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939) have illustrated policies can be 
regarded as desirable when they meet the Pareto criteria or at worse when the net 
gainers could compensate the net losers to the extent that they would be no worse 
off after the implementation of the policy. This can only be ascertained through 
empirical studies and the taxonomy provides a predictive analytic guide for such 
analysis. Thus this taxonomy devised will be employed in the rest of the study to 
examine the economic impacts of urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan African. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
The above discussion demonstrates that the power to enact real estate policies in 
Africa have for a long while been monopolised by a few. This reflected in the 
institution of colonialism (4.4.1 above), single party policy process (4.4.2 above), 
military regimes (4.4.4 above) and despotic policy process within an emergent 
democracy (4.4.5 above). The discussion revealed that real estate policies enacted 
during periods of pure autocratic rule were no different from those enacted during 
the democratic era because transaction costs in organising and running a viable 
opposition, pluralism, negotiation and consensus seeking remained considerably 
high in both periods. Real estate policies were thus enacted with virtually no 
scrutiny and absence of opposition to express indignation about inefficient 
decisions. Public opinion was of little concern, as political power is achieved not 
by winning of votes. Having made the transaction costs of opposition exorbitant to 
monopolise power, the monopolistic administrations faced very little or no 
transaction costs in policy formation particularly in societies where the 
monopolisation of power was absolute. Policies thus emerged at the whim of the 
monopolistic government. Now with the policies now classified and their goals 
and basis appreciated the study proceeds with an outline for the processes for 
evaluating the impacts of these policies. 
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Chapter 5 
The Economic Impacts Measuring Framework 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having addressed the first two research questions from the theoretical perspective 
in Chapter 4, the stage is now set to address the next three fundamental research 
questions namely: what is the quantitative balance between the costs and benefits 
of the real estate policies under review? What is the magnitude of their impacts on 
the economic welfare of real estate market dealers and the broad economy? And 
what are the relationships between the type of real estate policies as derived by the 
taxonomy in Chapter 4 and the scale of the economic impacts they reproduce on 
market dealers and the broad economy? These queries are addressed in Chapters 7 
and 8 using a bespoke quantitative measuring framework. 
This Chapter formulates the measuring framework employed in providing 
analytical responses to these research queries. In formulating this framework the 
Chapter also promotes greater awareness of the principal methods of economic 
impacts analysis relevant to sub-Saharan Africa urban real estate policies together 
with their potential, weaknesses as well as practical applicability in small to 
medium scale evaluation tasks. This judgment is made on the basis of their 
complexities, data requirements and associated costs. These are accomplished 
through a review of selected conventional evaluation methods with the view to 
appreciating their applicability to this study. Given the rather wide breadth of 
these conventional methods, judgment has been exercised in the selection of the 
methods for the review. The methods reviewed in this chapter are selected on the 
basis of their empirical applicability rather than purely on their methodological 
correctness. 
As economic impacts of policies and interventions constitutes the foremost sinew 
in the economic development processes of nations so also are the methods by 
which these impacts are gauged (Pfouts, 1960; Liew and Liew, 1984). Policy 
impacts like many other social science concepts are multidimensional and hence 
can be perceived in several ways. It is therefore crucial for a fuller appreciation of 
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this discourse to specify, at the outset, the perspective from which this study 
perceives policy impacts. This study views real estate policy impact as the 
identifiable social welfare changes resulting exclusively from the introduction and 
enforcement of particular real estate policies. The foci of real estate policy impacts 
measurement are thus to (1) estimate systematically and in a methodologically 
consistent way the magnitude of the net change in social welfare resulting 
exclusively from particular real estate policies (Baker, 2000); (2) ascertain the level 
of accountability and efficiency in the use of resources on the part of the public 
institutions and staff in charge of real estate policy enforcement and (3) draw 
attention to important policy lessons learnt from successes and failures, to do 
things better in future ( see further World Bank, 1998). Quantitatively, impacts are 
measured in terms of attributes of the policies on which numeric values can be 
ascribed (Lichfield, 1996). Typically such attributes are defined in appropriate 
units using appropriate social science and quantitative principles (Rau and 
Wooten, 1980). When these issues are made explicit through impact analysis they 
help concentrate the minds of governments and those in charge of the wealth of 
nations more on the outcomes as opposed to outputs from policies (Polidano, 
Hulme et al., 1993). An important merit of such numeric measures is that even lay 
economists can relate. 
5.2 THE RATIONALE FOR THE MEASURING FRAMEWORK 
In recent times, modelling economic impacts of exogenous interventions have 
become increasingly elegant among economists (Kahn, 1931; Keynes, 1936; 
Harberger, 1972; Baker, 2000; Harberger & Jenkins, 2002). For decades, economists 
in all fields have been preoccupied with developing, refining, rejecting and 
revising economic impacts methods (Haab and McConnel, 2003). Lewis (1988) for 
instance outlined at the bibliography over 400 references to published U. K. as well 
as significant overseas impact studies including those that dwelt mainly on 
methodological issues. A curious discovery however is the limited penetration of 
these theoretical insights into the arena of practical applications (Harberger & 
Jenkins, 2002) to the extent that the World Bank ( see Baker, 2000, p. vi) could note: 
"despite the billions of dollars spent on development assistance each year, there is 
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still very little known about the actual impact of projects on the poor". Several 
reasons have been adduced for this inertia. 
The most prominent is that "many governments, institutions and project managers 
are reluctant to carry out impact evaluations because they are deemed to be 
expensive, time consuming, and technically complex" (Baker, 2000). Many of the 
existing evaluation works have also been criticised for lack of analytical rigor 
(Baker, 2000). Further, as argued in Chapter 1 and 2 much of real estate policy 
impacts have been assessed qualitatively and hence make it difficult for lay 
economists to relate well to these results. It is thus imperative in seeking to obtain 
a more accurate and reliable appreciation of the economic impacts of real estate 
policies in sub-Saharan Africa that these impediments are prevailed over by 
formulating an appropriate measuring method that is inexpensive, less time 
consuming and less technically complex without compromising accuracy and 
reliability of results. The conventional methods are reviewed and appropriately 
adjusted where possible to devise such a method. 
5.3 REVIEW OF THE CONVENTIONAL METHODS 
Over the years economists have succeeded in developing quantitative methods for 
evaluating impacts of policies or exogenous changes in economic systems (see 
further Sen, 1968; Lichfield, Kettle et al., 1975; Haveman, 1976a; Elias, 1977; 
Leistritz, Chase et al., 1984; Sah and Stiglitz, 1985; Folmer and Nijkamp, 1985; 
Lichfield, 1996). However, these methodologies have not headed in the same 
direction. Whiles some have concentrated on theoretical and mathematical 
correctness of the model building processes and the derivation of formulae others 
have concentrated on the practical aspects of designating the area of impact, 
collecting data or finding suitable proxies and attempting to estimate the impacts 
(see further Lewis 1988, p. 163). 
Viewed from the standpoint of philosophy of knowledge claims these methods 
have developed along both quantitative and qualitative paradigms (Baker, 2000; 
Purdon et al 2001). Perceived also from the standpoint of economic theory these 
methods have developed along macro (see further Lewis, 1988) and micro 
economic (see further Haab and McConnel, 2003) realms. This review adopts the 
micro and macro economic classification because they provide a conceptual rather 
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than a philosophical view of the methods and hence offer a good basis for 
ascertaining their data requirements, economy and complexities. The resultant 
model can then be positioned within appropriate knowledge claims or 
methodology. 
5.3.1 Macroeconomic Methods 
The macroeconomic methods are captured impacts of exogenous interventions at 
the aggregate or economy wide levels. They proceed on the fundamental 
assumptions that exogenous interventions such as real estate policies precipitate 
changes in the functioning of the applicable wider economic systems. 
Real estate policies can and do have far-reaching and more complicated impacts on 
economic systems than currently understood. Figure 5-1 is an admittedly 
simplified representation of the likely macroeconomic changes that real estate 
policies interventions could occasion in any society. Each box represents a 
macroeconomic variable that is likely to be affected by particular real estate 
policies. Ideally, thus, the appreciation of the full economic impacts of real estate 
policies will have to entail the measurements and aggregation of the magnitude of 
changes in each affected macro-aggregates in the particular economic system. 
Without a doubt this by itself is unwieldy and further compounded by the fact that 
the individual macro-aggregates are measured in different units. The process is 
thus simplified using a nodal approach. In the nodal approach critical macro- 
aggregates that capture the resultant net changes from specific group of individual 
aggregates are identified and their overall net changes measured as indices of the 
impacts. Ultimately, it is the scale of the net changes in these critical aggregates 
attributable to particular policies that provide measures of their economic impacts. 
Traditionally these critical macro aggregates nodes include Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), Employment, Interest Rates, Investment and Capital Formation 
and Per Capita Income among others. The task of macro-economic impact 
evaluation methods is thus to track and estimate net changes in these macro- 
aggregate variables exclusively. This is often a very complex process as policy 
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Trying to isolate policy specific impacts from other non-policy impacts has 
remained intractable and it is the end to which much of the methods and 
approaches under this framework have been directed. The two most widely 
employed multipliers both in theoretical and empirical studies are: The Keynesian 
Model and the Input-Output Mode (Bushnell and Hyle, 1985; Lewis, 1988; Turco 
and Navarro, 1993; Wang, 1997). The Multiplier concept forms the basis of these 
methods. 
5.3.1.1 The Multiplier 
The multiplier concept is an investment or expenditure based impact analysis tool, 
which attempts to compute the aggregate turnover of each initial exogenous 
capital injection into economic systems such as real estate markets. It works on the 
basic principle that each initial capital injection into economic systems generates 
multiple rounds of incomes and expenditures (Lewis, 1988). Illustratively, when 
say capital is initially injected into the real estate sector, portions of this go to 
suppliers as payments for inputs whiles portions may also go into payments for 
wages and salaries of the particular real estate sector labour. Portions of the profits 
that the suppliers make from the sales are most likely invested in expanding their 
businesses in response to increasing demand for real estate related inputs. This 
business expansion creates further jobs and profits. They thus increase the total 
incomes of both the suppliers and their employees. If demand for real estate exists 
then the ready availability of inputs for real estate production will lead to 
expansion of the real estate business leading to the creation of further jobs, 
incomes and profits. Thus with one investment total income for both real estate 
investors, input suppliers, real estate sector labour and employees of input 
suppliers increase. This increase in total income expectedly leads to increases in 
spending by these income recipients say on consumption goods. This will in turn 
generate increase demand for consumption goods, which will ultimately result in 
further job creation in the consumption good sector. This will also commence 
another round of increase earning, expenditure and job creation ( see further 
Venieris and Sebold, 1977). The economic impacts of the initial capital injection 
into the real estate sector is thus the sum total of all business, economic activities, 
employment or income that it generates (Hughes, 2003). 
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The multiplier concept estimate the multiple of an initial income injection (the 
multiplicand) by which total income in the system changes (Lewis, 1988, p. 164) 
and to provide estimates of how much total business or income results from an 
initial capital injection ( see further Lee, 2001 ). Generally, this is estimated as the 
arithmetic sum of the respective amounts returned each time into the income 






X= percentage of the new income a consumer will spend rather 
than save or leak out 
Y= percentage of consumer expenditure made in the society 
Z= percentage of business expenditure made in the society 
This estimated multiplier is then multiplied by the initial investment to arrive at 
the overall economic impacts of that investment 
Real estate policies engender capital and income injection into an economy in two 
main ways. (1) (a) Direct government capital injection in the construction of say 
new housing units and other real estate facilities, (b) funding of annual budgets of 
government departments created to enforce real estate policies including the 
emoluments of staff of these department, administration, services and investment 
expenses. (2) Private sector capital injections incentivised by particular real estate 
policies. The sizes of these injections as well as the efficiency with which they enter 
the income stream to generate rounds of expenditure, business and income 
determine their eventual impacts. Thus if the reduction or increase in capital or 
income injection (the difference between potential investible capital and actual 
capital invested) attributable to particular real estate policies for instance can be 
established and tracked through the income stream the impacts of the policy can 
be estimated. This will be the aggregate difference between the potential multiplier 
effects that could have been generated had the policy not been in place and the 
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actual multiplier effect achieved with the policy in place. This can be estimated as 
the magnitude of change in the size of the multiplier attributable to particular real 
estate policies. 
These estimations are by no means simple as the estimation of potential capital or 
income injection in the absence of particular policies can hardly be done with great 
certainty. Besides, not all receipts of newly injected incomes are necessarily 
reinvested or re-spent to generate rounds of business, expenditure and income. As 
captured by the equation above, systematic analysis suggests that in most cases 
only a portion of incomes may be spent within the particular economic system 
(Archer, 1984; Crompton, 1995; Wang, 1997). This implies that not all new income 
remains within the income stream to contribute to economic impacts as they no 
longer contribute to business creation and income generation within the particular 
economic system (Vane and Thompson, 1982). Portions are normally leaked out of 
the income stream through savings and transfers outside the particular economic 
system. In the case of government interventions leakages are rife. These tend to 
come in the form of taxes, national insurance and superannuation deductions, 
official and extra-legal costs of compliance with policies, diversion of resources 
into unproductive activities so as to comply with or enforce policies. 
All these leakages would have to be established and deducted from policy induced 
capital or income injections into the economy before the true impacts of the 
policies can be ascertained. The challenge is that, not all of these leakages are 
explicit and calculable (see further Tullock, 1967; Niskanen, 1981). It is therefore 
difficult and improbable that a precise estimate of the full impacts of real estate 
policies can be realised. Even more difficult is the estimation of capital injections 
from the private sector end of the equation as well as the tracking of each of such 
injections throughout the income stream. In the developing world where data is 
highly impoverish (Flood, 1997; Baker, 2000) gathering such data will entail the 
investment of huge resources and time in collecting these data from primary 
sources. 
It is thus fair to conclude that the macroeconomic methods are unsuitable for 
medium to small-scale impacts evaluation as intended in this study particularly in 
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the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Given these limitations reliance is heavily 
placed on the microeconomic methods in devising the model presented in this 
Chapter. 
5.3.2 Microeconomic Methods 
Unlike the macro economic methods, the microeconomic methods concentrate on 
the impacts of policies on individual market participants. The central organising 
principle of these methods is to determine as far as practicable the change in 
economic conditions of affected individuals attributable to the existence of the 
policies under consideration. This can be accomplished if the counterfactual that is 
the economic conditions, of the affected individual prior to the introduction of the 
policy can be fairly and accurately estimated. Estimating the counterfactual has 
always been tricky in most cases simply because of the difficulties inherent in 
identifying and distinguishing the actual economic effects of the policies under 
consideration from non policy induced effects that may correlate with the 
outcomes (Baker, 2000). As Ezemenari et al (1999) points out "accurate and 
successful evaluation are those which are able to control for these effects" and are 
able to net out their effects from the true effect of the policy, a somewhat complex 
task. 
Profound complexities arise when viewed in the context of real estate policies. The 
core of these complexities relate to the difficulties in identifying comparison or 
control groups required for estimating the counterfactual as, generally, the scope 
of real estate policies are so wide in most cases nationwide making it improbable 
to find comparison groups. Even with those real estate policies confined to specific 
groups or geographical areas, it may be practically impossible to find other 
identical or comparable groups or locations that are unaffected by particular real 
estate policies concerned. There is thus the need for a method that can circumvent 
the control group problem. The starting point for such a method as devised in this 
study is to estimate the net benefits or costs associated with particular real estate 
policies as felt by affected individuals. The three welfare economic postulates 
(Harberger & Jenkins, 2002) that form the basis of microeconomic methods are: 
1. The voluntary (competitive) demand price for each unit of a good or service 
represents the value of that unit to the demander; 
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2. The voluntary (competitive) supply price for each unit represents the value 
placed on that unit by the supplier; 
3. To obtain a measure of net benefit or costs for an aggregate of the 
individuals or for society as a whole, one simply adds up (across all 
individuals in the relevant group) the costs and benefits measured 
according to postulates 1 and 2; 
Real Estate price data are thus the prime source by which the impacts of real estate 
policies can be deduced. Implicit in this price data are: (a) the demand price for 
applicable policies; a measure of the extra social welfare benefits induced by the 
policy and (b) the supply price of the policy; the extra social welfare losses or costs 
induced by the policy. The difference between (a) and (b) represents the impacts of 
the policy concerned. When the resulting difference is positive, then the policy is 
then contributing to improving the social welfare situation. Conversely when the 
difference is negative the policy is contributing to worsening social welfare 
situation. The theoretical framework by which the difference can be computed is 
the cost-benefit analytic framework. 
5.3.2.1 The Costs Benefit Analytic Framework 
The costs-benefits framework was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a 
technique for project evaluation which could be used across the economy (Stern, 
1989b; Harberger & Jenkins, 2002). The framework has since gained wide usage 
among development agencies such as the World Bank ( see Baker, 2000), OECD ( 
see Little and Mirrless, 1969), DFID ( see WELL, 1998) and the United Nations 
(Dasgupta et al (1972). The concept can be explained from the traditional demand 
curve. 
Consider Figure 5-2 for instance as the demand curve for particular urban real 
estate for an individual purchaser. Take the vertical axis to represent the unit price 
and the horizontal axis, the corresponding quantities. The vertical axis thus 
represents the marginal benefits derivable from the real estate from the point of 
view of the purchaser. Let Pi denote the equilibrium price of the property, which is 
a measure of the benefit it provides and Xi the equilibrium quantity. 
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Ultimately, the purchaser could afford up to the price, P3. Yet, rationality and self- 
interest maximisation suggests price Pi and quantity Xl to be the optimal price and 
quantity decision point. Purchasers who operate at this optimal price-quantity 
point are left with surplus disposable income, or consumer surplus of size EAB. 
Since at the equilibrium point the market price, demand price and supply price 
equalises (see Harberger and Jenkins, 2002), the costs of real estate also equal its 
benefits. Thus at equilibrium and in the absence of market distortions the real gain 
to the purchaser it could be argued is the consumer surplus. 
Any purchase above price Pi will result in a diminution of the consumer surplus 
whiles any reduction in price below Pi will also reduce the size of the consumer 
surplus on each unit purchased. Efficiency thus suggests that real estate policies 
that expands the supply price (extra costs incurred) above the demand price (extra 
benefits) or even contract the quantity in a way that bring demand price above the 
supply price are non-welfare enhancing. The key issue is thus to ascertain the gap 
between demand price and supply price of real estate brought about by particular 
real estate policies over the relevant period of time. Based on this framework a 
model is derived to help evaluate the true economic impacts of any gap that may 
exist between the extra costs and benefit. Figure 5-3 presents the basic analytical 
framework for the model. 
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5.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
In formulating this model an attempt is made at grafting some of the applicable 
benefit measurement methods onto costs measurement methods to deduce net 
benefits or costs. 
Two main microeconomic methods are applicable for estimating benefits of real 
estate policies. One method derives benefits via the behavioural route using 
mainly Standard Hedonic Price Model (HPM). The other method derives benefits 
using Stated Preference Approach using essentially contingent valuation methods 
even though conjoint and choice models may also be considered. The costs are 
essentially estimated using the deadweight loss approach. This enables the 
subsequent deductions of the estimated marginal costs of policies from their 
marginal benefits to arrive at the true marginal impacts. 
5.4.1 Estimating Benefits 
The two broad methods within the costs-benefit framework applicable to public 
policy benefit measurements are (1) the stated preference method and (2) the 
revealed preference method. Both approaches are geared towards estimating the 
maximum amount that individuals are willing to pay or have actually paid as the 
demand price for particular real estate policies. They also seek to measure the 
amount that purchasers will be willing to accept or have actually accepted for the 
extra reduction in their consumer surplus on account of a policy. These benefits are 
estimated from the perspective of market participants and that of government. 
5.4.1.1 Benefits to Market Participants 
As the figure shows, the benefits that individual market participants derive from 
real estate policies can be computed using both the behavioural and stated 
preference approaches. Both approaches are considered below. 
5.4.1.1.1 Option A: Revealed Preference Approach 
The principal method under this approach is the hedonic pricing model. The 
earliest work that employed the hedonic technique is credited to Hass in 1922 and 
Wallace in 1926 (see further Colwell & Dilmore, 1999). Gril fiches (1971) developed 
these earlier works further into an approach for measuring the price changes of 
commodities as price indices. Subsequently, Rosen (1974) methodically established 
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the theoretical foundations for the approach employing the method in the 
determination of the bid prices, or implicit value of attributes of a commodity for 
different consumers. Rosen (1974) defined the bid price as the maximum amount 
of money which consumers are willing to pay for a good under the condition that 
they retain a specific level of happiness or utility. The hedonic model views a good 
or commodity as consisting of bundles of heterogeneous sets of attributes and 
regards the relationship between the price of a good (V) as a function of the 
aggregate sum of each of the particular attributes that define them (x)(Rosen, 1974; 
Saderion, Smith, & Smith, 1993; Mills & Simenauer, 1996; Meese & Wallace, 1997; 
Hidano, 2002). This can be expressed functionally as: 
V= 
. 
fi(x) Equation 5-2 
In which the price is a dependent variable and the attributes are independent or 
explanatory variables. As applied to urban real estate the hedonic function is 
postulated to be of the form: 
I 
V, = ßo +>ßj + e, Equation 5-3 
1-1 
In which V, is the price of the ith property, /0 is a normal regression intercept, ý8, is 
the magnitude or the implicit price of the jth attribute. This represents the revealed 
marginal prices of each attribute, that is, the monetary equivalent of the revealed 
marginal willingness to pay for each attribute. Z, is the jth attribute of the ith 
property. Conventionally (Balchin & Kieve, 1977; Hallett, 1979; Harvey, 1987; 
Balchin, Bull, & Kieve, 1995) the set of attributes for urban properties may include: 
size, age, location, material of construction, workmanship, and number of rooms 
among others. E, is the stochastic term that accommodates any envisaged errors of 
measurements. The partial derivatives of the price V, with respect to each of the 
variable attributes in turn, that is 1 provides the monetary measure of the 
revealed marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit of each particular 
attribute. From the economic viewpoint, this estimate is the measure of the direct 
benefits of the respective attributes (Hidano, 2002). 
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It can thus be argued that when urban properties share identical attributes and are 
affected by different policies; any observed difference in their prices can be 
attributed to the differences in the applicable policies. Thus to account for the 
differences in price (benefits) attributable to particular policies, it is imperative that 
equation 5-3 is amended to take on board the applicable policies as additional 
attributes that contribute to the determination of the price of affected urban 
property. If Pu is taken as the variable representing policy z applicable to the ith 
property with z=1,2,3... k, the above equation can be expanded to capture Pu . 
Moreover, given that most of these policies have been in existence for many years, 
the equation is again amended to introduce into it a year specific variable (5, ) to 
account for historical property prices. The resultant model: equation 5-4 below is 
then postulated as the general hedonic equation for estimating the monetary 
measure of the benefits of particular urban real estate policies. 
1 
V, _X30+Lß, x, ß+2PPR+8t+E; Equation 5-4 
J=1 
Where VP, is the price of ith urban property affected by the applicable policy Pz, A 
is the magnitude of the implicit price of the zth policy. This represents the revealed 
marginal price of each applicable policy. That is, the monetary equivalent of the 
revealed marginal willingness to pay for additional unit of each applicable policy. 
This provides a measure of the economic benefits of policy PZ on the ice-affected 
property. This benefit can be isolated and measured by calculating the partial 
derivative of the price with respect to the policy specific variables. All other 
variables are as previously defined. 
Many studies (Bailey, et al, 1963; Rosen, 1974; Saderion et al., 1993; Mills et al., 
1996; Meese et al., 1997; Simon, Quercia, & Marice, 1998; Colwell et al., 1999; 
Hidano, 2002; Des Rosiers, Theriault, Kestens, & Villeneuve, 2002; Morancho, 2003; 
Frew J& Jud, 2003; Wolverton & Senteza, 2003; Griliches, 2003) have employed the 
hedonic approach to estimate the impacts of particular urban real estate policies 
mainly in the developed world context. In Jakarta, Indonesia Dowall and Leaf 
(1998) used the technique to estimate the benefits of land title in that country. 
Within sub-Saharan Africa Asabere (1981a; 1981b) and Arima, (1992); have 
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employed the technique to investigate various aspects of the region's urban real 
estate market. 
5.4.1.1.2 Option B: Stated Preference Approach 
Stated preference methods are typically relied on to measure the economic benefits 
of non-market goods. Thus in relying on this approach as an alternative benefit 
measurement technique in this framework, real estate policies is treated as non- 
market goods for which the utility they offer can be elicited from affected 
individuals' preference measurements. The methods under this rubric essentially 
work around the notions of compensating and equivalent variation (Friedman, 
2002) or the concepts, willingness to pay (VVTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) 
(Haab & McConnel, 2003). WTP represents the maximum amount of money that 
an individual is willing to pay in exchange for an improvement in circumstance or 
consumer surplus brought about by a policy. Alternatively, it is the amount a 
person is willing to pay to avoid a decline in consumer surplus or economic 
circumstance. On the other hand, WTA is the minimum amount of money a person 
will accept to forgo an improvement in consumer surplus or economic 
circumstances. Compensating Variation (CV) represents the amount of money 
paid or received in respect of a policy that leaves the person at the initial level of 
well-being. Equivalent Variation (EV) represents the amount of money paid or 
received that leaves the person at the final level of well-being (Haab & McConnel, 
2003). All these provide benefit measurements for surveyed individuals with 
respect to particular real estate policies. 
Unlike the Hedonic model which derives the benefits of policies from the 
composite price paid, the stated preference methods derive the benefits of non- 
market goods from the utility preference of individuals. Their income levels 
invariably influence the preference of actors and this is taken into serious 
consideration in the stated preference method. The premise of these methods is 
that, individuals will rationally strive to maximise utility and minimise 
expenditure associated with particular commodities subject to their income levels. 
Deducing from the hedonic model above, take the maximum utility that a person 
can derive from the purchase of particular real estate can be stated as: 
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J 
U; = /30 +Lß, xy +e, Equation 5-5 
Accordingly the individual maximised utility function transposes to equation 5 
when the property is affected by policy Pz. 
I 
Up, = /30 + L)6, Xy + ApPiz + 8t + E, Equation 5-6 
J=j 
All other variables are as defined above. Thus the maximum amount those 
individuals will be willing to pay for the policy can be estimated as: 
Up, -WIPP>_U, Equation 5-7 
WTPp is the maximum amount that individuals will be willing to pay for policy P. 
In the same way the minimum amount that individuals will be willing to accept 
for particular policy can be obtained as: 
Up, +WTA = U, Equation 5-8 
These thus provide an alternative framework for estimating benefits. Economists 
estimate the WTP or WTA Contingent Valuation methods are employed to 
procure data on the variables for these equations. 
The earliest application of contingent valuation methodology is credited to Davis 
(1963). Ever since many researchers such as Cummings et al, (1986) have employed 
the technique to show that, "when CV [contingent valuation] method is used to 
estimate the use of goods and services with which the individuals are familiar... 
CV surveys that are carefully designed and administered can yield accurate and 
useful information on household's preferences". Brookshire et al (1982) also show 
that contingent valuation and hedonic models yielded similar magnitudes for the 
WTA for improvements in air quality in Los Angeles. 
Contingent valuation is a process by which analysts typically pose contingent or 
hypothetical questions to policy affected individuals asking them to state their 
WTP (or accept compensation) for a specified public policy (Haab & McConnel, 
2003). The idea is to stimulate a market for non-marketed goods and obtain a value 
for that good, contingent on the hypothetical market described during the survey 
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(Wedgwood and Sansom, 2003). Thus applied to urban real estate policies the 
survey will seek to obtain the amount that real estate market participant's will be 
willing to pay for particular policies to continue to regulate their behaviours or 
willing to accept for the application of say compulsory acquisition policies to their 
property rights. Data obtained from the survey is then subjected to statistical and 
mathematical analysis from which inferences about WTP or WTA is made. At a 
more sophisticated level, Ordinary Least Square regression analysis could also be 
conducted to establish how peculiar traits of respondents including their socio- 
economic standing, incomes, status on 'real estate markets and attitudes influence 
their WTP and WTA. 
Whiles the method look straightforward to apply it is fraught with failings some of 
which could be ameliorated. For a start, the open ended questioning adopted in 
contingent valuation surveys are open to problems not the least is the inherent 
difficulty in getting respondents to assign monetary value to non-market goods 
such as urban real estate policies, something they are most likely unfamiliar with 
(Hanemann, 1994). While respondents may be able to make judgments on their 
preference for particular policies, they may find it a balancing act, in the absence of 
comparable prices or data, to be precise on the amount that they may be willing to 
pay or accept for the policy. To counteract these weaknesses, the referendum 
approach to contingent valuation has most recently been evolved. In the 
referendum approach relevant respondents are asked to make a discrete choice 
between two alternatives: pay nothing (extra) and maintain the status quo or pay a 
specified 'bid amount' for the continuous existence of the policy (Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW, 2001). 
The bid amount is varied continuously until the maximum bid amount is reached 
and that becomes the WTP or WTA for the concerned respondent. For instance 
rather than asking how much a respondent is WTP or WTA for a policy, the 
question posed under the referendum approach takes the form: "would you be 
willing to pay £X for your property to be subjected to policy Y? " in which X; is the 
bid amount with i= 0,1,2 .... n and n is the maximum bid mount. In this case, the 
answers obtained will usually take the form (yes or No) and these can be encoded 
as binary data and analysed to estimate a binary logit model of respondent choice. 
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From the model, value placed on the policy by the sampled population can be 
estimated and subsequently scaled up to cover the entire population. Though the 
referendum approach somewhat overcomes some of the bias in the open-ended 
approach it does not entirely free the contingent valuation method from 
weaknesses. Even under the referendum approach, in the absence of comparable 
market data, it will be difficult for the maximum bid amount selected by the 
respondent to be an objected valuation of the benefits of the policy. 
Secondly, the very hypothetical nature of the contingent valuation method opens 
the approach up to bias. Perception may differ from reality and in the absence of 
real life; situation utility maximisation may not be the only factor that may 
influence the choices of respondents. Respondents may even consider potentials 
for opportunistic behaviours or possible free riding which will motivate them to 
state much lower bid amounts and hope that government will bear the remaining 
costs whatever that may be. Besides, what respondents may state as their WWP 
under hypothetical conditions could change markedly when they are asked to 
actually pay or accept that amount. This therefore undermines the value of the 
approach when applied in practice. Li and Mattssson (1995) estimates that this 
could lead to serious bias by as much as a factor of six time of the true W TP. 
Perhaps the greatest shortcomings of contingent valuation are the costs and steep 
resource requirements. Although the reliability of contingent valuation in 
estimating the willingness to pay or accept has been widely attested to, its 
reliability is heavily dependant on the sample size surveyed. Large sample sizes 
yield better outcomes but are costly to implement. The DFID guidance manual on 
water supply and sanitation programmes for instance argues that "using CVM 
[contingent valuation methods] adds significantly to the cost and time needed for 
small survey demand assessment studies, but incremental costs will be relatively 
modest if a large random sample is to be undertaken in any case" (WELL, 1998 p. 
110). Wedgwood and Sanson (2003, p. 15) reports, based on evidence from Tanzania 
(Dar es Salaam), Uganda (Bushenyi) and Kenya (Mombasa) that a robust 
contingent valuation survey for small towns could costs up to US$ 20,000. The 
report mentions further that other experts notably the DFID have estimated the 
minimum price of contingent valuation surveys to be "US$ 50,000 and the high 
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quality large scale urban studies can costs up to US$ 150,000" (P. 15). Regarding the 
requirement on time and human resources for contingent valuation The World 
Bank team spent at least four weeks assessing Household Demand for improved 
sanitation in Kumasi, Ghana (Whittington, 1993). The team for this exercise 
comprise 20 enumerators, field supervisors and six staff contracted by the World 
Bank. Wedgwood and Sanson (2003, p. 15) provides what they describe as 
reasonable contingent valuation survey guidelines for a small town to consist of 
"30 days from the main staff member/ consultant who is familiar with the 
technique, 20 days from a support person and 15 days for each of the 
enumerators". These resource requirements are not trivial and are beyond the 
scope envisaged by the model presented in this paper. Thus for such small to 
medium scale evaluation exercise the DFID manual (WELL, 1998) recommends "if 
resources are available the contingent valuation method is the most reliable 
... however, in different circumstances, 
less costly options can yield worthwhile 
results". 
The weaknesses of the contingent valuation not withstanding, the impoverished 
data on property prices that adequately reflects the policy attributes of particular 
land parcels places greater restrictions on the hedonic approach for this study. The 
study thus relies on the contingent valuation approach to solicit real estate valuers 
expert valuation of the economic benefits of the respective policy strands derived 
in Chapter 4. The details of this approach as employed in this thesis are provided 
in Chapter 6. 
5.4.1.2 Benefits to Government 
In addition to the benefits as revealed by affected individuals, the service charges 
and fees paid to government departments to obtain services under applicable 
policies constitute revenue or benefits to government, GR. The total revenue 
associated with policy implementation can be obtained from the Generated 
Revenue Function (GRF) expressed as: 
n 
GR= _ OZR1 +E Equation 5-9 
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In which q$ = The average unit change in revenue associated with a unit change in 
output of policy z 
RZ = the revenue associated with the implementation of policy z. 
Thus based on equation 5-4 and 5-9 the marginal benefits (MBZ) associated with 
policy PZ can be estimated by summing up the values of the marginal benefit and 
marginal revenue associated with PZ. This transposes into equation 5-10 below. 
MB= = At + ýZ Equation 5-10 
5.4.1.3 The Social Marginal Costs 
The social marginal costs - the excess burden of policies - whether real estate 
related or not is the totality of: (1) The marginal welfare losses associated with the 
market distortions induced by charges and payments incidental to particular 
policies; (2) The marginal administrative costs incurred by governmental 
departments in administering the policies and (3) the actual out of pocket 
compliance costs (see further Harberger, 1964; Browning, 1976; Posner, 2005). 
Much theoretical and empirical work now exists on the measurement of social 
costs (or excess burdens) of variety of policies (Pigou, 1947; 1962; Vickery, 1963; 
Tullock, 1967). Even so, the Harberger triangle postulated by Arnold Harberger 
(1964) remains the cornerstone of current models for measuring social costs 
implications of policies. Some even argue that prior to Harberger's work; 
economists had no means of measuring the social costs or excess burden of policies 
(Hinds, 1999, p. 186). 
Interestingly, these works have largely occurred within the western world and 
concentrates almost exclusively on the social costs implications of taxation policies 
or monopoly power. There appear to be very little applications of these models in 
the sub-Saharan Africa real estate field. With some modifications essentially to 
incorporate the peculiar nature of costs imposed by real estate policies in Ghana, 
this Chapter extends the Harberger model into the arena of sub-Saharan Africa 
real estate policies. The Harberger model is modified and adapted in this model by 
incorporating indirect compliance costs including travel costs, costs of waiting and 
expediting and gratuities payments that have almost become conventional 
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payments in addition to official fees in real estate policy compliance in these 
countries. Additionally, the marginal administrative costs incurred by the 
respective delivery agencies are also built-in. In formulating the model it is worth 
noting that, real estate policies come in two main levels; (1) those policies that 
regulate or intervene at the demand ends (purchasers) of the market and (2) 
policies that regulate or intervenes at the supply ends (suppliers) of the market 
Each comes with its own peculiar marginal social costs and needs to be estimated 
independently for a clearer picture. The basis of the social marginal costs of 
demand end real estate policies is illustrated in Figure 5-3. 
d, Figure 5-3: Excess Burden of Policy 
(l+ c, ) 
Al DC E 
Pr 
d 
CO re re 
Where in a particular situation both levels of policy are in force, the marginal 
social costs of each contribute essential fragments to the associated multilevel 
marginal costs analysis. In the figure the assumed optimal demand of real estate is 
0 re at a price pe achieving equilibrium in the absence of real estate policy 
interferences atE. When real estate policies are introduced the effect of the costs 
they bring about on purchasers at say rate Cr is to raise the purchase price of real 
estate from Pr to Pr 
(i + Cr) 
. This shifts the compliance equilibrium upwards to 
point B. In this partial equilibrium framework the distortion caused by the 
compliance costs associated with real estate policy is measured by the loss of 
consumer surplus, the excess burden of the policy. In most of sub-Saharan Africa, 
in-built policy delivery traditions demands that out of pocket indirect compliance 
costs are incurred in addition to official charges. These include expediting and 
gratuity fees paid by market dealers to engage officials of delivery agencies to 
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personally follow up and ensure the expeditious formalisation of the payee's 
documents. This practice, as the study discovered, is so pervasive that the costs 
they impose can no longer be overlooked in any policy analysis. The indirect 
compliance costs imposed by real estate policies also includes costs incurred in 
contract formation, travel costs and costs of lag and waiting times. Let indirect 
compliance costs be represented by ' and official charges by f92. As stated supra 
the indirect compliance costs, ' is a conglomerate of range of costs functionally 
represented as: 
n 
oA =I(a; +A+s, 
; _I 
Equation 5-11 
In which i= the policy process and i =1 +2+... + n, a, = costs of contract 
documentation, ß, =costs of site plan, 8, =travel costs, A, =costs of lag time and so 
on. 
The effective marginal costs imposed on purchasers indicated in Figure 5-3 as 
c, can therefore be computed as c, = w, + w2. Only w2 represents a source of 
revenue to government. The indirect payments a are private unofficial payments 
some of which are earned by particular officers of the enforcement institutions. If 
the marginal costs of policy delivery is represented by 9g then from Figure 5-3 the 
social costs of real estate policies, which is the loss of consumer surplus over and 
above the revenue raised plus the costs of administering the policy can be 
expressed functionally as: 
i; =9g+2(APxAr) Equation 5-12 
In which 2 
(Op x Or) = the area of the triangle C in Figure 5-3. But price elasticity 




I. OP re 
This implies that 
Equation 5-13 
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Or=Ep re xAP Equation 5-14 
From Figure 5-3 Ap = c, x pe . This implies that Equation 5-14 can be rewritten as: 
r Ar -EP 
e xCrXPe ---i(rexc 
Pe 
Equation 5-15 
Plugging equation 5-15 into equation 5-11, social costs of real estate policies can be 
estimated as: 
P, p = t9g +2 
(Op 
x c; (r. x Cr)) Equation 5-16 
Since Op = c, x pe equation 5-16 can be rewritten as: 
Pp = 9g +2 
((c,, 
x Pe) X EP (re x c, )) Equation 5-17 
But c, = tvl + w2 which implies that. 
P, p = 9g + 
1(((cß, 
+ ao2) x pe) X Ep (re x (to, + w2 ))) Equation 5-18 
P, p = 9g +2 EP 
((aý + w2 )2 x pe X re) Equation 5-19 
In which re pe = price or value of real estate for quantity re . Thus at the margins the 
marginal social costs MS p or excess 
burden of real estate policies can be expressed 
as: 
MSp =9g+1((6; p0A+C021)2pe) Equation 5-20 
In which welfare costs W, is represented by the 
2 ((sp (cý + wZ, )Z pe) component of 
the equation. With policies that affect the supply ends of the market the marginal 
costs assessment can be looked at from a slightly different perspective as shown in 
Figure 5-4. 
The effect of such policies is to lower the earnings of real estate suppliers. If by 
virtue of the policy the earnings of real estate suppliers are reduced by say m, , its 
146 
THE MEASURING FRAMEWORK 
effect will be to reduce the earnings of suppliers from Y° to Y(l - m). In response 
to this reduction in earnings economic rationality suggests that, law-abiding 
suppliers will end up reducing their supply from re° to r,,. By cutting back on their 
supplies, real estate suppliers sacrifice earnings to the tune of the area indicated by 
BA r° re in Figure 5-3 and gains excess stock and resources of the size DA r° r,,. 
yo 
e 
Y(1- m, ) 
Figure 5-4: Supply Side Excess Burden 
The difference between the two BAD represents the total welfare costs or social 
marginal costs of such supply side policies. If it is assumed that no extra-official 
payments are required to comply with these policies as the case of Ghana the 
study area of this study shows, then from equation 5-20 above the marginal social 
costs of such policies can be estimated by the equation: 
MSS = 9g +2 
((Ep(Cr)2Pe) 
Equation 5-21 
Thus for policies that affects both the supply and demand ends of the market the 
overall social marginal costs (OSMC) become the sum of equation 5-20 and 5-21: 
OSMCp = (MS`P +MP, ) Equation 5-22 
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By identifying and computing the range of costs (co + ßv2) and 9g coupled with 
knowledge of the ex-ante real estate prices, pe the welfare cost as well as social 
costs of respective policies can be evaluated. This is the ends to which the ensuing 
sections are devoted. 
Before turning to the ensuing discussions, it needs to be borne in mind that in 
Ghana as in many sub-Saharan African countries different real estate policy 
delivery processes require different compliance activities and hence different 
indirect compliance costs are incurred. Besides the compliance costs incurred 
accumulates as market dealers' progress from one compliance activity to another. 
Each indirect compliance costs contribute a fragment to the overall costs incurred 
under particular policies. Thus in computing the indirect compliance costs 
incurred by applicants under the various compliance processes, a two-staged 
process is adopted. Firstly the major activities involved in the policy delivery 
processes are identified both from the perspectives of the government and real 
estate market dealers. The second stage is to trace the costs of each activity and 
accumulated them for particular policy delivery process according to the process' 
demand for these activities. 
5.4.1.4 Estimating the impacts 
Based on the central argument of this paper that urban real estate policies are 
worthwhile only when the costs they bring about are at least commensurate with 
the associated gains, at the margins the economic impacts or marginal gains (MG; ) 
of these policies on the ith property can be estimated employing equation 5-23 
below: 
MG, = MB.. - OSMCP Equation 5-23 
One can then estimate a rate of return index of policies by expressing their MG as a 
percentage of their marginal costs as in equation 5-24. 
ROR = 
(MYOSMCP 
* 100 Equation 5-24 
Equation 5-24 then provides a meaningful ranking of policies based on their rate of 
returns. 
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5.5 SUMMARY 
While elaborate methods exist within the economic text by which real estate 
policies can be estimated, their peculiarly large data requirements and 
complexities makes them unsuitable for this study at least in their pristine state. 
This has necessitated the development of a bespoke model. This model offers a 
uniform way of ascertaining real estate policy impacts relying on a 
considerably low amount of data and resources and provides an index for 
international or within country policy impacts comparison. It is used to 
estimate the economic impacts of urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa using Ghana as a case study country in chapters 8 and 9. 
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Chapter 6 
The Methodology of Inquiry 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having established in Chapter 5 the measuring framework by which the economic 
impacts reported in this thesis is procured, it is vital to display now the nature of 
the raw materials or data that went into the framework and the "local processes by 
which they were compressed and rearranged to make the conclusions credible" 
(Cronback and Suppes, 1969). To accomplish this, it is vital at the outset to set out 
the road map -"local processes"- by which the relevant data were appropriated 
and analysed to yield the conclusions reached. It is to this end that this chapter is 
directed. The local processes of concern to this chapter range in particular from the 
general philosophical ideas behind the inquiry through to the detailed data 
collection and analysis procedures. These are taxing but critical issues. Not least 
because they are the prime apparatus by which sensitive tradeoffs were made 
between triviality, adequacy and economy without compromising the relative 
rigour, accuracy, validity and reliability of the results of the study. 
At the same time these help avoid resource wastage through the investment of 
time, money and efforts in endeavours that would have produced in the end, 
irrelevant data and outcomes. Conventional texts (see further Moser and Kalton, 
1971; Babbie, 1973; Doyal and Roger Harris, 1986; Babbie, 1990; Alreck and Settle, 
1995; Kerlinger and Lee, 2000a; Fowler, 2002a; Creswell, 2003a) offer authoritative 
and well grounded pre-existing frameworks in which typical research studies can 
be lodged to achieve these tradeoffs more aptly. But, these conventional texts are 
generally based on experiences and conditions prevalent in western societies. In 
reality, nonetheless, prevailing conditions in developing countries as Ghana, 
regarding data availability, data quality, language barriers, literacy levels and 
communication media among others tend to differ considerably from what pertain 
in the west. Developing countries for instance face peculiar social data problems ( 
see further Rimmer, 1982). As Murthy (1978, p. 32) remarks "if a serious study of 
the availability of reliable data is undertaken, the situation in many developing 
countries is likely to be found to be quite alarming". These peculiar conditions on 
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occasion necessitate modifications of some of these traditional procedures and 
assumptions before meaningful results could be achieved. That said, whether or 
not these modifications are necessary at all, and if they are, the nature of 
modifications required depend in essence on the research paradigm of the study. 
6.2 THE RESEARCH PARADIGM 
It is vital to specify at this stage the study's paradigm of knowledge claims or 
philosophical assumptions about what is to be learnt and how it is to be learnt 
(Creswell, 2003, p. 6). To this end, the study takes a philosophical position on the 
basal constituent of knowledge (ontology), its nature, origin and scope 
(epistemology), its value compositions (axiology), how it is effectively and 
persuasively written about (rhetoric) and the processes for studying it 
(methodology) (Creswell, 1994; 2003). 
In the past two decades, philosophical knowledge claims, research methodologies 
or paradigms of inquiries have multiplied to a point at which researchers have 
many choices (Creswell, 2003). So also, the considerations that inform the choice of 
research methodologies have multiplied. The choice of an alternative research 
methodology or philosophical approach to knowledge claim is not to be made so 
much on the basis of their general strengths or weakness. On balance, they are all 
pervaded with strengths and weaknesses and it remains a moot point whether one 
is stronger or weaker than the others. Thus a general theory of choice for research 
methodologies based on these weaknesses and strengths is unlikely to provide an 
all-purpose objective guide. To be relevant, choices have to be made in the context 
of the research problem at hand together with the theoretical perspective of the 
study, experiences and skills of the researcher and the intended research audiences 
(Creswell, 2003, p. 21). This study has been driven from the outset by the quest to 
derive numeric measures of the economic impacts of urban real estate policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This commitment, more than anything else, dictates the choice 
of quantitative knowledge claim and research methodology as the foremost 
paradigm for this study. 
The quantitative methodology as adopted in this study constitutes that alternative 
knowledge claim also called positivist, post-positivist (Creswell, 2003b), 
empiricism, scientific method (Doyal and Harris Roger, 1986) and empirical 
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science (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000b). This knowledge claim philosophy counters the 
inadequacies of the constructivists' alternative to knowledge claims. The 
constructivists' paradigm, also called the qualitative, grounded theory, 
phenomenology or ethnographic design, contends particularly that real truths are jE 
relative rather than absolute. They are, it is argued, not independent of, but rather 
situated within the multiple meaning of individual beliefs, ideological learnings 
and experiences (Creswell, 2003). They thus exist only in mentally constructed 
form (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 234). For, knowledge about processes, 
behaviours and conditions, are perceived in terms of how the individuals or 
groups being studied perceive them (Valadez and Bamberger, 1994). For this 
reason constructivist researchers are in essence subjects in their own studies. While 
this researcher-subject nexus enhance the quality of knowledge discoveries of 
fi 
constructivist inquirers, it also exposes them particularly to the putative threats of 
"going native" or becoming so enmeshed with objects that they have difficulty 
t4i separating their own experiences, beliefs, ideologies and desires from their 
subjects' (Sandelowski, 1986, p. 30). This in turn becomes the single most important 
threat to the objectivity of the knowledge or truth claims of the constructivist <<. I 
studies. ±, 1
This also presumably crafts a very frail isomorphism between the findings of 
constructivist studies and the "real" world thereby rendering qualitative 
knowledge claims highly subjective and fraught with, dogma, speculation, value 
judgement or superstition- "anything but science" (Doyal & Harris Roger, 1986). It 
accordingly renders constructivist ontology and epistemology controversial and 
sometimes doubtful. Besides, owing to the fact that truth and reality under 
constructivist paradigm "exist in different forms in different minds, depending on 
different encountered circumstances and history, based on different experiences, 
interpreted within different value systems" (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 234), 
generalisation of constructivist research findings are considerably restricted 
(Baker, 2000). Again, human beliefs, ideologies and desires are constantly 
changing. This implies that truth in the qualitative sense is an unstable 
phenomenon. Since reliability in research is essentially an assessment of the 
stability of the phenomenon being assessed and of the instruments used to assess 
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them (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 234) the reliability of constructivist findings are 
also restricted. 
With these constraints reliance on the constructivist's research methodology will 
deny this study its very essence - to obtain as much as possible value neutral 
measures of the economic impacts of urban real estate policies. It lacks the needed 
tools to ensure in particular internal validity, external validity, reliability and 
objectivity. More so, available techniques devised to overcome these inadequacies 
have so far not been directed so much at remedying these inadequacies as to 
devising alternative criteria such as credibility; confirmability, transferability and 
dependability for conceptualising and enhancing the goodness of constructivist 
knowledge (see for instance Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 234). 
To accomplish the attainment of largely value neutral measures of the economic 
impacts of urban real estate policies thus: 
It is necessary that a method should be found by which our 
beliefs may be determined by nothing human but by some 
external permanency- by something upon which the ultimate 
conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method 
of science [the empiricist ontology and epistemology]. Its 
fundamental hypothesis is this: there are real things, whose 
characters are entirely independent of our opinions about 
them (Buchler, 1935, p. 18). 
The earliest formulations of the empiricists' ontology, epistemology and 
methodology laid claim to the existence of absolute rather than relative truth about 
human behaviours, which can be positively appropriated (Phillips & Burbules, 
2000). This absolute truth, it is argued, exists in reality outside the researcher and 
thus its structure and content are independent of their beliefs or desires (Kearney, 
1964; Quinton, 1980; Losee, 1980; Doyal & Harris Roger, 1986 p, 2). To this claim, 
the empiricist perceive the researcher, not as a subject in the study as the 
constructivists tradition, instead as a subject trying to understand an object in a 
more objective way by eliminating the bias that could lead to inaccuracies and 
weaken the researcher's ability to discover the true shape of reality (Doyal & Harris 
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Roger, 1986; Kerlinger & Lee, 2000b). Nonetheless, following the work of Comte, 
Mill, Durkheim, Newton and Locke (see further Creswell, 2003, p. 7) it is now well 
established that absolute truth and positive claim to knowledge about human 
behaviours and actions is unattainable ( see further Phillips and Burbules, 2000) 
Primarily as Popper (1957; 1972; 1976; 1980) argues, inquiry does not begin with 
open-mind collection of unambiguous data. Observations, it is argued, are always 
made instead with some problems in mind and are selected and interpreted in 
relation to tentative solutions to that problem. Both the selection of empirical 
evidence and the terms in which it is to be described are dictated by specified 
theory (Doyal & Harris Roger, 1986 p, 11). 
Accordingly, as Popper (1957; 1972; 1976; 1980) argues, it is only through the non- 
inductive process of theoretical conjecture and experimental refutation, combined 
with a drive to explain and discover increasingly at every state of scientific inquiry 
that the explanatory power of scientific theories is consistently increased. Thus 
rather than pursuing absolute truth, empiricists are now concerned with truth, 
objectively ascertained. Knowledge that results from such modified empiricism, 
develops from careful observation and measurement of objective reality that exists 
"out there" in the world (Creswell, 2003b). Kuhn (1970; 1972) postulates that such 
objectively ascertained truth is relative to the paradigm within which it is 
ascertained. Kuhn defined a paradigm in this context as the set of conceptual 
commitments, which dictate what is defined as a genuine research problem, how 
scientists should try to solve it and what they will accept as effective criticism of 
their solution. It is the imperviousness of paradigms to empirical refutation, that 
makes successful science or empiricist knowledge possible at all (Creswell, 2003b). 
Within this paradigm the empiricists knowledge is appropriated through scientific 
deterministic and reductionism principles by which empiricists research 
concentrates on determining the probable cause of outcomes by reducing ideas into 
small discrete sets of ideas, as variables in research questions and hypothesis to be 
tested (Creswell, 2003b , p. 7). Hypotheses in this sense refer to statements 
describing what are empirically expected, which can be tested. If these expectations 
do not occur, the hypothesis is seen to be refuted ( see also Doyal & Harris Roger, 
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1986; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). The key hypotheses for this study are thus 
postulated based on the research questions raised in Chapter 1 for empirical testing. 
6.3 THE HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses to be verified are: 
Hl Regulative real estate policies will have lower compliance costs than 
distributive and redistributive polices. 
Hi Redistributive real estate policies will have higher compliance costs 
than distributive policies. 
H3 Regulative real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than distributive and redistributive real estate policies. 
H4 Distributive real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than redistributive real estate policies. 
Hs Regulative real estate policies will have higher benefits than 
distributive and redistributive policies. 
H6 Distributive real estate policies will have higher benefits than 
redistributive real estate policies. 
H7 Regulative real estate policies will have positive economic impacts as 
their associated social welfare costs will fall short of their 
corresponding social welfare benefits. 
Hs Distributive and redistributive real estate policies will have negative 
economic impacts, as their associated social welfare costs will exceed 
their corresponding social welfare benefits. 
H9 Redistributive policies will yield higher economic deficits than 
distributive policies. 
Hio The direct costs of enforcing respective categories of real estate 
policies in Ghana are not significantly different and are also not 
excessive. 
Hypotheses Hi to H5 are tested in Chapter 7 whiles hypotheses H6 to H9 are tested 
in Chapter 8. The final hypothesis, H10 is verified in Chapter 9. Before turning to the 
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verification of these hypotheses, the strategy or methods by which the data on the 
variables used as inputs was acquired is described. 
6.4 THE STRATEGY OF INQUIRY 
To ensure sufficient objectivity of the outcomes, it is a cardinal principle in the 
quantitative tradition to device strategies by which the variances of independent 
variables are maximised, whiles extraneous variables are controlled and error 
variances are minimised (see Kerlinger et al, 2000). These are customarily 
accomplished, within the empiricists tradition, through undistorted or 
uncontaminated recording of particular observations gained essentially from 
either experiments or surveys devised to facilitate the discovery process (Doyal & 
Harris Roger, 1986 p, 2). Experimental designs particularly require the contrivance 
of a setting which could be actively manipulated, either in a laboratory or in a field 
situation so that the data resulting from the effects of that manipulation on the 
experimental participants can be observed and gathered (see Bryman and Cramer, 
1999, p. 5). 
Thus, as applied to this study, this would entail the setting up of real life 
experiments or quasi experiments with the random or non-random assignment of 
real estate market participants to particular real estate policy regimes with the 
view to observing and collecting data on the economic impacts of these simulated 
policy environment for analysis ( see Baker, 2000). This also would necessitate a 
replication of the policy enforcement arrangements within this controlled 
environment for reality to be amply approximated. The true effect of this 
simulated policy environments could however only be ascertained by comparing 
the obtained data with those of another set of randomly assigned participants, 
controlled group, who are in similarly controlled but non-policy environment. 
Even if it is assumed that the establishment of such experimental groups and their 
corresponding control groups were economically feasible and methodologically 
possible, it will be very difficult to tell how long it would have to take for the 
simulated policies to start having observable effects. This could be years. 
This is obviously an expensive and time-consuming enterprise, which is 
unaffordable given this study's limited resource and time constraints. It is also 
devoid of the many spontaneous interactions that real estate policies usually make 
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particularly with the customary tenure system or even the natural price system 
both of which bear considerably on policy outcomes. This implies that the results 
obtained would likely to diverge starkly from the objective truth that is being 
sought for in this study. Even when the natural settings within which real estate 
policies function in reality are to be leveraged, the nationwide application of real 
estate policies makes it impossible for statistically significant different control 
groups to be established for comparison. Besides, it is not possible to manipulate 
the study's main independent variables- - real estate policy induced costs and 
benefits - and thus all such variables had to be collected as they are in reality. 
These inadequacies restrict the suitability of experimental design approach for this 
study. 
Thus the survey design approach was relied on exclusively. With the survey 
design there is no need to manipulate any variable of interest as in the case of 
experimental design. Data relating to all variables are collected simultaneously 
(see Bryman and Cramer, 1999, p. 5). An added advantage of the survey approach 
is its strength in enabling attributes of a larger population to be identified from a 
small group of individuals (Babbie, 1990) thereby permitting generalisation and 
inferences to be made from sample estimates to the population (Babbie, 1990). 
Besides for this study, the survey designs appeared economical to implement as 
compared to experimental designs. 
In implementing the survey design, it was necessary to take conscious steps to 
eliminate the effect of possible influential variables on the dependent variable. 
This was realised by ensuring that the participants surveyed (see below) were 
selected to be as homogenous as possible while embodying the diversities of real 
estate policy actors and recipients. For instance, the cross section of the real estate 
policy delivery agencies surveyed was perceptibly homogenous in terms of their 
mode of conduct, funding, budgeting and methods of policy delivery. Yet they 
represented the diversity of conditions and types of policy delivery systems in the 
study site. The need to control extraneous variables necessitated the adoption, as 
far as possible, of random sampling methods in selecting policy recipients or 
participants for the survey as that was thought likely to ensure that effects of 
extraneous variables will eventually cancel out and support generalisation of 
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conclusions. Additionally, extraneous variables considered critical, such as income 
building into the research design these as attribute variables controlled disparities 
between participants, gender and the policy zones of operation of respondents. 
These efforts yielded additional research information about the effect of these 
extraneous variables on the dependent variable and about their possible 
interaction with other independent variables. Error variance was also controlled 
essentially through the improvement in the reliability of the measuring 
instrument, given as far as possible specific and clear instructions to participants 
and by excluding from the survey situation factors that are extraneous to the 
research purpose. 
6.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
In view of resource constraints and data limitation the survey was cross sectional 
in that the requisite data was collected at one point in time (between June, 2004 
and January 2005) using varied data collection methods. In all, four main 
approaches were employed in gathering the requisite data for this study. These 
were (1) self administered questionnaires; (2) interviews with sampled bureaucrats 
in charge of policy enforcement (3) structured review of financial and 
administrative records obtained from sampled government departments and (4) 
structured observations particularly to collect information on time spent on policy 
enforcement activities. The details of these are discussed later in this chapter. 
6.5.1 The Population and Sample 
Based on the research questions and the resultant hypothesis the population with 
the requisite attributes were selected with a view to avoid confounding the data by 
extraneous variables to preserve the generalisability of the findings from the 
samples drawn. Given the time and resource constraints of this study, the goal of 
information gathering was not intended to generate statistics about the entire 
populations identified. The aim, on the contrary was to produce quantitative data 
within the resources available for the study that can be subjected to rigorous 
analysis to make inferences to the population and to address the research 
questions and hypotheses raised earlier using the formulated quantitative 
measuring framework of Chapter 5. This implies the need to sample representative 
segments of the population in a way that these goals can be accomplished more 
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economically. The sampling methods employed to realise this end are described in 
the following section. 
6.5.2 Sampling 
To ensure efficiency in outcome and a high level of accuracy in generalisation of 
the results to the population it is vital to ensure that the selected sample is suitably 
representative of the population. Best practice suggests that a representative 
sample should be so drawn that every member of the population concerned has a 
specific non-zero probability of being included in the sample (Oppenheim, 2001 
, p. 39). That is to say that every member of the population should have equal 
chance of being selected. This necessitated choices to be made about the 
appropriate sample frames, that is, the set of participants drawn for the survey (see 
further Fowler, 2002b , p. 10). The respective sample frames and corresponding 
sampling for this study are described below. 
6.5.3 Respondents and Participants 
Using the cluster sampling technique (see further Oppenheim, 2001) the 
population of concern within the study site was clustered into subgroups 
according to their shared characteristics and stratified by their relation with real 
estate policy, notably: 
" Real estate policy delivery institutions 
" Real estate policy recipients 
" Real estate market mediators 
The sampling processes by which samples were drawn from these population 
segments are discussed below. 
6.5.4 The Sampled Real Estate Policy Institutions 
In Ghana, the arrangement for real estate policy delivery comprises a robust and 
institutionally wide network of interrelated but independent civil service 
organisations. The Ghana Land Policy Document (GLPD, 1999) lists 18 of these 
government departments. In reality however, as this survey established, only six 
government departments in addition to their parent Ministries are directly 
responsible for the task. For the rest, real estate policy delivery is only tangential to 
their core functions. 
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At the apex of real estate policy delivery in Ghana is the Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry, the main governing body, under which all the departments but the Town 
and Country Planning Department operates. The departments comprise (1) The 
Lands Commission - responsible for the management of public lands, certification 
of stool land transactions, assisting in land title registration and land policy 
advisory services (see further Lands Commission Act, 1994 (Act 483)); (2) Land 
Valuation Board- responsible for government valuation functions including 
preparation of valuation lists for local authorities, assessment of compensation for 
state acquisitions, valuation of state owned properties and stamp duty assessment 
(See further, PNDC Law 42 of 1986)); (3) Land Title Registry- responsible for parcel 
based land title registration across the country (see further Land Title Registration 
Law, 1986 (PNDCL, 152)) (4) Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands- 
responsible for the collection and disbursement of stool land revenues in 
accordance with a prescribed formula (see further, Office of the Administrator of 
Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act, 481)); (5) Town and Country Planning Department- 
responsible for physical planning, zoning and development control (see further 
Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1945 (Cap 84); Local Government Act, 
1994, (Act 462); (6) the Survey Department responsible for surveying and mapping 
of land parcels (see further The Survey Act, 1962 (Act, 127). 
With the exception of the Town and Country Planning Department whose 
functions falls outside the study's scope of property acquisition and registration all 
the above listed agencies (excluding the parent Ministries) were purposively 
sampled and surveyed. 
6.5.5 The Sampled Real Estate Policy Recipients 
These categories of respondents were the dealers- purchasers and suppliers- of real 
estates that incidentally are the main recipients of real estate policies in Ghana. For 
the reason adduced earlier respondents from this group were randomly sampled 
and surveyed. The main impediments to this were the absence of published lists of 
real estate suppliers and purchasers from which the sample could be drawn. This 
also made it impossible to establish the sizes of the respective population and 
hence denied any chance of employing rigorous selection methods such as the use 
of random numbers tables. Thus the size of the selected samples was determined 
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largely by the constraints of available resources and time for the study. In all a 
total of 303 respondents from this category were randomly sampled and surveyed. 
The samples drawn were not stratified on the basis of gender as the absence of 
published lists made it impossible to identify the actual gender composition of the 
population to warrant any such gender stratification. However the gender 
representation of the respondents is analysed. 
In surveying these selected samples the unique permanency and conspicuousness 
of real estates made it somewhat easier to locate some of these recipients by 
visiting them at home. Some were also surveyed when they visited the 
enforcement agencies to follow up on the processing of their applications. The 
instrument used in this survey will be briefly described later in the Chapter. 
6.5.6 The Sampled Market Intermediaries 
This sample was drawn from the population of professional real estate valuers in 
Ghana. The list of professional valuers was obtained from the offices of the Ghana 
Institution of Surveyors in Accra, Ghana. Though the selection of sampled valuers 
was undertaken randomly, only valuers with considerable post qualification 
experience (minimum 10 years) in the sampled geographical areas were surveyed. 
In all 10 experienced valuers were surveyed essentially to obtain their professional 
assessment of the economic value of particular policies using the contingent 
valuation approach described in Chapter 5. The instruments used at this phase of 
the survey will also be looked later in the Chapter. 
In addition to the sampled respondents and participants, the geographical territory 
within which the survey was conducted was also systematically sampled as 
discussed below. 
6.6 THE AREA SAMPLING 
The almost 19 million population of Ghana, the site for this study (Chapter 1) can 
be categorised into four geographical strata: Regions, Districts, Localities and 
Neighbourhoods. Administratively there are 10 mutually exclusive regions with 
identifiable boundaries in Ghana. Table 6-idepicts the names of the administrative 
regions and their corresponding demographic attributes. The number of 
administrative districts within regions varies, the Ashanti Region having the most- 
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-eighteen, and the Greater Accra Region and the Upper West Region having the 
fewest--five. Since the compilation of this table, 28 more districts have been 
created. Each district contains several urban localities which also in turn contain 
several neighbourhoods. 
Table 6-1: Regional Demographic Characteristics of Ghana 









1 Western 11 1,924,577 36.3 420,000 
2 Central 12 1,593,823 37.5 540,000 
3 Greater Accra 5 2,905,726 87.7 730,000 
4 Volta 12 1,635,421 27 380,000 
5 Eastern 15 2,106,6% 34.6 570,000 
6 Ashanti 18 3,612,950 51.3 740,000 
7 Brong Ahafo 13 1,815,408 37.4 450,000 
8 Northern 13 1,820,806 26.6 200,000 
9 Upper East 6 920,089 15.7 60,000 
10 Upper West 5 576,583 17.5 150,000 
Total 10 110 18,912,079 43.8 4,240,000 
Sources: Adapted from GSS (2000; 2002a) 
Since it was impracticable in this study to survey all these localities, representative 
samples were drawn from which the clustered samples were also drawn and 
surveyed. Given the hierarchical structure of the Ghanaian population this area 
sampling was carried out in four stages: (1) Regional sampling (2) District 
sampling (3) Locality sampling and (4) Neighbourhoods sampling. 
Going by the probability sampling technique, each of the ten regions had equal 
chance (1/10) of being sampled for the surveyed. However since the study is 
urban focused, using random or probability sampling could lead to the selection of 
regions with considerably low urban attributes such as the Upper East and Upper 
West Regions. This could compromise the validity of the conclusions drawn from 
the survey in serious ways. To obviate this problem the scale of urbanisation was 
rather employed as the prime selection criterion to arrive at some judgement on 
the most representative geographical area (s) to be survey. Since nationally Ghana 
is about 44 percent urbanised (Table 6-1) this figure was used as the threshold limit 
such that regions above this urban threshold (national average) were deemed 
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sufficiently urbanised to provide reliable and valid data for credible results. 
According to the table only two regions, Ashanti and Greater Accra met this 
criterion. Indeed apart from these two regions the rest of the country remain 
predominantly rural (GSS, 2000, p. 2). Of the two, the Greater Accra region is the 
most urbanised as reflected in the table and hence offers better prospects and was 
thus chosen for this study. That the Greater Accra region is representative of sub- 
Saharan Africa cities is also well corroborated by Antwi (2000). With the Greater 
Accra region sampled, it became opportune to sample localities within the region 
for the survey. This makes it an obvious choice on the basis of both sampling 
factors. 
The demographic details of the 20 largest localities of the Greater Accra region are 
presented in Table 6-2 below. Neighbourhoods within these localities were further 
classified into policy zones according to their predominant real estate policies for 
ease of reference (Table 6-2). As illustrated in Table 2, apart from regulative 
policies, which generally apply nationwide, distributive and redistributive policies 
in Ghana have been enforced in specific neighbourhoods. Even with the regulative 
policies, certain strands are applicable only within specific neighbourhoods. For 
impact evaluation purposes thus, it was presumed vital to select these 
neighbourhoods in ways that would ensure that neighbourhoods with different 
applicable policies are sampled to enable some sense of control and comparison to 
be established for counter factual reasons. Even so, since the localities vary widely 
in their urban character, it was important to make the urban attribute a factor in 
the selection of the localities to be surveyed. 
The locality sampling was thus based on two main factors. First was the size of the 
population as an indicator of their urban status. Second was the type of applicable 
policies. This was to maximise variance and also to avoid sampling of localities 
that have fewer than necessary applicable policies. 
The table shows that within the Greater Accra region, the Accra metropolis is by 
far the most urbanised locality with an appropriate blend of applicable policies. 
Figure 6-1 below is a map of the city of Accra. Preliminary inquiries revealed 
however that distinctive data on redistributive policy zone in the Accra metropolis 
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METHODOLOGY OF INQUIRY 
Table 6-2 provides statistics and policy attributes of the twenty largest localities in 
Accra, Ghana. 
Table 6-2: 20 Largest Localities of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana 
Locality Population 
Total 
houses Policy Zones 
Accra Metropolis 1,658,937 131,355 Mixed (except redistributive) 
Ashaiman 150,312 9,813 Regulative - Zone 1 
Tema 141,479 17,199 Distributive 
Madina 76,697 6,948 Regulative - Zone 1&2 
Tema Newtown 58,786 4,771 Regulative - Zone 1 
Adenta East 31,070 5,060 Regulative - Zone 1 
ashibi 30,193 5,191 Regulative - Zone 1 
Dome 29,193 3,448 Regulative - Zone 1 
Gbawe 28,989 4,193 Regulative - Zone 1 
aifa 26,145 3,289 Regulative - Zone 1 
New Achimota 22,767 2,898 Redistributive 
Sakumono 20,172 3,028 Distributive 
Awoshie 19,890 1,906 Regulative - Zone 1 
fankor 16,177 2,219 Distributive and Redistributive 
Anyaa 15,738 2,281 Regulative - Zone 1 
hantan 13,585 1,426 Regulative - Zone 1 
Amanfrom 12,803 1,704 Regulative - Zone 1 
denta West 12,559 1,825 Distributive 
Sowutuom 12,520 1,503 Regulative - Zone 1 
Ashale Botwe 11,974 1,667 Regulative- Zone 1 
Source: Adapted from GSS (2002b) 
This is because, in this locality, the redistributive zone, East Legon Ambassadorial 
Area, is so close and in some parts so enmeshed with the distributive policy zones, 
East Legon Residential Area. Such is the proximity of the two policy zones that it 
was anticipated that the differences in the impacts of the redistributive policies 
could not so objectively be distinguished from those of the distributive policies 
using the contingent valuation technique. 
Thus a redistributive policy zone that is considerably adrift of distributive policy 
zones had to be selected. From the table it could be noted that the only such 
locality is the New Achimota locality otherwise referred to as the Sports Complex 
area. This locality is almost exclusively a redistributive policy zone as briefly 
discussed below and was thus purposively sampled. As the Accra metropolis has 
some 20 or so distributive policy zones and an equally large number of regulative 
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policy zones 1 and 2, random sampling was used at this stage to sample the 
distributive and regulative policy zones within these neighbourhoods. 
6.6.1 The Sampled Redistributive Policy Zone: New Achimota Area 
This zone is located in the North western section of Accra covering approximately 
2,870.60 acres of land which was originally acquired by the Government of Ghana 
under the Executive Instrument No. 61 of 1975 for a National Sports Complex with 
adjacent first class residential and commercial areas. The Sports Complex 
Residential Area comprises about 962 acres, to be managed by the Lands 
Commission. An approved planning scheme was prepared for the area creating 
799 residential plots and 21 plots for other uses. These plots were allocated for 
private residential development between 1977 and 1979. The State Housing 
Company was to develop housing estates on 1,099.2 acres of the land as part of the 
development of the complex. The remaining 870.20 acres were reserved as the 
sporting zone where all the sports facilities were to be built. 
For various reasons government did not pay compensation to the 352 dispossessed 
landowners. This inertia on the part of government engendered a spate of 
encroachment in the area in 1987. Attempts by government to combat and check 
these encroachments including construction of access roads and demolishing of 
encroached properties, which proved futile. By 1989, the landowners had started 
using thugs to threaten the lives of officers of the Lands Commission who patrol 
the area. This made any attempt to stop the encroachments even more futile. Thus, 
though by 1979 all 799 plots had been allocated by the Commission only 487 of the 
lessees were able to take possession of their plots due to resistance from the 
disposed owners. In all at least 90 percent of the area was at the time of the study 
under encroachment by the disposed owners. These encroachers are having 
difficulties obtaining formal titles to their properties. 
6.6.2 The Sampled Distributive Policy Zone: East Legon Area 
This policy zone is located within the North Eastern section of Accra metropolis 
covering an area of 5.6 square miles. This zone was compulsorily acquired in 1944 
by the then Government of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) under Certificate of Title 
No. 404/1944. This was acquired as an extension to the previously acquired 1.248 
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square miles in 1936 for an Anti-Amaryl Aerodrome under Certificate of Title no. 
252/36. While portions of the Anti-Amaryl Aerodrome land were developed into 
the Kotoka International Airport, the acquired extension remains essentially 
undeveloped for almost two decades. In 1960 the first postcolonial Cabinet 
authorised the subdivision of the extension into urban land uses for distribution to 
private developers. The East Legon Residential Area layout encapsulated five 
existing settlements - Shiashie, Abotsiman, Okponglo, La Bawaleshie and Gointe. 
Upon a petition to the Head of State a committee of enquiry was set up in 1975, 
which recommended that all the settlements be retained, but the residents should 
upgrade their structures to meet the standard of development envisaged for the 
areas. The Lands Commission commenced plots allocations for private 
development at East Legon in 1975/76. It was however not until 1980/81 that 
access roads were provided in the estate (Larbi, 1994). Due to a shortage of state 
lands in Accra in general, re-entries have been rigorously pursued in East Legon 
(since 1985) and other government distributive zones of Accra to recover 
undeveloped lands for re-allocation (see Larbi, 1994). 
6.6.3 The sampled Regulative Policy Zones 1 and 2: Ajirigano and Baatsonaa 
These are areas typically controlled by traditional land owning agents. The 
sampled Policy zone 1, Ajirigano, is a comparatively new and fast developing 
residential area contiguous to the East Legon distributive zone. The Odaitei Tsewe 
family as affirmed by a high court judgement owns lands in this policy zone. 
Policy zone 2, Baatsonaa, is located within the South Eastern section of Accra. 
Lands in this area are owned and administered by the Nungua land owning Stool, 
a corporate land owning community. 
Having established the sampled respondents, participants and policy zones of 
Ghana that this study concentrated on, the next section takes a look at the type of 
variables on which data was procured for the analysis. Figure 6-2 provides the 
structural relationships of the central variables of the study. 
5 The full recommendations of the Committee of enquiry are found in the Alomatu Committee Report, 
Ministry of Lands and Forestry, July, 1978. In all 103 dwelling houses had either been turned into a 
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6.7 THE VARIABLES IN THE STUDY 
In order to assess the validity of the hypothesis, measures of the constituent 
variables or constructs in the hypothesis were devised. As the Table 6-2 depicts, the 
central goal was to obtain information on the dependent variable, economic 
impacts. This dependent variable however depended on the two key independent 
or explanatory variables- social costs and social benefits of the respective real 
estate policies. These top level independent variables are also dependent on a 
series of subordinate independent variables. In the case of the social costs, these 
subordinate independent variables consist of welfare costs of policies, the 
administrative costs of policy enforcement and the costs of complying with 
applicable policies. The compliance costs independent variables are also derivable 
from two main subordinate independent variables: direct compliance costs and 
indirect compliance costs variables. The direct compliance costs depended on the 
subordinate variables: Official fees and Extra-official payments. Yet the indirect 
compliance costs variable depended on some five subordinate independent 
variables namely; Search costs, Contract costs, Travel costs, Lag time costs and 
Waiting time costs. As can be seen from the diagram the social benefit variable was 
derived mainly from a single subordinate variable; the Extra value. 
Thus by capturing data on variables at the lowest level of the hierarchy, the 
higher-level variables can be computed. Data on the lowest level variables were 
captured using purposively designed research instruments. The data obtained was 
analysed and inputted into the framework equation in Chapter 5 to estimate the 
economic impacts of the real estate policies. 
6.8 THE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
To obtain the relevant data on the outlined variables three separate instruments 
were developed and administered. The first instrument, indexed as CP-COST001- 
2004/5 was developed and used exclusively to collect data on the costs of 
compliance with particular real estate policies in Ghana. The main respondents for 
this instrument were the real estate policy recipients as described above. The 
instrument is subdivided into five main sections. Table 6-3 summarises the 
contents of the instrument. In all, the instruments comprised 21 distinct questions 
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measuring five distinct independent variables. A sample of the questionnaire is 
provided at the appendix 19 at page 324. 






Items on Survey 
Instrument 
1 Respondent's Attributes CP-COST001-2004/5 Q1 to Q6 
2 Search Costs CP-COSTO 01-2004/5 Q7 to Q9 
3 Costs of Contract CP-COST001-2004/5 Q10 to Q13 
4 Expediting payments CP-COST001-2004/5 Q14 to Q16 
5 Follow up Costs CP-COST001-2004/5 Q17 to Q21 
6 Costs of Policy Administration AD-COSTS002-2004/5 All 
7 Respondent's Profile EX-VALUE003-2004/5 Q1 and Q2 
8 Extra Benefits of distributive Policies EX-VALUE003-2004/5 Q3a, Q3b, Q3c, Q3d 
9 
Extra Benefits of Regulative Policies- EX-VALUE003-2004/5 Q4e, f, 4h, gß Q Zone-1 
10 
Extra Benefits of Regulative Policies- EX-VALUE003-2004/5 Q5i, Q5j, Q5k, Q51 
Zone-2 
11 
Extra Benefits of Redistributive EX-VALUE003-2004/5 Q6m, Q6n, Q6o, Q6p 
Policies 
The second instrument, indexed, as AD-COSTS002-2004/5 was developed to 
compile data on the administrative costs incurred in administering particular 
segments of real estate policies. This instrument was developed in a spreadsheet 
format with provisions for (1) Name of policy enforcement activity (2) Type of 
human resource used and (3) Duration of the activity. A sample of this survey 
instrument is also provided at the appendix 20 at page 330. The data obtained 
using this instrument was supplemented with data gleaned from other 
administrative records and interviews with officials of the enforcement agencies to 
approximate the administrative costs incurred in administering particular policies. 
The third instrument, indexed EX-VALUE003-2004/5 was also developed and 
used to obtain valuers expert opinion of the economic worth of particular 
applicable policies. As shown in the table, the instrument is structured into five 
main sections comprising a total of 20 identical questions. A sample of this survey 
instrument is provided at the appendix 21 at page 331. 
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6.9 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES 
Data for this study was collected over a period of seven months from June 2004 
through January 2005. The instruments were pre-tested in a pilot survey involving 
15 policy recipients, two valuers and one policy delivery institution, the Lands 
Commission. The pilot revealed that alternative instrument administration 
methods as postal, email or telephone were unworkable in Ghana owing to the 
lack of pre-existing published lists including addresses, email and telephone 
numbers. 
These methods were also likely to be relatively more expensive to administer with 
the possibility of considerably low response rates. Also, generally it was found that 
respondents were much more comfortable with the face-to-face approach as this 
provided the opportunity to seek clarification of questions that were unclear to 
them in the course of the interviews. They also found it less bothersome that the 
postal method in particular, which would have required them to devote extra time 
to return it through the post at their own transportation and, expense. Another 
advantage of the face-to-face methods over the telephone interview method for 
instance was the assurance that respondents were dealing with people they can see 
and deal with in a real life context without any suspicion of scams which could 
highly influence the candour with which they respond to questions. As a result, a 
decision was taken on the field to administer instruments CP-COST001-2004/5 and 
EX-VALUE003-2004/5 exclusively by face-to-face interview approach. Four field 
officers were recruited for the task. This approach led to a 100 percent response 
rate. 
With regard to data on the costs of policy administration a different approach was 
used because this information was largely unknown by operatives of the 
responsible organisations. Much of the requisite data was thus acquired from first 
principles through data triangulation by collecting the data from multiple sources 
including interviews, observations and document analysis. This highlights an 
important issue for real estate policy studies in sub-Saharan Africa in general and 
necessitates sensitivity in the design of instruments and the way data on these 
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variables are measured. The data collection on this particular variable was thus 
organised in phases as discussed below. 
6.9.1 Policy Supply Costs 
In Ghana, real estate policies are implemented via an established long continuum 
of multi-segmented official processes and procedures. This study identified at least 
20 distinct segments of the policy enforcement process. The six different core 
public bureaucracies independently enforce the distinct segments of this 
continuum. The process-based approach to policy delivery in Ghana implies that 
the costs of policy supply or administration are the costs of all the interlinked 
processes required to implement the various segments of the continuum. This 
implies that an effective way of measuring the costs and benefits variables of real 
estate policies in Ghana turns essentially on the measurement of the costs and 
benefits dimensions of the various segments of the continuum together with the 
costs of running the organisations. To measure this, there is the need for a rational, 
objective and valid means by which these costs for the respective segments can be 
examined. Since the devised framework relies on marginal costs and benefits 
variables to evaluate impacts, the approach adopted was to determine and 
accumulate the costs of rendering a unit of service under particular real estate 
policy. Under normal circumstances the direct variable costs for a service rendered 
could simply be computed by estimating the costs of labour hours, material costs 
and overheads chargeable to particular processes. 
This can only yield reliable results in organisations that have a well structured 
costs accounting system in which materials issued are chargeable to an 
appropriate job number or overhead account, the relevant information being 
obtained from the stores requisitions (see further, Drury, 1996, p. 60). However, all 
the enforcement agencies are bereft of such elaborate costs accounting systems 
making it all the more difficult and impracticable to use this approach. Preliminary 
investigations disclosed that traditionally public services in Ghana accumulate 
costs on aggregate terms and classify costs in organisational budgets into four 
main categories, personnel emolument, administrative, services and investment 
costs. It is thus these costs that had to be disintegrated in a way that would enable 
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the computation of the marginal costs of each segment of the processing 
continuum. The difficulty at this stage was to do with the choice of an appropriate 
allocation base or the measure for allocating these costs. Direct labour hours and / 
or machine hours are the most commonly used allocation based in most 
organisations (see further Drury, 1996, p. 85). 
This approach was adopted using labour hours rather than machine hours as 
machines hours are more relevant to manufacturing organisations rather than 
service organisations as the land sector agencies. Then again, there is another 
important difficulty that had to be prevailed over. In all the sampled organisations 
the basic source documents for analysing labour hours were nonexistent. None of 
the organisations kept job cards or time sheets from which accurate information on 
time spent per labour (the allocation base) per activity could be analysed. In 
addition idle time cards to record times when particular labour was not working 
on task was also not kept by any of the sampled agencies, indeed all the public 
services in Ghana. Since labour hours were the adopted allocation base, it was 
inevitable that the labour hours spent per activity had to be estimated. In the 
absence of these key documents the most feasible approach was to estimate from 
first principles. 
To build up systematically over a period of time an account of the labour hours 
spent naturally at each stage of the policy enforcement processes - gaining an 
insider view of the processing time, an observational research method was used. 
The first principle approach meant that any account of labour hours spent on 
policy enforcement processes were to be on account of the way staff of the 
sampled institutions work presently. Beker and Geer (1970, p. 133) defined such 
participant observation as that 'method in which the observer participates in the 
daily life of people under studies either openly in the role of researcher or covertly 
in some disguised role'. This method of data collection has been previously 
employed in social science research since the 1920s in America by sociologists 
(Acroyed and Hughes, 1992). In much recent times DeSoto (2000) employed the 
approach to investigate real estate market performance in the third world. In this 
study this was accomplished through the research team's participation in the 
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processes of the organisation to be able to observe and capture the actual time 
spent per labour on each activity. This method of data collection, in contrast to the 
survey methods used, involved the research team in a series of engagements in 
quite ordinary social and work situations in which the research aim of the 
encounter was concealed or at least not disclosed as the paramount point of the 
encounter. This was to avoid reactive effects from staff of the agencies, which 
could disturb the naturalness of their mode of conduct. Rather the team took 
advantage of the fact that the land sector agencies of Ghana allowed private 
outsiders to follow through the processing of their applications from stage to stage 
and from office to office. It was thus convenient for the team to pose as individuals 
following up their documents in the normal way. This was based on insights from 
Gold's (1960) statement that: 
The complete participant realises that he and he alone, knows 
that in reality he is other than the person he pretends to be. He 
must pretend that his real self is represented by the role or 
roles, he plays in and out of the ... situation in relationship 
with people who to him are but informants.. . He must bind the 
mask of pretence to himself or stand the risk of exposure or 
failure. 
In such pose, the team were able to record the time spent by staff at each stage on a 
pre-prepared time spread sheet as they moved from one office or task to the next. 
The spreadsheet served thus as a field log which enabled a detailed account of the 
hours spent per labour category on an activity to be chronicled. Each step was 
observed thrice and the average time adopted. Actually more than three 
observations would definitely have improved the accuracy of the recorded time 
for respective activities. But available resources did not permit that. As a safeguard 
measure thus irrespective of the situation encountered in the process the field staff 
ensured that the time was recorded as accurately as possible. It was reckoned that 
with time individual field staff recruited for the purpose could easily slip out of 
their role as researchers and become instead overindulged in the processes- a 
phenomena termed in research theory as 'going native' (see further Gold, 1960). 
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Yet the team's over concentration on the research could risk their exposure which 
could result in suspect data, waste of time and resources (see further Gold, 1960). 
Getting the balance right meant the need for considerable sensitivity in the 
recruitment of the research team for this task. To pre-empt'going native', national 
service personnel within the organisations that had been with the organisation or 
sector for at least three years were recruited for the job. These recruited persons, 
were already very familiar with the work of the organisations and were considered 
unlikely to be so fascinated by events of the organisations as to cause them to slip 
from their researchers roles easily. However, it was recognised that because these 
field officers were known to the officers they were likely to be given preferential 
treatments and the cases they were following were likely to be dealt with quicker 
than usual. Thus the times recorded by these field officers were presumed to be the 
optimistic task durations. The method enabled the sampled organisations to be 
studied in their natural state. 
The approach is obviously enmeshed with some ethical issues. It is the normal 
practice in research to inform participants and allow them to choose whether to 
participate or not in the research. However in this study, this was most likely to 
jeopardise the research itself by unduly influencing the behaviour of the people 
involved. To overcome this problem, since the data obtained related to the 
organisation as a whole rather than the individual operatives, permission was 
sought and granted from the heads of the sampled organisations. 
The approach helped track first hand, the actual labour hours spent per real estate 
policy processing activity in Ghana. The labour rates for each class of labour were 
then applied to compute the labour costs per activity. To ensure that the true costs 
of policy enforcement was obtained; the market labour rate (rates paid to staff of 
private survey and valuation firms in Ghana), rather than the actual salary of the 
staff (which is considerably lower) were used to compute the labour costs per 
activity. 
6.10 THE DATA ANALYSIS 
The main data obtained from the field survey were coded into Microsoft excel 
computer software version 2003, a spreadsheet analytical package. The data on the 
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costs of procedures for administering the policies were however coded and 
analysed with Microsoft Project version 2003, a project planning and monitoring 
software package. The data were thoroughly inspected and cleaned after which the 
real analysis commenced. The Microsoft Project package enabled the computation 
of the costs per policy task based on the costs of the hourly rate of the human 
resources used per task and the duration of the task. Subsequently, the costs of 
materials and other resources employed were also incorporated to deduce the 
estimate of the costs per task. 
Descriptive analysis was also conducted on the data for the lowermost key 
subordinate variables in the above reference figure. Based on this analysis the most 
typical value (mean, median or mode) was adopted as the relevant data for the 
corresponding variable. These typical values were put together to accumulate the 
values for the next level variables which in turn were also put together to 
accumulate the next until the ultimate dependent variable was estimated for each 
policy strand using the devised measuring framework (Chapter 5). 
In evaluating the running costs of the agencies responsible for administering the 
policies however there was recourse to employ analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Similarly, stepwise regression analysis was employed to evaluate the unique 
contribution of policies to land values, the extra benefits, in the respective policy 
zones as required by the measuring framework. These analyses were aided by the 
use of quantitative data analysis computer program, SPSS and Microsoft Excel. 
Generally multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that helps 
determine the proportion of variance in, preferably normally distributed 
dependent variable, accounted for by two or more independent variables taking 
into account the associations between those independent variables themselves 
(Cramer, 2003, p. 59). The stepwise regression technique is one of two main ways 
that the multiple regression method is used. The other is the hierarchical 
regression method. The stepwise method helps determine which variables explain 
the greatest and significant proportions of the variance in the dependent variable 
of interest and what these proportions are. The coefficient provides information on 
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the magnitude of the unique contributions that each independent variable makes 
to the dependent variables. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) or F-test is a parametric statistical technique for 
determining whether the variance in quantitative variables differ significantly 
from that expected by chance (Cramer, 2003, p. 59). This is achieved by testing 
whether the samples drawn come from the populations with equal mean, by 
comparing the means of the samples (Argyrous, 2003). The means are indirectly 
examined using the estimates of population variances instead (Black, 1999). This 
was employed to establish whether the agencies enforcing real estate policies in 
Ghana exhibits budget maximising tendencies, a tendency that could be promoting 
wasteful expenses in policy administration. 
6.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Lately, ethical considerations have become almost a condition without which the 
admissibility of research in both academia and industry is highly curtailed. 
Certainly this is of grave concern to the University of Wolverhampton where this 
research is based. As a result important steps were taken to ensure that ethical 
issues were properly addressed in keeping with the requirements of the University 
of Wolverhampton. The detail steps taken to ensure conformity of the study with 
the ethics requirements of the University's standards and this was approved by the 
relevant ethical committee before embarking on the field study. These are 
summarised in this section. 
First and foremost the obligation to respect the rights, needs, values and desires of 
respondents and participating organisations were given high premium through 
out the study. To an extent the observational methods and administrative records 
search employed in this study was somewhat obtrusive which invaded the records 
and activities of the sampled agencies and participants. In the course of the study 
sensitive information were encountered intermittently. This was of important 
ethical consideration as the public services are highly visible and was found to be 
under significant scrutiny by both the press and the Ghanaian public. 
Thus the following safeguards were employed to protect the respondents and 
participating institutions. Firstly the research objectives as well as a description of 
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how the data was to be collected and analysed were clearly articulated verbally 
(often in the applicable local dialect) and in writing at the header of the survey 
instruments so that they were clearly understood by respondents and participants. 
Secondly, permission to proceed with the study as articulated was obtained from 
each head of the respective agencies before commencing the survey. Thirdly, the 
rights, interests and wishes of the participating agencies regarding reporting of the 
data and informant anonymity was given priority in the analysis of the data and 
presentation of the results. 
6.12 SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the basic processes by which the raw materials for 
evaluating the economic impacts of urban real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa 
using Ghana as the case study has been compressed and arranged in this study. 
The stage is now set for the presentation of the results of the outcomes of the data 
collection and analysis phase of the study. These will be the task of Chapters 7 to 9. 
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Chapter 7 
Findings and Analysis of the Marginal Costs 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having devised a taxonomy for real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Chapter 4), formulated the measuring framework for analysing the impacts of 
these respective policies (see Chapter 5) and laid out the processes by which data 
was obtained for the computation of the impacts (see Chapter 6), the study now 
turns to the actual evaluation of the impacts. Specifically, this Chapter and the next 
addresses four of the five yet unaddressed research questions of the thesis raised 
in Chapter 1 (see section 1.6) vis: What is the quantitative balance between the 
costs and benefits of these policies? What is the magnitude of the impacts of extant 
sub-Saharan Africa urban real estate policies on the economic welfare of real estate 
market dealers and the broad economy? What are the relationships between the 
real estate policy types and the scale of the economic impacts they reproduce on 
market dealers and the broad economy? How do these impacts materialise? It is 
noted in Chapter 5 that these fundamental questions have two main aspects; the 
social costs aspect and the benefit aspect (see also Figure 5-3). This chapter 
concentrates on analysing the social costs aspects of these questions using 





In which MSS = marginal social costs, welfare costs W,, is represented by the 
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estate. OA = the composite indirect compliance costs made up of- Costs of Contract 
documentation, Costs of Site Plan, Travel Costs, Costs of lag time and so on. w2 = 
Costs of official charges and 9g = Costs of policy administration. 
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The chapter first reports information regarding the data and the response rate 
followed by the reporting of the results and data analysis. This is then followed 
with the computation of the social costs dimension of the respective policies. 
7.2 DATA COLLECTION RESPONSE RATE 
To answer the social costs perspective of the above restated research questions, the 
overall strategy was to survey a sample of 500 policy recipients, randomly selected 
to maximise variation in the independent variables using questionnaire No. CP- 
COST001-2004/5 developed for this thesis. However, owing to resource and time 
constraints, a total of 303 representing a shortfall of 197 from the target sample size 
were surveyed using a face-to-face questionnaire administration method as 
explained in Chapter 6. No questionnaire was posted or left to respondents for 
later collection or administration. 
The main research data obtained is summarised using descriptive statistics and 
grouped by variable types in accordance with the measuring framework. The 
descriptive statistics of each main variable in the research question is analysed in 
separate sections of the chapter. At the end of the chapter the arithmetic means of 
the variables are plugged into the above reproduced equation to evaluate the 
social costs dimensions of the policies. 
Before turning to the analysis of this variable, the profile of the surveyed 
respondents is reported below using the Chi-Square statistical procedure. The Chi- 
square procedure tests the hypothesis that the row and column variables in a cross 
tabulation are independent of each other. The main test statistics under the Chi- 
Square procedure is the Pearson Chi-Square statistic. A low significance value for 
the Chi-Square statistics, typically below 0.05, indicates the existence of significant 
relationship between the two variables. 
7.2.1 Capacity and Gender of Respondents 
The gender and capacity profile of the respondents surveyed to address the 
research question are summarized in Table 7-1. Of the 303 respondents, 302 
indicated their capacity or status on the real estate market. Of the 302,223 (about 
73 percent) are males and 79 (about 27 percent) females. 56.62 percent of the 
surveyed respondents (total = 171 respondents, males = 123 (71.93 percent), female 
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= 48 (28.62 percent)) were private land or property purchasers. 11.26 percent (total 
= 34 respondents, males=23 (67.65 percent), females=ll (32.35 percent) were staff 
of Real Estate development companies. 




Estate Estate Solicitors For Others 
Purchasers Developers Agents Friends 
Male Count 123 23 10 20 35 12 223 
% within Gender 55.16 10.31 4.48 8.97 15.70 5.38 100 
% within Capacity 71.93 67.65 66.67 83.33 77.78 92.31 74 
Female Count 48.00 11.00 5.00 4.00 10.00 1.00 79 
% within Gender 60.76 13.92 6.33 5.06 12.66 1.27 100 
% within Capacity 28.07 32.35 33.33 16.67 22.22 7.69 26 
Total Count 171.00 34.00 15.00 24.00 45.00 13.00 302 
% within Gender 56.62 11.26 4.97 7.95 14.90 4.30 100 
% within Capacity 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Field Survey 
Estate Agents formed 4.97 percent of the respondents (total = 15, males = 10 (66.67 
percent), females=4 (16.67 percent). Solicitors also comprised 7.95 percent of the 
respondents (total =24, males=20 (83.33 percent), female =4 (16.67 percent)). 
Respondents who purchased lands or properties for friends or relatives resident 
abroad constituted 14.90 percent of the total respondents (total = 45, males = 35 
(77.78 percent), female = 10 (22.22 percent). Respondents with other status 
represented 4.3 percent (total = 13, male = 12 (92.31 percent), female = (7.69 
percent)). 
7.2.2 Income Status and Gender of Respondents 
Table 7-2 reports the results cross-tabulated data of the income status and Gender 
of the respondents. The results indicate that 28.7 percent (total = 113, males = 31.86 
(78.16 percent), female = 68.14 (21.84 percent)) of the respondents earned monthly 
income of less than 01,000,000.00.37.29 percent (total = 49, males = 77 (68.14 
percent), females = 36 (31.86 percent)) earned monthly income of between 
C1,000,001 and V4,000,000.00. Also 16.17 percent (total = 49, males = 41 (83.67 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
Then again, 7.26 percent of the respondents (total = 22, males = 18 (81.82 percent), 
female =4 (18.18 percent)) earned monthly income of between Q7,000,001.00 and 
Q10,000,000.00.10.56 percent of respondents (total = 32, males = 20 (62.50 percent), 
female = 12 (37.50 percent)) of respondents earned monthly income of more than 
¢10,000,000.00. 
7.2.3 Policy Zone and Gender 
The results of a cross tabulation analysis of the relationship between the purchases 
of land or properties with particular policy zones and gender is summarised in 
Table 7-3. 
Table 7-3 Policy Zone and Gender of Respondents 
P-Zone Total 
Regulative Distributive Redistributive 
Policy Zone Policy Zone Policy Zone 
Gender Male Count 89 35 45 224 
% Within Gender 39.73 15.63 20.09 100 
% Within P-Zone 80.18 74.47 66.18 74 
Female Count 22.00 12.00 23.00 79 
% Within Gender 27.85 15.19 29.11 100 
% Within P-Zone 19.82 25.53 33.82 26 
Total Count 111.00 47.00 68.00 303 
% Within Gender 36.63 15.51 22.44 100 
% Within P-Zone 100 100 100 100 
Source: Field Survey 
The results show that 36.63 percent of the respondents (total 111, male= 89 (80.18 
percent), female = 22 (19.82 percent)) purchased land or property within the 
regulative policy zone. 15.51 percent (total = 47, male = 35 (74.47 percent), female= 
12 (25.53 percent) have purchased land or property within distributive policy 
zones whiles 22.44 percent (total = 68, male = 44 (66.18 percent), female = 23 (33.82 
percent)) have purchased land and property within redistributive policy zones. 
With the attributes of respondents reported, the Chapter now reports the data and 
descriptive analysis of the main social costs variables of the study. 
7.3 THE SOCIAL COSTS ANALYSIS 
As alluded to in Chapter 5, real estate policies in Ghana are delivered through a 
complex web of prima facie legal and administrative procedures depicted by Berg 
(1971) as an `administrative jungle'. In compliance with these procedures, real 
estate transactions in Ghana are bunched up into categories and are formalized 
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according to the applicable processes. In its operational form, particular 
combinations of processes complete a formalisation procedure for specific 
categories of real estate transactions. Real estate transaction documents submitted 
to appropriate government offices for formalisation are thus passed through these 
requisite set of processes. The essential reason for these prima facie processes is 
probably to introduce certainty and impartiality in real estate policy enforcement 
in pursuit of the goals of respective real estate policies. 
Law prescribes the principal procedural and processing requirements affecting 
property market transactions. In addition to these laws, various circulars, 
directives, orders, bulletins, gazettes and guides have constantly abated or 
amplified these procedures and processes. The procedures have progressively 
circumscribed the limits within which property decisions can be made and 
heightened the standards of expected behaviours of economic actors. Property 
market dealers of all sorts and in all sections have increasingly had to acquaint 
themselves to the intricacies of these formalisation procedures and to incorporate 
their costs incidences in their market decisions. These have combined to produce 
procedures that are far too complex and involved; making it far easier to point out 
what in these processes are doing harm than what is generating benefit. 
The repercussions of these processes extend beyond the individual complying 
market dealers and are felt by the wider society in the form of social welfare costs. 
This implies that an effective means of discovering the scale of social welfare costs 
of real estate policies in Ghana is to evaluate the costs of these prima facie 
processes. This is a somewhat complex undertaking given that these costs 
originate from diverse sources, are faced by different groups of actors and are 
engendered by different phenomena. The government of Ghana for instance incurs 
real estate policy costs essentially through the exclusive funding of the running 
costs of the respective implementing institutions (see further Chapter 7). Then 
again, market dealers face a multifaceted regime of real estate policy compliance 
costs, direct and indirect. The demand based policy delivery approach adopted in 
Ghana for instance oblige market dealers to, on their own volition, tender their real 
estate transaction documents and contracts to respective government agencies for 
formalisation and compliance. To achieve this, real estate market dealers in Ghana 
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expose themselves to a wide spectrum of costs from the contract formation stage 
through formalisation stages to final registration. 
The question that falls to be examined in this chapter is; what is the scale of the 
allied social costs of this compliance incidental costs? Are these policies, from a 
welfare costs perspective, justified and worthwhile? Deriving from the research 
questions raised in chapter 1 the study predicts in Chapter 6 that 
Hl Regulative real estate policies will have lower compliance costs than 
distributive and redistributive polices. 
H2 Redistributive real estate policies will have higher compliance costs 
than distributive policies. 
H3 Regulative real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than distributive and redistributive real estate policies. 
H4 Distributive real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than redistributive real estate policies. 
These hypotheses are verified in this chapter. Chapter 9 will explore further the 
commensurability of the social costs of these policies with the gains they bring 
about. 
7.4 THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COSTS OF REAL ESTATE POLICIES 
As established in Chapter 5 the social marginal costs is the sum total of: (1) The 
marginal welfare losses associated with the market distortions induced by charges 
and payments incidental to particular policies; (2) The marginal administrative 
costs incurred by governmental departments in administering the policies; and (3) 
the actual out of pocket compliance costs. The requisite variables for these 
components are assessed based on the empirical data from the field survey. 
Before directing attention to the ensuing discussions, it needs to be borne in mind 
that in Ghana different real estate policy delivery processes require different 
compliance activities and hence different indirect compliance costs are incurred. 
Besides the compliance costs incurred accumulates as market dealers' progress 
from one compliance activity to another. Each indirect compliance cost contributes 
a fragment to the overall costs incurred under particular policies. Thus in 
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computing the indirect compliance costs incurred by applicants under the various 
compliance processes, a two-staged process is adopted. Firstly the major activities 
involved in the policy delivery processes are identified both from the perspectives 
of the government and real estate market dealers. The second stage is to trace the 
costs of each activity and accumulate them for particular policy delivery process 
according to the process' demand for these activities. The data for this analysis 
were obtained from direct field survey of market dealers and participants (public 
officers) observation (Chapter 6). 
7.5 THE MARGINAL INDIRECT COMPLIANCE COSTS (Cri 
The analysis found that rather than reducing costs and risk associated with 
contracts, existing policies surrounding real estate contracts, formation and 
registration are amplifying the costs. The full impacts of these costs are not always 
clear, as only a minute proportion of these costs are empirically observable. Much 
of these costs emanates from far too complex sources that cannot be easily 
computed in quantitative terms. As a result, the social costs computed in this 
chapter are based on the observable costs only and are thus indications of the 
minimum rather than categorical statements of the social costs of the respective 
policies. 
7.5.1 The Marginal Costs of Real Estate Contract Formation 
Hitherto, under indigenous tenure and laws land transactions were essentially 
parole contracts without any requirements to reduce them into writing or was 
writing in any form essential for validity (on which see further Woodman, 1996). 
Costs of contract were thus negligible or non-existent. By virtue of series of 
enactments in Ghana such as the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act, 123), The 
Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) and the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD, 175) 
policies made writing a requirement for land transactions in Ghana. The thrust of 
these policies is to impose requirements of writing on commercial contracts. The 
chief merits of this requirement seem to be the minimization of costs of contract by 
introducing a measure of certainty, coherence and clarity in commercial real estate 
transactions in the country. The Conveyancing decree (supra) specifically in 
conjunction with the common law for instance economizes on transaction costs by 
reducing the complexity and hence costs' of transactions. The law accomplished 
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this in supplying a set of templates of normal terms of real estate contracts that 
otherwise would have to be negotiated expressly by transacting parties at costs. 
Compliance with these requirements for writing, subject to various provisos, give 
rise to rights in the contracting parties of remedies in the form of actions for 
damages, injunctions and decrees of specific performance. 
The real costs of these enactments however is that the indigenous system has not 
yet in practice discarded the long established practices of parole transactions, 
though in few cases have strained to comply with the requirements for writing. 
This is understandable from an economics perspective. Such is the spate of 
disregard to these policies that the World Bank (2005b) estimates for instance that 
in Ghana only eight percent of transactions are formalised. The American Cadastre 
(1998, p. 6) also estimates that within the urban precincts of Ghana only 30 per cent 
of transactions are formalized. The costs are the huge information gaps that have 
emerged in these markets which are denying the market of the efficiency benefits 
of full and cheap information. 
Costly also is the fact that, often, in practice, what appear to be perfectly written 
real estate contracts indeed conceal essential matters such as the true price, 
consideration and duration of transactions that the parties actually agreed on. 
These are contrived rather than actual to evade other policies such as the Stamp 
Duty Ordinance under and the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act (Act 
481) and Article 257(5) of the 1992 constitution, which imposes severe restrictions 
on earnings, and terms of real estate transactions. 
A curious finding of this survey is that a majority (about 85 percent) of deed of 
conveyances in Ghana are framed and typed by typists (not solicitors) of the policy 
delivery bureaucracies already described in Chapter 5 and 7. These typists 
eventually find itinerant solicitors or barristers to endorse these typed leases 
without studying the contents for a small fee that currently ranged between 
¢10,000.00 to ¢50,000.00. Just about 15 percent of deeds of conveyances are actually 
drawn up by solicitors in Ghana. Because the typists themselves frame these 
contracts they often embody matters that one or both of the parties had given no 
thought. Thus most of the contract documents circulating in the Ghanaian real 
estate system are in reality sheer evidence that some transactions took place 
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between the parties. They do not provide the substance of the transactions. This 
state of affair apart from undermining the justification for government 
interventions is constantly keeping the market misinformed. This also denies the 
market the efficiency functions of true transaction data at costs. It is impossible for 
policy experts, investors, and market dealers to rely on data extracted from these 
information to guide decisions. The question then is of what value is such 
documentation apart from portraying evidence of compliance with the law for the 
eight percent? 
Such is the nature of contracts on which real estate dealers expend resources and 
for which huge government bureaucracies have as well been established and 
funded annually (see Chapter 7) to formalize or record onto official registers. 
Because these deeds are not normally drawn out by solicitors they cost (direct 
costs) on the average much lower than they would normally have cost if the 
documents were being prepared by solicitors as the policies envisaged. 
Table 7-4 reports descriptive statistics on the unit costs data obtain for such largely 
spurious contract documents. According to the table the marginal costs for such 
contract documents range from a minimum of Q50,000.00 to a maximum of 
C500,000.00 with a mean costs of about 4125,000.00. By focusing on the mean it is 
possible to establish the typical costs of contract document preparation. 
Table 7-4: Descriptive Statistics on Costs of Real Estate Contracts (Q) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Costs of Transaction 105 50,000.00 500,000.00 123,047.62 77,783.28 Documents 
Costs of Parcel Plan 104 50,000.00 800,000.00 128,605.77 186,434.94 
Valid N (listwise) 92 , 
Source: Field Survey (June, 2004-January, 2005) 
Additionally, the Survey Act, 1962 (Act, 127) require such transaction documents 
to be accompanied by site plans prepared by licensed surveyors. Again technical 
officers of the policy delivery bureaucracies who are not licensed surveyors 
invariably tend to prepare these site plans. They subsequently look for itinerant 
licensed surveyors to endorse as authors usually for small fees, currently of about 
Q30,000.00 per building plot. Sometimes survey transparencies (Mylar) endorsed 
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by licensed surveyors for earlier jobs are recycled for subsequent jobs, a process 
termed in Ghanaian local parlance particularly in Accra as Gansha. 
What is most disquieting is that officials of the delivery bureaucracies 
acknowledge the harm that this is causing but feel helpless for the reasons already 
advanced in Chapter 7. The vast majority of site plans affixed to real estate contract 
documents prepared this way are confirmed by officials of the delivery 
bureaucracies to be severely inaccurate. They sometimes deviate substantially or 
even bear no relation to the true triangulations of the contracted property. None of 
the various attempts by appropriate authorities to stop this practice have produced 
meaningful results. Again, from a costs perspective, this clearly unhealthy practice, 
appears to have reduced the potential mean direct costs of survey plans 
considerably in comparison to what would have been incurred if the right 
procedures were followed. As Table 7-4 illustrates, the costs of site plans in Ghana 
range from a minimum of 4Z50,000.00 to a maximum of 4800,000.00. The mean site 
plan costs in Ghana is about '130,000.00. 
It is worth noting that these figures represent no more than the direct and perhaps 
the most easily calculable costs of property contract documentation in Ghana. The 
real costs indeed becomes apparent when the need arises for contracting parties to 
enforce their true negotiated agreements which are invariably at variance with 
what is embodied in the registered contract. It is difficult if not impossible to find 
empirically observable measures of these potential costs. But it is reasonable to 
suggest that this can be significant. How the direct costs of property contract 
documentation contribute to social welfare costs will be established in due course. 
7.5.2 The Marginal Extra Official Costs 
In addition to the requisite official fees several fragments of costs are incurred by 
complying market dealers. The World Bank (2005) estimates that the official 
charges for complying with real estate policies in Ghana average 4.1 percent of the 
value of the property being registered in Ghana. This figure represents only official 
payments. Extra official cost emanates essentially from the delays in the processing 
procedures of Ghana. The processing procedures in Ghana are so sluggish and 
severely gridlocked that the World Bank (2005) estimates, it takes on average 382 
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days to complete a single process. This study established further that just about 
6.38 percent of real estate contracts are formalised in less than 100 days in Ghana 
whiles some 5 percent are completed in over 2101days. With such huge delays and 
in the absence of any internally generated means of expediting the completion of 
formalisation processes, the natural tendency is for market dealers to seek their 
own means of expediting the process. They employ methods such as political 
influences, crony alliances or employment of officials themselves at agreed extra- 
official fees. There is, almost as a convention, a widespread engagement of officials 
of the agencies at fees to facilitate and expedite the processing of property related 
contracts in Ghana. It is thus important in seeking to establish the magnitude of 
welfare losses of real estate policies to incorporate these payments in the calculus. 
Table 7-5 reports descriptive statistics of the extra official costs for the eight 
different policy processes. 
Unfortunately, data on extra-official payments for allocation of public lands or 
regularization of illegally acquired public land rights in particular could not be 
obtained from the field survey as respondents were generally unwilling to disclose 
this information. These are thus excluded from the analysis. According to the table 
the extra official fees paid by market dealers vary markedly between policies. They 
range from a minimum of 430,000.00 (Stamp Duty) to a maximum of Q5,000,000.00 
(Stamp Duty) per typical transaction. Extra official payments data for the specific 
policies remain largely less variable as indicated by their respective small standard 
deviations in comparison to their means. The only exception to this is the extra 
official fees paid in compliance with the stamp duty policy. On the whole, the most 
frequently paid amount (mode) for particular policies range from Q100,000.00 to 
V3,500,000.00. 
Further the closeness of the means and the medians of the respective policies also 
indicate that the presence of possible outliers in the data have less considerable 
influence on the mean. The mean thus provides a more reliable measure of the 
typical extra-official payments for the respective eight policies. 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
In summary, the arithmetic mean of indirect extra-official costs across the 
spectrum of policies sampled range from a minimum of ¢107,000.00 to a maximum 
of 42,753,521.13. In computing the social costs the respective means of the policy 
processes is thus adopted as inputs for the extra-official payments variable. 
7.5.3 The Marginal Costs of Travel 
The demand driven approach to real estate policy compliance, the insecurity of the 
postal system in Ghana and the widespread inertia of real estate policy 
enforcement agencies in Ghana necessitates frequent travels by market dealers to 
the agencies to follow up on their documents. About 66 percent of respondents 
claim to make regular travels to the agencies to follow up on their cases. This 
introduces two classes of costs: direct travel fare or costs and the costs or value of 
the travel time, both of which contributes important fragments to the marginal 
costs of the policies. 
7.5.4 The Marginal Costs of Travel Time 
Table 7-6 depicts, the mean travel duration to the respective agencies by market 
dealers to be about one hour. This coincides with the median and mode travel 
durations respectively. This implies that the mean travel duration is not unduly 
affected by extreme or outlaying travel durations. These together with the 
comparatively small standard deviations or variability of travel duration confirm 
that travels to the agencies are typically of one hour durations. 
Table 7-6: Duration (in Hours) of Travel to Respective Enforcement Agencies 
Travel Time to 
Lands 
Commission 
Travel Time to 
Land Title 
Registry 
Travel Time to 
Land Valuation 
Board 
Travel Time to 
Survey 
Department 
N Valid 203 70 202 203 
Missing 100 233 101 100 
Mean 1.14 1.16 1.12 1.12 
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mode 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Std. 
Deviation . 60 . 66 . 58 . 58 
Minimum 
. 25 . 16 . 25 . 25 
Maximum 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Source: Field Survey (June, 2004-January, 2005) 
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The real costs of this travel duration are the potential labour efforts lost through 
travels as people leave their jobs and offices to travel to the agencies or even loss of 
leisure hours as people sacrifice their leisure time in pursuit of the formalisation of 
these contracts. Alternatively they are the potential labour efforts or leisure time 
that could have been gained had the need to travel not arisen in the first place. The 
costs of this travel time are the time value rate multiplied by the travel duration. If 
the labour wage lost is adopted as proxy for the time value rate then knowledge of 
current labour wage rate in Ghana is required. The mean monthly wage in Ghana 
as at December, 2003 was 41,220,807.00 (SSNIT, 2003). Although the minimum 
wage in Ghana has increased since then from 4M, 200.00 to 413,500.00, data on 
current average wage in Ghana was unavailable at the time of the survey. This 
implies the need to adjust the 2003 average wage to reflect current probable 
average wage. 
The Dollar appears to have been fairly stable in comparison to the Ghanaian Cedi 
during the intervening period. It is thus presumed that the increase in minimum 
wage compensates nearly for any depreciation of the Ghanaian Cedi against the 
Dollar during the period. Thus the 2003 Dollar equivalent of the wage (at 
US$1/Q8,204) is adopted and applied to obtain an estimated current average 
monthly wage. This gives a monthly wage of US$149. Using an average of 22 paid 
working days in a month and eight paid working hours in a day the mean hourly 
wage rate, time value rate, in Ghana approximates to US$0.85 an hour. The Cedi 
equivalent of this figure in today's prices (i. e. US$1/Q9,200) is '7,820.00 per hour. 
This figure is adopted as a measure of the time value rate in Ghana. 
This implies that the time value of a typical return journey to any of the delivery 
agencies would be about 415,640.00 (Q7,820.00 x 2). The actual costs depend on the 
frequency at which market dealers visit the agencies to follow up on their cases. 
Table 7-7 reports the descriptive data on the frequency of travels or visits per week 
made to the respective agencies by applicants seeking compliance. The table shows 
that complying market dealers make an average of two visits per week to 
particular agencies formalizing their transactions. This is typical considering the 
comparatively small variability (standard deviation) in the frequency of visits 
across the agencies. 
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This is further reinforced by the closeness of the median frequency of visits to the 
means except in the case of visits to the Land valuation Board. This makes the 
mean travel frequency of two per week a reliable measure of travel frequency. The 
mean resultant time value loss or real costs of travel time to the agencies per week 
then works out to 431,280 (i. e. C15,640 x 2). 






Visits to Land 
Title Registry 
Frequency of 






N Valid 241 70 93 82 
Missing 62 233 210 221 
Mean 1.89 1.99 1.42 2.40 
Median 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 
Mode 1 2 1 2 
Std. Deviation 1.065 . 893 . 798 1.110 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Source: Field Survey (June, 2004-January, 2005) 
The total real costs of travel time per contract are however a function of the total 
number of visits undertaken to complete the requisite set of formalisation 
procedures. This can be deduced on the average from the duration per processing 
procedure. According to Table 7-8, it takes on average 382 days in Ghana to 
complete a set of formalisation procedures for respective real estate transaction 
categories. This is the longest processing duration in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
works out to about 76 processing weeks12. This means that complying market 
dealers make on the average a total of about 304 trips to and from the agencies to 
complete their formalisation processes, 152 each way. Applied to the real costs of 
travel time, Q31,280.00, this gives an overall real marginal travel time costs of 
C9,509,120.00 (i. e. about US$1000). 
This means that in real terms about eight times the average minimum wage in 
Ghana is expended on travelling to follow up the formalisation of every single real 
estate contract. This excludes the actual transport fares. 
12 This is based on a five day rather than 7 day week. 
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Table 7-8: Property Registration in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Year Number of 
procedures 
Time (days) Cost (% of property 
value per capita) 
AVERAGE 2004 6 114 13.1 
Madagascar 2004 
South Africa 2004 6 20 11.3 
Namibia 2004 9 28 9.7 
Zimbabwe 2004 4 30 18.1 
Mozambique 2004 7 33 11.9 
Kenya 2004 7 39 4 
Chad 2004 6 44 13.3 
Mali 2004 5 44 20.6 
Uganda 2004 8 48 5.5 
Mauritania 2004 4 49 8.5 
Niger 2004 5 49 12.5 
Benin 2004 3 50 15.1 
Ethiopia 2004 15 56 11 
Sierra Leone 2004 8 58 16.5 
Tanzania 2004 12 61 12.6 
Botswana 2004 4 69 5 
Central African Republic 2004 3 69 17.4 
Zambia 2004 6 70 9.2 
Cameroon 2004 5 93 18.8 
Burundi 2004 5 94 18.1 
Lesotho 2004 6 101 9.1 
Congo, Re . 2004 6 103 22.5 
Guinea 2004 6 104 15.7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004 8 106 10.1 
Burkina Faso 2004 8 107 16.2 
Senegal 2004 6 114 34 
Malawi 2004 6 118 3.5 
Too 2004 6 212 7.8 
Nigeria 2004 21 274 27.2 
An ola 2004 8 335 11 
Cote d'Ivoire 2004 7 340 10.2 
Rwanda 2004 5 354 9.5 
Ghana 2004 7 382 4.1 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
7.5.5 Transport Fare and Direct Travel Expenses 
The next element of costs encountered in property formalisation is the direct 
transport fares or travel expenses. The empirical data on this is summarised in 
Table 7-9 below. As shown in the table, the mean direct travel cost range from 
about (30,200 to 034,000.00. This works out to an overall average of about 
Q31,300.00. 
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Table 7-9: Costs of One Way Travels (in Cedis) 
Travel Costs to 
Lands 
Commission 
Travel Costs to 
Land Title 
Registry 
Travel Costs to 
Land Valuation 
Board 
Travel Costs to 
Survey 
Department 
N Valid 186 75 177 180 
Missing 117 228 126 123 
Mean 30,686.02 34,000.00 30,218.07 30,214.44 
Median 20,000.00 30,000.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 
Mode 20,000.00 50,000.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 
Std. Deviation 23,672.16 24,356.59 23,384.96 23,133.92 
Minimum 4,000.00 5,000.00 4,000.00 4,000.00 
Maximum 100,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 
Source: Field Survey (June, 2004-January, 2005) 
The apparent differences between the respective means and the corresponding 
medians are indications of the presence of extreme or outliers that have affected 
the mean but not the median travel costs. Nonetheless, to maintain consistency in 
the analysis, the mean is adopted as the typical direct travel costs. This implies that 
the mean costs of return trip to the agencies per visit is about Q62,600.00. On the 
basis of 382 processing days duration and two visits per week, hence 152 total trips 
(see Section, 7.5.4, p. 1920), the estimated average direct travel costs per transaction 
approximates to 49,390,000.00 (i. e. 62,600.00 x 152 trips). Again this is about eight 
times the average wage of Ghana (i. e. US$ 1000). Combining this with the costs of 
travelling time (Section 0), the true total costs of travels associated with real estate 
policy compliance in Ghana is roughly Q18,899,120.00 (i. e. about $2,054.00) per 
transaction. 
7.5.6 The Marginal Costs of Lag-Time 
There are costs concomitant to the considerable delays in property ownership 
formalisation that have to be plugged into the above model for a fuller picture. 
Two main variants of these costs identified in this study are: (1) costs of waiting 
times at the agencies and (2) time value of delay periods. 
7.5.6.1 The Marginal Costs of Waiting Time 
As shown in Table 7-10, when real estate market dealers call at the respective 
agencies to follow up on their applications for formalisation they spend on the 
average between 1.5 to 1.8 hours at the particular bureaucracy. This translates to 
an overall average waiting time of about 1.5 hours. 
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Table 7-10: Waiting times (Hours) 
Waiting Time at 
Lands Commission 
Waiting Time at 
Land Title Registry 
Waiting Time at Land 
Valuation Board 
Waiting Time at 
Survey Department 
N Valid 228 83 106 81 
Missing 75 220 197 222 
Mean 1.5450 1.6596 . 8707 1.8723 
Median 1.0000 1.5000 . 7500 2.0000 
Mode 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 
Std. 
Deviation 1.04403 1.16712 . 59479 1.00783 
Minimum 
. 16 . 25 . 17 . 33 
Maximum 6.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 
Source: Field Survey (June, 2004-January, 2005) 
With an average of two visits a week over an average processing duration of 382 
days, a total of 229 compliance waiting hours, equivalent of about 28 man-days 
(using 8 hours/ man-day) is incurred per transaction. Given a time value rate of 
Q7,820.00 per hour, the costs of waiting time per transaction approximates to 
C1,790,780.00. How this contributes to the overall social costs of real estate policies 
in Ghana will be established in due course. 
7.5.7 The Marginal Costs of Delays 
As, Table 7-8 depicts, property registration is not instant across sub-Saharan Africa. 
It takes from a minimum of 20 days (in South Africa) to a maximum of 382 days (in 
Ghana). This works out to an average processing duration of 114 days across sub- 
Saharan Africa. With the longest processing duration, Ghana is most likely to 
incur the highest costs of delays. Not all of these costs can be quantified 
numerically. For instance loss of opportunities incurred as a result, though likely 
to be huge and varied between transactions are difficult to stipulate precisely in 
monetary terms. A rough estimate of these costs is the opportunity costs of time 
incurred in waiting. For instance most real estate transactions in Ghana involve the 
purchase of land rather than developed properties for residential, industrial or 
commercial developments. Most purchasers develop these properties from their 
own personal resources, a few through commercial credits. The policies demand 
that formalisation processes are completed before developments commence. 
The reason for this may be the need to safeguard private property rights and 
public interest from unwarranted encroachments and muddled development 
patterns. But the costs of this as engendered by the delays in formalizing these 
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transactions are significant. They can be looked at as the scale of change in the 
prices of building materials occasioned over the period of delay. This is in addition 
to any loss of income that could have been earned if the property were developed 
at an earlier date. Thus the costs of delays turn on the extra costs incurred on costs 
of development, for instance, over the period of delay at the opportunity costs of 
capital. 
Another way of approaching this is from the perspective that, on occasions bank 
credits are approved pending completion of title formalisation. Having to wait for 
this long to be able to access the loan comes with its own costs leading in some 
cases to loss of opportunities in business. The time value or costs of this delay can 
be approximated using simple compound interest formula as 
[(1 
+ i)" -1] where i= 
opportunity costs of capital and n= the delay period. Using Ghana's average 
commercial bank lending rate of 33% and the average processing duration of 382 
days the extra costs attributable to the delays in the processing time 
[(1+. 33/365)382 -1] equals 40.4123 for every 01.00 or 41 percent increase in real 
costs of say building. But though this is an important way of looking at these costs, 
it will be difficult to incorporate such estimates given the requirements of the 
model used in this analysis. 
Another way of looking at these costs, perhaps the most logical way is from the 
perspective of the income loss through waiting. For ease of computation this study 
guestimates this loss to be equivalent to Ghana's average hourly wage of Q7,820.00, 
though this figure is likely to be very conservative. This translates to an average 
daily wage of C62,560.00 (i. e. '7,820.00 x8 hours). Using the compounding interest 
equation, the amount to which the daily wage loss ('62,560.00) will accumulate 






This is no trivial amount. Unless the benefits from the delay specifically exceed the 
costs of delay, economic rationality suggests that compliance with these policies is 
likely to be low. Thus the fact that only eight percent of real estate contracts are 
13 Amount of 01p. a. 
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formalised in Ghana suggests that the benefits are not commensurate with the 
costs. As findings of this study reinforced, even those market dealers who seek the 
formalisation of their properties tend to jump start and in some cases complete 
their developments whiles their transaction documents remain in process. Officials 
of the Town and Country Planning Department in the Greater Accra region of 
Ghana confirmed in an interview that about 80 percent of developments in the 
region are not covered by formalized documents. The overall implications of these 
costs will be reviewed shortly. 
7.5.8 The Costs of Act 481,1994 
The Office of Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act 481) imposes unique 
costs on suppliers of stool lands or properties developed on stool lands. As 
mentioned in previous chapters the Act, though not a tax instrument, impose 
statutory deductions on all revenue from transactions involving stool lands or 
properties developed on stool lands. The Act in essence stipulates the following 
deductions from revenue involving stool lands: (1) 10% for administration of the 
Act, (2) 49.5% for the District Assemblies, (3) 18% to the Traditional Council and 
(4) 22.5% to the land owning stool. See Antwi (2000) for a detailed analysis of the 
economic merits of these deductions. 
Deductions (1) and (2) are essentially revenue to government. Even though they 
constitute significant costs to stool property owners, because they feature also as 
revenue and hence benefits to government, their effects, which are in equal 
magnitude but on opposite sides of the impacts equation, cancel out. They will 
thus have no effects on the policy impacts and hence have to be conveniently 
ignored in the estimation of the social costs. Deduction (4) also accounts as 
revenue to the particular stool. This will reflect as benefit to the stool rather than 
costs and hence do not contribute to the social costs of the policy. Thus, deduction 
(3), 18 percent of revenue or price, is the only deduction that has non direct 
compensating benefits and hence has to be incorporated into evaluation of the 
social costs of the policy. Using land values as indicators of stool land revenue, the 
direct costs of this policy is 18 percent of the average land values in stool land 
areas. Table 7-11 presents the descriptive data on land values in the study areas of 
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Accra. Baatsonaa is the selected stool land suburb of Accra, Ghana. Average land 
values in this area according to the data is Q66,700,000.00. 
Table 7-11: Descriptive Statistics on Land Values 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Ajirigano 10 55,000,000.00 100,000,000.00 71,500,000.00 12,703,892.66 
Baatsonaa 10 50,000,000.00 82,000,000.00 66,700,000.00 10,328,493.49 
East Legon 10 150,000,000.00 300,000,000.00 216,000,000.00 51,897,334.54 
Sports Complex 10 45,000,000.00 60,500,000.00 53,900,000.00 5,450,789.95 
Valid N 
10 (listwise) 
Source: Fiend Survey (dune, ZUU4-January, ZUU5) 
This implies that the average direct costs of this Act is Q12,000,000.00 [i. e. 
66,700,000 x 0.18]. How this contributes to social costs is also looked at shortly. 
Table 7-12 reports the summary of how the costs estimated so far accumulates 
under particular policies. 
7.6 THE TOTAL ACCUMULATED NON-OFFICIAL COMPLIANCE COSTS 
The Table (Table 7-12) shows that the real non-official compliance costs borne by 
market dealers range from a minimum of t61,900,570 (i. e. £3,541 or $6,728) to a 
maximum of ¢75,178,996 (i. e. £4,300 or $8,1712), the mean costs being 
: 465,476,450(£7,117 or $3,746). Clearly these are substantial costs considering that 
the average indirect compliance costs per policy of Q65,476,450 are some 54 times 
the country's average monthly wage. 
7.7 THE MARGINAL COSTS OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION 
Thus far the discussions have focused on the costs faced by market dealers in 
seeking compliance with particular policies. An important variant of costs of real 
estate policy to which this section concentrates is the costs incurred by 
governmental departments in administering these policies, 9g. As argued earlier in 
Ghana, policy administration is reduced into a series of prima facie processing 
procedures; the costs of administering these policies turn on the costs incurred in 
implementing these processes and procedures. The dearth of data on critical 
aspects of the operations of the bureaucracies makes any attempt at computing the 
full and precise range of costs incurred in administering these policies very 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
For instance, data on the fixed costs of the bureaucracies, which falls into the 
category of costs incurred in administering real estate policies, were nonexistent. 
So also are data on personnel size of support departments such as stores, transport 
and security that are not directly involved but contribute indirectly to the policy 
processes. 
Additionally, these bureaucracies occupy government buildings and are not 
subject explicitly to rent payments. Data on rent costs could thus only be more 
accurately obtained through direct valuation of these premises. Time, resources 
and permission constraints did not enable such valuations to be conducted. The 
costs estimates for the respective processes are thus based on the labour hours 
spent per processing task (see further Chapter 5, Methodology, for how these were 
measured). Available direct labour hours are used as the allocation base to 
apportion the overhead costs (see Table 7-13). 
The total overheads are assumed to be the total budgets of the respective agencies 
less their personnel expenses. This approach assumes that the greater the direct 
labour hours for a task the greater will be the overhead expenditure incurred. To 
accomplish this, a single overhead rate for the respective agencies based on their 
staff numbers and approved budgets for 2004 is estimated. The estimates are 
reported in Table 7-13 above. This rate is assigned to all processes handled by the 
corresponding agencies. 
Based on these established overhead rates the costs for the respective task are 
established. Column 2 of Table 7-14 above is a break down of the policy processes 
into the major identifiable activities. The estimated labour and overhead costs for 
each of the activities together with their total costs have also been estimated in 
columns 3,4, and 5 respectively. It could be observed that a conservative mark-up 
of 15 percent (see column 6) has been applied as provision for the incidents of costs 
that could not be established. The last two columns provide the equivalent costs in 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
Table 7-5 shows that the direct labour cost for the various processing activities are 
widely dispersed (Mean = 0570,415; St. Deviation = 4719,477; Min = 015,503; 
Max=Q2,057,974). The overheads are relatively less dispersed (Mean =Q538,414; St. 
Deviation=4542,361; Min=463,064 and Max = 41,199,815). 
Table 7-15: Descriptive Statistics on the Costs of Processing Activities 
Direct 
Labour Costs Overheads Total 
15 Percent 
Margin Grand Total 
Mean 570,415.08 538,414.47 1,108,829.54 166,324.43 1,275,153.98 
Min 15,503.58 11,168.00 63,064.08 9,459.61 72,523.70 
Max 2,057,974.10 1,993,190.00 4,051,164.10 607,674.62 4,658,838.72 
St. Deviation 719,477.83 542,361.56 1,199,815.38 179,972.31 1,379,787.69 
Source: Field Survey (June, 2004-January, 2005) 
The overall mean activity costs is '1,275,153 (Min = 72,523 and Max = 4,658,838, St. 
Deviation = '1,379,787). These results provide good indication of the typical costs 
that are incurred in executing a typical processing procedure under particular 
policy. The means thus provide an index for the activity costs that can be relied on 
in estimating the welfare and social costs respectively of policies. As a result, the 
mean figure is incorporated into the calculation of the welfare costs as well as the 
social costs of these policies. To appreciate the full scale of costs incurred by both 
the government and market dealers on account of real estate policies in Ghana, the 
costs computed from both ends have been put together. This is presented in Table 
7-16 below. 
The table reports at the top row, the major individual policy activities and the 
corresponding policy category under which they fall. Details of their 
corresponding compliance and administrative costs are then computed and 
reported according. The total costs, which is the sum of the compliance costs and 
the administrative costs is also computed and converted accordingly into Pound 
Sterling and US dollars for ease of international, comparison. The details and 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
7.8 THE AGGREGATED MARGINAL COSTS OF REAL ESTATE POLICY IN GHANA 
The costs per compliance as shown in the table range from a minimum overall 
costs of about e65,359,215 (£3,739 or $7,104) to a maximum of about Q79,139,996 
(i. e. £4,527 or $8,602). The average overall costs per single transaction is about 
470,263,537 (i. e. £4,019 or $7,637). The results refutes hypothesis Hi that regulative 
policies will have lower compliance costs than distributive policies. Instead the 
results show that regulative policies lead to higher average compliance costs of 
approximately C69 million relative to 462.3 for redistributive and '62.2 for 
distributive policies. The results however confirm hypothesis H2 that redistributive 
policies will have higher compliance costs than distributive policies. But these 
results has to be taken in the context that an important ingredient for compliance 
costs for distributive and redistributive policies, the unofficial payment was not 
incorporated in the calculus owing to the limitations of the data explained in 
Chapter 6. 
7.9 TOTAL WELFARE COSTS OF REAL ESTATE POLICIES IN GHANA 
This section verifies the two remaining hypothesis that 
H3 Regulative real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than distributive and redistributive real estate policies. 
H4 Distributive real estate policies will have lower social welfare costs 
than redistributive real estate policies. 
To be able to employ the devised model in estimating the welfare costs of real 
estate policies in Ghana, two key information; values of property and elasticity of 
property are required in addition to the above costs estimates. To simplify the 
analysis, land values rather than values of developed properties were used in the 
model. Table 7-11 above reports the summary statistics of land values for the 
respective policy zones as obtained from the field survey. According to the 
devised measuring framework in Chapter 5, an important statistic required to 
compute the social costs is the price elasticity of demand for real estate in Ghana. 
Price elasticity is an index that provides a measure of the magnitude of change in 
the quantity of real estate purchased likely occasioned by a unit change in real 
estate prices. The price elasticity scale ranges from zero to one, with zero 
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indicating no change in quantity as a result of a change in price and one denoting 
hundred percent changes in quantity demanded as a result of a unit change in 
price. Typically the elasticity of a commodity lies somewhere within the range. 
There was however dearth of secondary data on price elasticity of property or land 
in Ghana. Resource constraints also did not permit sufficient data on this variable 
to be obtained empirically for the study. 
Interviews with local valuers in Ghana suggest however that, in the case of bare 
lands for instance, purchasers tend to initially somewhat double their purchases 
when prices are about half what they expected. In that case the elasticity can be 
said to be perfect (i. e. 1). Even so, beyond a threshold quantity of about 4 
residential plots, changes in quantity demanded tend to be less than proportionate 
to price changes. This can continue until it assumes a perfectly inelastic character 
(i. e. index of zero). Thus the elasticity of land in Accra, Ghana could be up to zero. 
A mid point elasticity index of 0.5 is adopted for this estimate. Table 7-17 reports 
the resultant estimated welfare costs grouped by policies based on these variables. 
While this estimate is clearly inexact, it appears probably reliable enough for the 
purpose of this analysis. In Column 3 of the table, the extra official compliance 
costs borne by market dealers are provided. Column 4 provides the mean land 
values for the areas affected by the respective policies. Column 5 gives the 
marginal compliance rate, which is the proportion of the land value expended as 
indirect compliance costs. 
The ° World Bank (2005) estimate of the average costs of official payments as a 
proportion of land values of 4.1 percent (see Table 7-8) is adopted as the official 
costs of compliance and presented in column 6. Column 7 gives the effective 
marginal rate which is the sum total of the compliance rate (column 5) and the 
marginal official rate (column 6). Columns 8 and 9 give the welfare costs of 
indirect payments per policy process and the total welfare costs respectively. The 
last column is the percentage contribution of indirect compliance costs to overall 
welfare costs. As shown in Table 7-17 (see column, 11), on average the welfare 
costs consequences of real estate policies in Ghana per policy strand range from a 
minimum of Q5,794,555 (i. e. US$630 or £331) to a maximum of ¢27,753,163 (i. e. 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
The average welfare costs consequence per transaction across all policy strands is 
Q14,124,462 (i. e. US$1,535 or £808). Looking at the results more closely, 
redistributive policies incur the highest welfare costs of Q19,277,544 (i. e. 2,095 of 
£1,103). This is followed closely by Regulative policies with welfare cost of 
Q18,065,600 (i. e. US$1,963 or £1,033). Distributive policies are the least costly with 
welfare costs of 05,838,206 (i. e. US$635 or £334). These results refutes hypothesis 
H3 and H4 and instead confirm that distributive policies incurs the lowest welfare 
costs relative to regulative and redistributive policies. 
Column 12 show that indirect compliance payments (indirect expenses) including 
the costs of contracts, travel, delay and extra official payments contributes as much 
as 90 percent of these welfare costs. Official payments contribute only 10 percent in 
general to welfare costs. A detailed look at the results show that, indirect expenses 
incurred 93 percent of the welfare costs associated with redistributive policies, 92 
percent of those associated with regulative policies and 76 percent of those 
associated with distributive policies. It is note worthy that as mentioned above; it 
was not possible to obtain information on extra official payments in respect of 
distributive and redistributive policies. This means that their respective welfare 
costs are comparatively understated. 
Moreover, redistributive policies as defined in Chapter 4 comprise lands that 
government has compulsory acquired for redistribution for which compensation 
has not been paid. This implies that an important component of the social costs is 
the compensation lost by the dispossessed owners of the land. Based on equation 
10 above and using the average land values for the selected redistributive policy 
zone (sports complex area), the welfare costs of unpaid compensation per 
residential plot of land is estimated as: 0.5(53,90g00 x 0.5) x 1002 =¢ 13,47500Q00. In this 
equation the land value used is 053,900,000, elasticity is 0.5 and percentage of 
direct costs imposed to land value is 100%. When this is added to the welfare costs 
from the perspective of land purchasers an aggregate marginal welfare costs of 
Q32,753,000.00 (i. e. 419,277,544.22 +Q13,475,000.00) is obtained. 
Given that the average residential plot in the area is about 0.45 of an acre, this 
works out to a social costs of about Q30,000,000.00 (i. e. US$3,254.18 or £1,713.04) 
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per acre of land. As a matter of interest, given that, the total size of land within this 
policy zone is 2,870.60 acres, it implies that the overall welfare costs of this 
redistributive policy in this particular policy zone is approximately C86 billion or 
some US$ 9,343,000.00 or £4,920,000.00. 
With these interim results, the social costs of real estate policies can now be 
estimated. This is the sum of the welfare costs per policy and the direct costs of 
compliance and policy delivery. 
7.10 THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COSTS OF REAL ESTATE POLICIES IN GHANA 
This section turns now to the estimation of the marginal social costs of existing real 
estate policies in Ghana. Table 7-18 summarised the analysis of the social costs 
dimensions of the respective policies. Column 6 of the table reports the marginal 
social costs of each policy category. As shown in the table the mean social costs of 
real estate policies in Ghana is about 445,347,000.00 (i. e. US$4900.00 or £2,590.00) 
per real estate transaction. 
The minimum social costs is Q32,600,000 (i. e. US$3,600.00 or £1,900.00) and the 
maximum, 062,433.00 (i. e. US$6,800.00 or £3,600.00). Again, redistributive policies 
incurred the highest mean social costs. 
They are followed by regulative policies with mean social costs of about 
V49,500,000.00 (i. e. US$5,320.00 or £2,600.00). According to the analysis, 
distributive policies incurred the least mean social costs of Q32,900,000.00 (i. e. 
. 
US$3,573 or £1880). 
. 
These results imply that the extra benefits brought about by government 
-interventions, 
which include the abatement of the social costs of market failure, 
must exceed the social costs allied' to these interventions. This means that unless 
the benefits they engender falls short of this estimated social cost, they constitute a 
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THE MARGINAL COSTS 
7.11 SUMMARY 
The analysis has shown that real estate policies in Ghana are imposing huge social 
costs on the Ghanaian society. About 90 percent of these costs are due to indirect 
costs borne by market dealers seeking compliance with these policies. To be 
worthwhile these government policies induced social costs must exceed the social 
costs of the market failures that they were designed to abate. The social costs of the 
market failures that necessitated these interventions in Ghana are yet unknown. It 
will thus be necessary to pit these costs against the benefits that they are producing 
to gain insights into their overall economic impacts. This will be explored in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Findings and Analysis of the Marginal Benefits and Impacts 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the benefits aspects of the four research questions restated 
in Chapter 7. In particular the chapter examines the empirical evidence on the 
benefits of real estate policies and studies the balance between these benefits and 
the social costs analysed in Chapter 7. 
Within the measuring framework formulated in Chapter 5, the benefits 
dimensions of the policies under review is deducible from equation 8-1 
[ VP, = X30 + , 3,, ßu + 22P. + 8r + e, ] in which, VP, = the price of the ith urban property 
i=1 
affected by the applicable policy Pz, A is the magnitude of the implicit price of the 
zth policy. ß6o is a normal regression intercept, /J = the magnitude or the implicit 
price of the jth attribute. This represents the revealed marginal prices of each 
attribute, that is, the monetary equivalent of the revealed marginal willingness to 
pay for each attribute. X. = the jth attribute of the ith property. As explained in 
Chapter 5A represents the revealed marginal price of each applicable policy. That 
is, the monetary equivalent of the revealed marginal willingness to pay for 
additional unit of each applicable policy. As a result it provides a measure or index 
for the economic benefits of policy PZ on the it-affected property. The task of this 
Chapter is thus to address the research questions by estimating the A for each of 
the policy strands of policies classified in Chapter 4: regulative, distributive and 
redistributive policies. 
8.2 THE DATA 
The dearth of reliable data sources or organised databases on property prices 
necessitated the reliance on contingent valuation approaches to procure data on 
the key variables for the benefits analysis. The contingent valuation approach to 
evaluating benefits of real estate policies in a developing world context is not 
without precedent in the relevant literature. The procedure was previously applied 
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successfully by Dowall (1989) and Dowall and Leaf (1990) to evaluate the benefits 
of land titling in Jarkata, Indonesia. 
The overall strategy was to survey a sample of 20 valuers with at least 10 years 
professional experience in real estate valuation and market analysis within Accra. 
The goal was to sample and analyse the expert opinion of the surveyed valuers on 
the monetary worth or value of the respective policies using contingent valuation 
method. The 10 years professional experience in Accra condition was imposed to 
ensure that the data obtained evolved not merely from casual but instead from 
prolonged and critical observation of events on the Accra real estate market. Even 
though in the end only 10 valuers were surveyed due essentially to resource 
constraints and the limited number of valuers who meet these conditions, this was 
sufficient to address the concerned research questions. The survey was conducted 
using the questionnaire index as EX-VALUE003-2004/5 at the appendix developed 
purposely for this study. Because in Ghana policy compliance is synonymous with 
formalisation of land rights, the valuers were simply required to value a typical 
hypothetical standard building plot of land if it was (1) formalised and (2) 
unformalised under applicable policies. While five agencies are involved in land 
rights formalisation in Ghana, it is the final outputs or assents of only two, the 
Lands Commission and the Land Title Registry that finalises the process and hence 
determines whether the land is formalised or unformalised. Thus to simplify 
matters formalisation in this survey was defined as formalisation with the Lands 
Commission and or the Land Title Registry. The details of the survey method are 
provided in Chapter 6. The data obtained is analysed using the stepwise 
regression procedure, a variant of regression analysis, to establish the monetary 
worth of the respective policies. 
The regression procedure is a statistical procedure that provides the means to 
ascertain the relative contributions of, in this case, land rights formalisation to 
property prices in respective policy zones. The procedure accomplishes this by 
expressing in the form of equations, the relationships between the dependent 
variable (property prices) and independent variables (formalised and unformlised 
land rights). This equation is also employed in making predictions of the likely 
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values of the variables. The coefficients estimated by the regression model for the 
respective independent variables indicate their unique contributions to the 
dependent variable. Thus, the corresponding coefficients of the independent 
variables are expected to provide measures of their unique contributions or 
benefits to the overall property prices. However, to appreciate the independent 
unique contributions of formalisation or the lack of it to the ultimate price of 
property in particular policy zones, the stepwise variant of the regression 
procedure is employed. 
Stepwise regression allows the determination of the combination of possible 
independent variables that best explains the variation and magnitude of 
dependent variables. It accomplishes this by including and excluding variables 
from the calculations according to whether they make a statistically significant 
change to the value of the coefficient of determination (R-squared). The R-Square 
in this sense is a statistic that indicates on a scale of zero to one how variations in a 
dependent variable are accounted for by particular independent variable such that 
zero indicates no influence and one indicates 100 percent influence. Thus, the R- 
Square indices for the respective independent variables will offer an idea of the 
proportion of influence they exert on the dependent variables. For the independent 
variables to be good predictors of property prices in the respective zones their 
specific R-Square indices should be as close as possible to 1. 
The output for the ANOVA analysis of the regression model displays information 
about the variation that is not accounted for by the model. A model with a large 
regression sum of squares in comparison to the residual sum of squares indicates 
that the model accounts for more of the variation in the dependent variable. Very 
high residual sum of squares on the other hand indicates that the model fails to 
explain a lot of the variation in the dependent variable and other variables could 
be accounting for higher proportion of the dependent variables. 
In the stepwise procedure, based on the F-test on changes in the R-square, 
independent variables that are not useful or do not contribute significantly to the 
overall dependent variables (prices) are automatically excluded. Thus, the 
relationship or degree of influence between dependent variables and say 
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formalised can be easily examined whiles holding the other independent variables 
(unformalised) constant. It will thus enable the unique influences of the respective 
independent variables on the property prices to be determined and provide basis 
for making deductions about their unique contributions to social benefits. 
Following the benefits analysis, the balance between the social costs as analysed in 
Chapter 7 and the benefits so derived in this Chapter are studied. As the 
arguments of this thesis has remained from the outset, if in this comparison, it is 
found that the benefit fall short of the associated costs, the economic repercussions 
of these policies could be deemed negative otherwise they could be deemed 
positive. It is important to impose a caveat on this assertion at this stage. The 
results of this thesis is not intended to convey the impression that results from the 
comparative analysis are categorical since, apart from the limitations on the data 
available for this analysis, some costs and benefits from policies are generally not 
empirically observable as argued in Chapters 3,6 and 7. Even for the empirically 
observables, the scale of this study does not permit all of them to be incorporated. 
The results reported in this Chapter as in the previous and subsequent empirical 
chapters are thus more of indications than categorical. 
The study at this stage turns to the analysis of the benefits of the respective real 
estate policies under review. 
8.3 THE BENEFITS OF REAL ESTATE POLICIES 
The a priory expectations of this section's analysis is couched in terms of formal 
hypotheses in Chapter 6 and reproduced in this Chapter as follows: 
Hs Regulative real estate policies will have higher benefits than 
distributive and redistributive policies. 
H6 Distributive real estate policies will have higher benefits than 
redistributive real estate policies. 
The' ensuing analysis is geared towards verifying these propositions and 
expectations. 
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8.3.1 The Benefits of Redistributive Policies 
By definition (see Chapter 4) lands affected by redistributive policies in Ghana 
comprise those lands compulsorily acquired by government for which 
compensation remains unpaid. The sampled area for this policy as described in 
Chapter 6 is a 2,870.60-acre land situated at North East Odorkor, Accra. 
Government under Executive Instrument No. 61 of 1975 compulsorily acquired 
this for a National Sports Complex. The dispossessed and displaced owners were 
not compensated for the loss of their rights. Yet government went ahead to 
demarcate the area for residential development, to be managed by the Lands 
Commission. An approved planning scheme was prepared for the area creating 
799 residential plots and 21 plots for other uses. All of these residential plots were 
allocated to private individuals between 1977 and 1979 on 99 years leasehold basis. 
However owing to resistance from the dispossessed landowners, just about 487 
could take possession of their plots. The remaining area, which is about 78 percent 
of the acquired land, had been sold and developed by purchasers of the 
dispossessed owners. These allocations by the dispossessed owners are considered 
illegal transactions or 'encroachments' in governmental circles. This means that no 
legal rights are vested in this category of purchasers. This has given rise to two 
distinct real estate markets in the area; the first operate around the 487 allocations 
by government and the second operates around the 'illegal' allocations. The result 
is a two tier property pricing system: prices for properties in the first market and 
prices for properties in the second. The survey obtained prices from both markets 
to ascertain the real impacts of redistributive policies. 
The results of the stepwise regression are reported in Table 8-1 below. The analysis 
found model-3 (the last row) below to be a very good fit for the data. It shows that 
as much as 95 per cent (R2 = 0.954) of the proportion of variations in land prices in 
this policy zone are explained by the three variables (see foot note c of table). Table 
8-2 reports the ANOVA for the regression model. It confirms that the model 
accounts for most of the variations in the dependent variable as the models 
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ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND IMPACTS 
This is at a statistically significant level, P-Value, of less than 0.05 for the F- 
statistics. Thus only 5 percent of the variances in land prices in this policy zone are 
not explained by selected independent variables. According to Table 8-1 land 
rights with formalised documents from both the Lands Commission and the Land 
Title Registry accounts for about 41 per cent of the variation of the land prices in 
this policy zone (Fl, 38 = 27.323, P-value < 0.05). On the other hand, land rights with 
formalised documents from the Lands Commission exclusively in contrast 
uniquely accounts for as much as 53 percent of the variances in land prices in this 
policy zone (Fl, 37 = 366.211, P-value < 0.05). Yet again, land rights with formalised 
documents from the Land Title Registry accounts for only 0.7 per cent of the 
variance in land prices in the zone. These results are not really unexpected. Table 
8-3 reports the unique monetary contributions or relative extra benefits that the 
respective independent variables make to land prices. 
Table 8-3: Coefficients (a) of the Regression Model 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 81,316,666.67 5,498,591.66 14.789 . 000 BothFormalised 57,483,333.33 10,997,183.32 . 647 5.227 . 000 
2 (Constant) 58,475,000.00 2,067,390.80 28.284 . 000 BothFormalised 80,325,000.00 3,580,825.91 . 904 22.432 . 000 LCFormalised 68,525,000.00 3,580,825.91 . 771 19.137 . 000 
3 (Constant) 53,900,000.00 2,760,950.42 19.522 . 000 
BothFormalised 84,900,000.00 3,904,573.53 . 955 21.744 . 000 LCFormalised 73,100,000.00 3,904,573.53 . 822 18.722 . 000 LTFormalised 9,150,000.00 3,904,573.53 . 103 2.343 . 025 
a Dependent Variable: Land Value 
The Unstandardized Coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression 
model, which provides the relative measure of extra benefits that documentation 
from the Lands Commission, Land Title Registry or both. The results reveal that 
for this policy zone formalisation at both the Lands Commission and the Land 
Title Registry (column 3, row 9) contributes extra benefits of about 4t85,000,000.00 
(Unstandardized Coefficient = 84,900,000.00, 't -statistics = 21.744, and P-value < 
0.05). That the t-statistics are considerably greater than 2 (rule of thumb) is a 
confirmation of the reliability of this estimate. As much as 86 percent of this 
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amount, Q73,100,000.00 (t-statistics = 18.722, and P-value < 0.05), is accounted for 
by the formalisation at the Lands Commission whiles the formalisation at the Land 
Title Registry contributes about 11 percent, Q9,150,000.00 (t-statistics = 2.343, and 
P-value < 0.05). Even in the case of formalisation at the Land Title Registration, the 
t-statistics are so small (very close to 2) signalling that documents from the Land 
Title Registry in this policy zone are relatively less important as contributor to 
benefits. 
The results imply that Title certificates granted over land rights that have not been 
previously formalised at the Land Commission confers little extra benefits in this 
policy zone. This reflects the official position of the enforcement bureaucracies. 
The official position is that regardless of how long one has been in peaceful and 
uncontested possession of land. This is because, by virtue of the redistributive 
policies of Ghana, the official basis of legal rights within this policy zone is 
allocations or formalised land rights from the Lands Commission - the 
administrators of redistributive policies in Ghana. It is thus the formalisation at the 
Lands Commission that, officially speaking, confers rights and hence some 
benefits. Accordingly, any residual benefits that land title or effective possession of 
the land may confer cannot fully materialize without prior existence of formalised 
land rights from the Lands Commission. This position seems to have permeated 
decisions of market actors and the opinions of valuers. It follows that those who 
acquire Land Title in this policy zone without prior formalised land rights from 
the Lands Commission tend to do so simply for the modicum peace of mind it 
brings. It may also be for them to be able to say that some form of officially 
sanctioned documents regardless of their validity and worth covers their 
properties. Such benefits according to the regression influence land prices in this 
policy zone by less than 11-percent. 
Owing to this official position, without formalised' documents those in effective 
possession of their rights are unable to use their land rights for any formal credit 
transaction for instance. They even cannot sell their holdings to purchasers who 
are mindful of formalised ownership documents. These thus stultify the potential 
worth of these land rights as they make unformalised land rights in the area 
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latently insecure and risky. It is thus from this standpoint that formalised 
documentation from the Lands Commission explain substantial proportions of 
price variations in this policy zone. But this suggests however that these benefits 
are officially contrived rather than evolved through interactions of market forces. 
The lack of document, has not in any significant way however constrained 
development of land rights in the area as the area is substantially developed with 
modern residential buildings. Perhaps the main source of benefits in this area is 
the inability to utilize unformalised land rights in official transactions. For those 
who are unwilling to use their land rights in official transactions the real benefits 
seems to be the exemptions from threats of possible future eviction or demolishing 
of, their investments by the government. Certainly if possessory titles were 
acceptable for formal transactions, formalized documents whether from the Lands 
Commission or Land Title would have less considerable influence on land prices 
in this policy zone. They would thus be considerably less beneficial. 
This means that any government investments into title registration in this zone 
will produce inconsequential overall benefits, which could lead to the 
amplification of the social costs. Rather efforts to formalise land rights in the zone 
through the Lands Commission on a grand scale will spring up enormous benefits 
at least to compensate for the social costs of the policy. 
8.3.2 The Benefits of Distributive Policies 
Distributive policies comprise lands compulsorily acquired by government on full 
payment of compensation that are currently being distributed to private entities 
i .. 
for development and use. The sample neighbourhood for this policy zone is the 
East Legon residential area (see Chapter 5). Table 8-4 reports the stepwise 
regression results. The results reveal a strong goodness of fit between the model 
and the variables as the model explains about 93 percent (see column 3, row 4; R- 
square = 0.932) of the proportion of variations in the land prices within the area. 
This is also confirmed by the ANOVA table (Table 8-5) which reveals a large 
"regression sum of squares" in comparison to the "residual sum of squares" 
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ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND IMPACTS 
The model has a high statistical significance level indicated by a p-value of less 
than 0.05 for the F-statistics. This indicates further that the independent variables 
accounts well for the variations in land prices in this zone as well. In the stepwise 
multiple regression, land rights formalised at the Lands Commission only 
accounts for about 55 per cent of the variations in land prices in this policy zone. 
This is slightly more than that of the redistributive zone. Surprisingly however, the 
results show that Land rights formalised both at the Lands Commission and the 
Land Title Registry accounts for a comparatively lower proportion (just about 38 
per cent, R-Square = 0.324) of the variations of land prices in this zone. 
This is an indication that formalisation of land rights at the Land Title Registry 
tends to have reducing effects on land prices in the zone when held in conjunction 
with those of the Lands Commission. Even more surprisingly is the fact that 
formalised ownership documents from the Land Title Registry alone explains 
insignificant proportion of the variance in land prices and hence was automatically 
discarded by the model. Table 8-6 presents the coefficients of the regression model, 
which represent the relative importance or unique contribution, in absolute 
monetary terms of the two main variables in the analysis. 
Table 8-6: Coefficients (a) of Policy Zone 3 Model 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 342,666,666.67 27,656,201.78 12.390 . 000 
Both Formalised 269,333,333.33 55,312,403.57 . 620 4.869 . 000 
2 (Constant) 229,000,000.00 11,433,710.23 20.028 . 000 
Both Formalised 383,000,000.00 19,803,767.05 . 881 19.340 . 000 
LC Formalised 341,000,000.00 19,803,767.05 . 785 17.219 . 000 
a Dependent Variable: Land Value 
The model found that formalised ownership documents from the Lands 
Commission exclusively tends to make a unique contribution of V341,000,000.00 to 
prices of standard residential building plots of about 0.43 acres. Mutual ownership 
of formalised documents from both the Lands Commission and the Land Title 
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Registry alternatively make unique contributions of V383,000,000.000 to land prices 
in'the policy zone. This figure will shortly be compared with the social costs of 
distributive policies measured in chapter 8. It is worth noting however that 
ownership of formalised documents from the Land Title Registry in contrasts 
makes virtually no contribution at all to land prices in this policy zone. When held 
in conjunction with formalised documents from the Lands Commission, Land Title 
Certification contributes only about 042,000,000.00 to land prices. This implies that 
within this zone Land titling per se makes very insignificant contribution to land 
prices even when they are held in conjunction with formalised documents from 
the Lands Commission in the zone. The reasons for such levels of benefits are the 
same as those of redistributive policy zones. This is an indication that expenses 
incurred in obtaining title certificates both from the government perspective and 
perspective of property owners is less yielding if the likelihood of obtaining 
formalised documents from the Lands Commission is considerably low. 
8.3.3 The Benefits of Regulative Policies 
Broadly regulative policies zones are areas in which absolute land rights are vested 
in indigenous communities such as families, clans and stools. However, within this 
broad classification are two main different shades of indigenous land right classes 
affected by distinct regulative policies. Thus to offer a more detailed view of the 
benefits derived by regulative policies, this policy zone has been segmented in this 
chapter into zone-1 and zone-2. This will enable the apparent nuances of 
regulative policies across the regulative zones to be explored and their benefits 
captured. To this end, Zone-1 comprise neighbourhoods predominated by stool 
land rights. Stool land rights as such are subjected, , rather curiously, to peculiar 
regulative, the concurrence policy, in addition to all the other regulative policies 
applicable in Zone-2. The neighbourhood sampled for this zone is the Baatsonaa 
residential neighbourhood of Accra. Zone-2 comprises all other non- stool land 
indigenous land rights areas not affected by distributive and redistributive 
policies. The results of the stepwise regression are reported in Table 8-7. Table 8-8 
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ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND IMPACTS 
In these areas indigenous communities or their transferees hold land rights. The 
neighbourhood sampled for this zone is the Ajirigano residential area. 
8.3.3.1 Regulative Policies zone -1: Baatsonaa Residential Area 
The model in Table 8-7 shows that formalisation of land rights contributes little to 
land price variations in this zone. This model explains just about 56 percent of the 
variations in land prices in this policy zone. This is reinforced by the relatively 
large "residual sum of squares" obtained from the ANOVA (seeTable 8-8). Indeed 
as the model shows, formalisation of land rights explains just about 17.3 percent of 
the variances in land prices in this policy zone. This is in contrast to 95 percent in 
redistributive zones and 93 percent in distributive zones. 
The absence of formalised documents explains approximately 38 percent of land 
price variations in this zone. Clearly, formalisation of land rights do not have as 
profound an influence on land prices in this policy zone as they do in the 
distributive and redistributive policy zones discussed above. The most plausible 
explanation to such results is that non-policy variables as location, neighbourhood 
quality, reputation of neighbourhood, scarcity of land, availability of infrastructure 
and utility services dominantly influence land prices in this zone. Table 8-9 reports 
the coefficients of the regression model for this policy zone. The results show that, 
in absolute terms, within this policy zone, the lack of officially sanctioned 
documents uniquely reduces land values by about Q14,500,000.00, which is about 
15 per cent of the mean potential value of lands within the area. 
Table 8-9: Coefficients (a) for Policy Zone 1.1 Model 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized t Sig. Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 84,466,666.67 1,937,865.23 43.58748 4.68E-34 
Unformalised (19,266,666.67) 3,875,730.45 -0.627737479 -4.97111 1.45E-05 2 (Constant) 79,700,000.00 1,985,692.06 40.13714 4.15E-32 
Unformalised (14,500,000.00) 3,439,319.54 -0.472432186 -4.21595 0.000154 BothFormalised 14,300,000.00 3,439,319.54 0.46591588 4.157799 0.000183 
,a LCpenuenc variaDie: Lana value 
Availability of ownership documents jointly sanctioned by the Lands Commission 
and the Land Title Registry makes a unique positive contribution of C14,300,000.00 
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which is also about 15 per cent of the mean potential value of lands within the 
area. Thus as much as 70 percent, about 084.5 million of the mean land values in 
the zone are accounted for by other non-policy factors. 
The implication here is that the likely benefits derivable from regulative policies in 
this zone are considerably small. It is unlikely therefore that the accomplishment of 
regulative policies in this zone will be phenomenal. This also shows that regulative 
policies cannot be used to significantly regulate the economic behaviours of 
economic actors operating within this zone. It is thus naive to think that the 
intermittent ban on land transactions, an ad-hoc administrative policy instrument 
introduced into the country in February 1991 to regulate the behaviours of actors 
in this policy zone, can ever be effective. 
This policy was implemented by refusing to formalize transactions from policy 
areas on which the ad-hoc policy has been imposed for the time being. It is trite 
learning, that actors would have no difficulty sacrificing such small benefits in 
return for the huge gains from continuing their transactions in disregard to the 
policy. Interviews with one of the rival custodians of land rights in this policy zone 
confirmed that transactions had never ceased or even halted due to the imposition 
of such policies. All the policy achieved is to prevent actors from complying with 
the policy. 
Given the importance of land rights formalisation to the development of land and 
property markets, this finding suggests the need for a bespoke formalisation 
approaches that will raise the benefit bar. This will provide the desirable incentive 
for higher rate of compliance in this policy zone. 
8.4 REGULATIVE POLICY ZONE-2: AJIRIGANO RESIDENTIAL AREA 
Table 8-10 reports the results of the stepwise regression analysis. The results show 
that the model fits the data very well, at least better than that of regulative policy 
zone-1(Adjusted R2 =. 676, P-Value < 0.05). The implication is that land rights 













.. r a.. 
. -r 
v" 











L() e-. i 
n 4+ 00 
CD e 
r 




C\ n v 









































rr r lie 
d WW WW 
G; N CD a- 
w co CD 
O N OM c) C ) C 
If u, co CO to 
V- V- V- Lo 
O 4) WWW W+ W 




w C) C 
C) 
U) V% a ý l ) 
co M 
0 C ! M 
W 01 ' e- 
O 0 























ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND IMPACTS 
Further, as indicated in the ANOVA table (Table 8-11) the large regression sum of 
squares in comparison to the residual sum of squares indicate that the model accounts 
for most of the variations in land prices in the area. Actually, the model could not 
account for just about 30 percent of land value variations in the area. This is a 
significant improvement on the model for zone-1. 
In the stepwise regression analysis, absence of officially sanctioned ownership 
documents uniquely accounts for as much as 50 per cent of variations in land prices in 
the area (Adjusted R2 = 0.497, P-Value < 0.05). Whiles formalized documents from 
both the Lands Commission and Land Title Registry accounts for just about 20 per 
cent of variations in land values in the area (Adjusted R2 = 0.183, P-Value < 0.05). 
Individually, however, neither the existence of officially sanctioned document from 
the Lands Commission nor the Land Title Registry by themselves explained 
significant variations in land values in the area as in the case of regulative zone-1 The 
coefficients of the regression showing the unique contributions of the variables in 
absolute monetary terms are reported in Table 8-12. 
Table 8-12 : Coefficients (a) for the Regulative Policy Zone 1.2 Model 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 106,166,666.67 2,864,891.33 37.05783 1.94E-31 
Unformalised (35,666,666.67) 5,729,782.66 -0.71054 -6.22479 2.8E-07 
2 (Constant) 98,500,000.00 2,806,844.92 35.09278 5.27E-30 
Unformalised (28,000,000.00) 4,861,598.00 -0.55781 -5.75942 1.33E-06 
Both Formalised 23,000,000.00 4,861,598.00 0.458201 4.730955 3.23E-05 
a liepenaent Variable: Land Value 
The results show that land rights formalisation is more beneficial in these zones than 
they are in zone-i. As the results show, the absence of officially sanctioned land rights 
documents tends to reduce land prices in these areas by 428.5 million. On the contrary 
however formalised land rights obtained from both the Lands Commission and the 
Land Title Registry tends to make a unique contribution of about 423.0 million to land 
prices in these areas. This indicates the quantitative dimension of the benefits that 
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documentation contributes to the utility of land rights in this policy zone. But this can 
only occur when the formalisation is with both the Lands Commission and the Land 
Title Registry. Formalisation with only one of these enforcement bodies contributes 
insignificantly to value as the model reveals. 
Given the varying economic benefits of the respective policies, H5 that regulative real 
estate policies will have higher benefits than distributive and redistributive policies is 
rejected as distributive policies instead are producing considerably higher benefits in 
comparison to regulative and redistributive policies. On the other hand, hypothesis H6 
that distributive real estate policies will have higher benefits than redistributive 
policies is accepted as the hypothesis is confirmed by the analysis. 
It is now opportune to ascertain the balance between the costs estimated in Chapter 7 
and the benefits estimated in this chapter to establish the impacts of these policies. 
8.5 THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF URBAN REAL ESTATE POLICIES IN GHANA 
On the basis of the research questions the a priori expectations of the analysis of the 
impacts of the policies under review is stated formally in hypotheses form in Chapter 
6 and reproduced below as follows: 
H7 Regulative real estate policies will have positive economic impacts as 
their associated social welfare costs will fall short of their corresponding 
social welfare benefits. 
Hs Distributive and redistributive real estate policies will have negative 
economic impacts, as their associated social welfare costs will exceed 
their corresponding social welfare benefits. 
H9 Redistributive policies will yield higher economic deficits than 
distributive policies. 
These hypotheses are verified below. This is accomplished by comparing the benefit 
measures computed in this chapter with their corresponding social costs measures as 
established in chapter 8. 
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8.6 THE IMPACTS OF REGULATIVE POLICIES 
The social costs and welfare damage that regulative policies generate generally far 
exceed the benefits they produce resulting in their generation of substantial economic 
deficits. Table 8-13 reports the economic impacts of regulative real estate policies in 
Ghana computed as the simple arithmetic difference between the estimated costs 
(Chapter 7) and benefits in this Chapter. 
Table 8-13: The Computed Impacts of Regulative Policies 













Concurrence Regulative 14,300,000.00 61,555,593.46 (47,255,593.46) (5,136.48) (2,703.41) 
Stool Consent Regulative 14,300,000.00 60,836,279.73 (46,536,279.73) (5,058.29) (2,662.26) 
Plotting Regulative 23,000,000.00 41,596,223.63 (18,596,223.63) (2,021.33) (1,063.86) 
Land Title (Zone-1) Regulative - 36,030,440.28 (36,030,440.28) (3,916.35) (2,061.24) 
Land Title (Zone-2) Regulative - 47,040,304.53 (47,040,304.53) (5,113.08) (2,691.09) 
Average Regulative 10,320,000.00 49,411,768.33 (39,091,768.33) (4,249.11) (2,236.37) 
Source: Field Survey 
The analysis found that typically regulative policies incur economic deficits of some 
C39.00 million (US$4,200.00 or £2,200.00) per transaction involving basic unit of 
residential land, typically 0.23 acres. In detail, the Concurrence regulative policies 
generate overall highest deficit of about V47.3 million (US$5,136.00 or £2,703.00) per 
single transaction. Additionally, Stool Land Consent incurs a marginal economic 
deficit of ¢46.5 million (US$5,000.00 or £2,700.00). The Plotting regulative policy which 
is indeed a superfluous administrative policy albeit most widely patronised generates 
marginal deficits of Q16.6 million (US$ 2,000 or £1,000). Within regulative policy zone- 
1, Land Title certification incurs a marginal deficit of Q36.00 million (US$3,900.00 or 
£2,000.00). They however generate a comparatively higher deficit of ¢47.00 million 
(US$5,100.00 or £2,200.00) in regulative policy zone-2. 
This widespread deficit could be because the regimes of regulative policies in place 
are inapt or deficiently delivered or both. Whatever the source, these deficits are 
indications that the regulative policies are overbearing on market dealers and 
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constraining their rationality. The end result, if compliance is strictly enforced, will be 
a complete stultification of the development of the real estate markets in this policy 
zone. It does not appear, from earlier studies like Larbi (1994) and Antwi (2000) that 
these policies are so far being strictly enforced. If this claim is correct, then it will limit 
the aggregate scale of the damage these policies impose. Nonetheless, so long as they 
remain on the policy books they present real and eminent danger if not appropriately 
reformed. It is the weight of these regulative policies that appear to be driving more 
and more people into the realm of informality and perhaps accounts for the 70 percent 
land contracts within urban areas of Ghana that are not formalised in compliance with 
these policies. 
8.7 THE IMPACTS OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
Table 8-14 reports the impacts of redistributive policies estimated as the arithmetic 
difference between their corresponding costs and benefits. 
Table 8-14 : The Economic Impacts of Redistributive Real Estate Policies 




Social Benefits (C) Costs (C) Impacts Costs ($) Costs (£) 
Regularization Redistributive 85,000,000.00 62,433,488.17 22,566,511.83 2,452.88 1,290.99 
Average Overall 85,000,000.00 62,433,488.17 22,566,511.83 2,452.88 1,290.99 
Source: Field Survey 
As shown in the table redistributive policies produce positive impacts of ¢22.6 million 
(US$2,500.00 or £1,300.00). This figure however is notional and essentially an 
inconclusive reflection of the true impacts for a number of reasons. Firstly, as 
mentioned in Chapter 8, data on the extra official payments made to secure 
formalisation of land rights in this zone was unavailable for the analysis. Scanty 
anecdotal evidence suggests that, extra official payments made in compliance with 
this policy can be up to about 50 percent of the land value. If this data had been 
obtained and incorporated in the analysis, it would undoubtedly have amplified the 
social costs allied to this regime of policy. This would have eroded the emergent 
positive impacts, driving it most likely to negative. Secondly, as the analysis in this 
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chapter shows, the increase in price, that is the extra benefits, results clearly because 
of official denial of the legal validity of possessory titles to the extent that even though 
people are in possession of their holdings their titles are considered illegal. 
Indeed the true test of the benefits of this policy can be obtained when market dealers 
are allowed the free will to decide whether or not they are willing to pay the extra 
costs of compliance. Against their will, effective occupiers of land within these zones 
are coerced, so to speak, to pay extra for the benefit of obtaining formalized land 
rights. It is doubtful if such coercive price increase could rightly be classified as 
benefits within the meaning of economic theory. Economic principles suggest that for 
any increase in price to be attributed to the utilities derived by market dealers, it must 
flow from the willingness of the party and not by duress. It is only when consumers, 
on their own volition are willing to pay a price for the policy that it could be said that 
they, envisage some benefits from and hence prefer to obtain that value from the 
policy. This is an important way of knowing whether consumers are deriving benefits 
as it affords them the opportunity to decide if it is worthwhile to comply with the 
policy. It is clear that if market dealers are not allowed the free will, without such 
undue instruments of control such as denial of the legal validity of their possessory 
titles, to decide to pay the extra price to formalize their land rights, they are not being 
allowed to make rationale decisions on the use of their money. The extra price they 
are compelled to pay may not reflect the value they place on the policy. It is thus 
impossible under such situation of duress to know whether the policy is indeed 
engendering social benefits and hence impacts. 
Again, owing to the tenor of this study, the costs of the inequities and injustices meted 
out to the displaced, dispossessed and uncompensated land rights owners were also 
not taken into consideration in this analysis. It is however not beyond questioning 
. whether 
if these are incorporated in the analysis any merit will exists in these policies 
to enable them generate such negative impacts. 
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8.8 THE IMPACTS OF DISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
Table 8-15 reports the computed economic impacts of distributive real estate policies 
estimated as above. Barring the costs of inequities, injustices and inherent waste in the 
delivery system, distributive policies emerged as the policy that offers the highest and 
most significant positive impacts. According to the results of the analysis, the overall 
impacts of distributive policies per transaction in the sampled zone is about ¢350.00 
million (US$38,000.00 or £20,000). 
Table 8-15: The Computed Economic Impacts of Distributive Policies 
Policy Process Policy Type Total Social Total 
Social Economic Total Social 
Total 
Social 
Benefits (Q) Costs (¢) Impacts Costs ($) Costs (E. ) 
State Lease Renewal Distributive 383,000,000.00 32,593,034.48 350,406,965.52 38,087.71 20,046.17 
Allocation Distributive 383,000,000.00 33,297,433.50 349,702,566.50 38,011.15 20,005.87 
State Consent Distributive 383,000,000.00 32,742,469.82 350,257,530.18 38,071.47 20,037.62 
Average Overall 383,000,000.00 32,877,645.93 350,122,354.07 38,056.78 20,029.88 
Source: Field Survey 
Again, as in the case of redistributive policies, data on extra official payments made in 
complying with these policies could not be obtained for analysis. Though this may be 
considerable, even up to 50 percent of the land values, their incorporation are unlikely 
to erode and drive the impacts to negative given the sheer magnitude of their impacts. 
This is reflected in the high rate of compliance and land rights formalisation in this 
area. Perhaps about 90 percent of land rights in this area are formalized. 
The reasons for such high impacts could emanate from several sources. Firstly 
government has paid for all the lands in this policy zone. Accordingly potentials for 
ownership disputes between government tenants and the dispossessed owners as in 
the redistributive zones is minimal and in most cases non existent. Thus 90 percent of 
allocation by government is effectively implemented on the ground. In comparison to 
other policy zones in the country, distributive policy zones enjoy less ownership 
contestations and squabbles. Besides, there are no social costs to the dispossessed 
landowners as they have been duly compensated hopefully at market rates. Even if 
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some residual social costs exist their effects on the outcome are unlikely to be 
substantial. Then again, because this policy zone unlike the other policy zones benefits 
from high professional management and government investment in infrastructure 
and services including road network drains, piped water and electricity, they tend to 
attract foreign expatriates, the business community, the high standing members of 
society, the affluent and politicians. Demands for land in these zones are the highest 
in Accra and elsewhere in the country. Those who are able to acquire lands in these 
zones are the few privileged of society and to avoid losing their investments they tend 
to show willingness to pay the extra price to comply with the policy. It is these 
characteristics that make the policies socially worthwhile. 
Accordingly, hypothesis H7 that regulative real estate policies will have positive 
economic impacts as their associated social welfare costs will fall short of their 
corresponding social welfare benefits is rejected. Regulative policies as the analysis 
shows are producing clear negative impacts. Again, hypothesis Ha that distributive 
and redistributive policy will have negative economic impacts as their associated 
social welfare costs will exceed their corresponding social welfare benefits is also 
refuted. The analyses show that while distributive policies generate positive impacts, 
redistributive policies are producing inconclusive results. Besides, hypothesis H9 that 
redistributive policies will yield higher economic deficits than distributive policies is 
also refuted. 
8.9 MODEL VALIDATION 
Ideally, having estimated the impacts of urban real estate policies, the models relied 
on for this estimates needs to be checked for external validity. That is by checking 
whether the results obtained will be statistically comparable to what was likely to be 
obtained using another data set drawn from the same population of data. This will 
give an indication of the extent to which the results of the study can be generalised. To 
neutralise or isolate the effect of the timing of the data collection as well as the 
influence of the particular field officers employed for the collection of the. empirical 
data on the results, the validation data has to be obtained at a different time and by 
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different set of field officers. This implies the need for extra financial and other 
resources. Owing purely to the lack of financial and other resources no such 
validation data could be obtained for this testing. It was thus not possible for the 
models employed in the study to be so validated. That said, as explained in the 
Chapter 6 enormous efforts were put into ensuring the external validity of the data 
collected at the data collection stage of the study. For instance to improve the external 
validity of the study random selection as much as possible rather than non random 
procedure was used in the sampling of respondents and participants for the study. 
Besides, before the model was utilized to analyse the data, it was first presented at the 
2004 annual conference of the Commonwealth Association of Surveyors and Land 
Economists where it was subjected to expert interrogation and modification to 
improve its rigor and reliability. Accordingly, the significantly low p-value or 
significance level relative to the chosen alpha level of 0.05 for the t-test for the 
individual partial regression coefficient reported in tables 8-3,8-6,8-9 and 8-12 as well 
as the F-test reported in tables 8-1; 8-2,8-4,8-5,8-7,8-8,8-10 and 8-11 confirm that, 
statistically the results of the multiple regression are significant and could not have 
been obtained simply by chance or happenstance. These results indicate a high 
probability of obtaining statistically similar results if the study is repeated, implying 
also that the results are reliable enough to form the basis for generalising the 
conclusions to the relevant population. However, the external validity of the model 
will be stronger if this study is replicated in other sub-Saharan Africa urban areas. 
8.10 SUMMARY 
The foregoing provides indications of the scale of benefits and overall economic 
impacts of real estate policies in Ghana. Data constraints did not enable precise 
estimates of these benefits and impacts to be provided. Nonetheless, the available data 
revealed deferring impacts of real estate policies in Ghana. As the analysis show 
regulative policies are engendering negative economic consequences whiles 
distributive policies are producing positive economic consequences. While it is clear 
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from economic principles that redistributive policies are likely to yield negative 




Findings and Analysis of the Cost of Real Estate Policy Bureaucracies 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter addresses the last research question vis: to what extent are the 
enforcement institutions and processes contributing to the impacts of these policies? 
This question led to the hypothesis that: 
Hlo The direct costs of enforcing respective categories of real estate policies 
in Ghana are not significantly different and are also not excessive. 
The argument that policy delivery institutions, the world over, bear immensely on the 
economic outcomes of policies is now widely accepted by specialists in the field 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1990; 1991). This position derives fundamentally from the scale 
of costs these delivery modalities incur in their operations (see Baron and Myerson R, 
1982). This chapter's concern however is not so much about the typically huge public 
funds required to deliver real estate policies as their probable inbuilt avoidable or 
irrelevant costs. This is because, by definition relevant costs promote positive policy 
outcomes whiles irrelevant costs are essentially waste and hence do not contribute 
positively to overall policy outcomes. Thus by focusing on the irrelevant costs it is 
possible to draw attention to the level of waste accumulated and reproduced in real 
estate policy delivery in Ghana and by extension, sub-Saharan Africa. It is this 
appreciation that is of profound interest for policy decisions. Bureaucracy theory 
suggests that policy delivery bureaucracies accumulate irrelevant costs in four main 
ways (see Chapter 3) notably; (1) aimlessness and inattentiveness to relevant policy 
delivery activities (2) excessive budgets; (3) superfluous bloating of personnel rosters 
and (4) the complexities of internal methods of coordination and policy delivery. The 
ensuing analysis examines the evidence from this perspective to establish the scale of 
inbuilt irrelevant costs in real estate policy delivery in Ghana. 
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9.2 THE DATA 
The prime data for this section of the analyses is the published approved budgets for 
these bureaucracies as well as national budget statements for the period 2000 and 
2005. This raw nominal budget time series data are reported in Appendix 1 below. 
Auxiliary data on employee levels of the agencies obtained through systematic 
administrative records search, observations and unstructured interviews with some 
staff of the agencies have all been crystallized in the analysis. Before embarking on the 
analysis, it is vital to point out the paucity of time series data on such variables as 
employee rosters; approved budgets, actual expenditure patterns and revenue 
generated. Databases on these variables are either nonexistent in most cases, 
inconsistent, impoverished or utterly disorganized. Efforts were made to extract 
crucial data as much as possible from these impoverished sources and these have 
been relied on for the analysis reported in this chapter. Incidentally, the year 2000, the 
year for which budget data was obtained coincides also with the commencement of 
the current dispensation of budgeting rules for the public sector. Thus, the data 
obtained captures the most current budgeting behaviors of the bureaucracies under 
analyses. 
As explained in Chapter 6 five of the six real estate policy bureaucracies were 
purposively surveyed for this analysis. The survey excludes the Town and Country 
Planning Department as the study concentrates on policies within the band of 
ownership acquisition and formalisation. Land use policies as implemented by Town 
and Country Planning Department are essentially post ownership formalisation and 
hence fall, strictly speaking, beyond the domain of this study. The data is analyzed 
using ANOVA and other supplementary statistical techniques. The rationale for this 
analysis tools are provided at appropriate sections of the chapter. 
9.3 RESULTS AND BASIC FINDINGS 
Table 9-4 reports the annualised compounded budgets of the land sector agencies. 
This is simply the nominal budget figures (Appendix 1) for the bureaucracies for the 
period 2000 to 2005 compounded at a discount rate of 33 percent. The adopted 
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discount rate represents the mean bank lending rate for the period under review (2000 
to 2005). The compounding procedure is a financial analysis technique that deflates 
and converts the nominal budget data to their respective 2005 equivalents. By 
compounding the nominal data, the differences in the budget figures accounted for 
exclusively by differences in budget years are neutralized making it possible to focus 
on the real figures for the respective budgets indexed to 2005 prices. Having 
established a common basis it is possible to make direct comparative analysis of the 
budgets for the respective years. 
Appendix 2 reports the dollar equivalent of the compounded budget data indexed to 
2005 prices for ease of international comparison. Table 9-1 and Table 9-2 report the 
summaries of these compounded budgets in Cedis and Dollars respectively grouped 
by bureaucracies. Table 9-1 reveals that, the real total budgeted expenditure for real 
estate policy delivery in Ghana for the period 2000 and 2005 (Table 9-1, column-6 row- 
ä 8) iss 4588 billion. This translates to US$64 million (Table 9-2, column-7, row-8). This 
works out to US$11 million per annum (Table 9-2, column -7 row-9). Between the 
bureaucracies, the analysis found that the Survey Department is the bureaucracy with 
the largest real annual budgeted expenditure of US$ 3 million per annum (Table 9-2, 
column-6, row-9). The Land Title Registry on the other hand is the bureaucracy with 
the least annual real budgeted expenditure of US$ 728,000 per annum (Table 9-2, 
column-3, row-9). These amounts indicate simply that, in real terms, the government 
of Ghana is making substantial investments into real estate policy delivery. The basic 
question that falls for investigations in this Chapter however is whether these 
government investments are entirely relevant and sufficient for the task of efficient 
real estate policy delivery. 
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Put differently, what is the scale of irrelevant costs inbuilt into these expenditures? To 
establish this, the data is examined to find out whether, as imagined by bureaucracy 
theory, the budgets and personnel rosters of the bureaucracies as such are excessive. 
The excessiveness of the budgets in particular is verified in the ensuing section in two 
stages. Firstly the data is examined for evidence of budget maximizing traits across 
the bureaucracies. Secondly the data is examined to ascertain, from a comparative 
perspective, whether the quantitative dimensions of the budgets as such are indeed 
excessive. This will make it possible for judgments to be made on the extent to which 
the budgets are potentially ballooned with irrelevant programmes, mode of conduct 
and courses of action. 
9.4 BUDGET MAXIMIZING TENDENCIES 
In the absence of any standardized yardstick for determining the optimal budgets for 
bureaucracies, an effective way of ascertaining the potential excessiveness of these 
budgets is to establish, from the budget data, whether the surveyed bureaucracies 
exhibits significantly similar budget maximizing traits. This, when established will 
confirm that the surveyed bureaucracies are drawn from the universal population of 
bureaucracies which will enable conclusions of invariably excessive budgets sizes to 
be drawn. 
This can be confirmed, statistically, if equality in the means and variances of the 
budget estimates of the surveyed bureaucracies can be established. Surely, it is not 
expected that the means of the surveyed budget for the respective bureaucracies will 
be equal given that random variations in the agencies could affect their respective 
budget allocations. The question being addressed is whether the differences between 
the budgets are consistent with the assumption of similar budget maximization 
behavior of bureaucracies. This necessitates the application of the Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) procedure. The ANOVA procedure is a statistical procedure that 
tests the null hypotheses that the surveyed budgets were drawn from a population 
whose budget means are equal. The a priori expectation thus is that if the null 
hypothesis were true then the arithmetic means of the respective budget items would 
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be roughly the same. The F-ratio is the test statistics for the ANOVA procedure. 
Actually, the F-ratio is a statistic of the ratio of the variances within and between each 
budget item with each corrected for the appropriate degrees of freedom14. The 
statistical significance of the F-ratio provides a measure of the probability of rejecting 
the null hypothesis of no difference between the means of the budgets when in fact 
there is no significant difference (type 1 error). Thus if the probability of making such 
a type 1 error is high then the null hypothesis is confirmed indicating the absence of 
significant differences in the means of the budgets being analyzed. 
Accordingly, to verify the significance of the differences in the means of the sampled 
budgets, one-way 5x4 analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted on the data using 
the four expenditure classes; Wage bills, Administration, Services and Investments as 
variables and the respective bureaucracies as factors. Table 9-3 reports the results of 
the ANOVA procedure. The p-value (or sig. in Table 9-3) which is a measure of the 
actual probability of obtaining the reported value of the respective F-ratio (or F in 
Table 9-3) provides a measure of the lowest significance level at which the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the respective budget items can be rejected. By 
statistics convention, the p-value (or sig. ) statistic is gauged against an accepted, albeit 
arbitrary alpha or probability level of 0.05. That is to say, the probability (i. e. p-value or 
sig. ) of obtaining the F-ratio for particular budget variables must be more than 0.05 for 
the null hypothesis of no difference in the budgets to hold. If the probability is less 
than 0.05 then significant differences exist in the budget variables. 
Table 9-3 confirms that statistically significant difference exists in the respective mean 
Wage bills (F4,25 = 14.662, sig. = 0.000) as well as Administration budgets (F4,25 = 9.210, 
sig. = 0.000). The probability of obtaining the reported F-ratios is considerably low, 
less than 5 in 10,000 (see Table 9-2, sig. = 0.000 rounded to three decimal places). This 
means that chances of making an error in rejecting the hypothesis of no significant 
difference in the budgets for these variables is less than 5 in 10,000.00. With such 
4 The degree of freedom for the variances between samples is the number of 
samples less one while the degree of freedom for the estimated variances within 
the sample is the total number of cases less one. 
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trivial risk, the null hypothesis is rejected leading to the confirmation of significant 
difference in the means of these particular budget variables. Thus for these variables 
at least one of the bureaucracies differs significantly from the rest in budget 
maximizing traits. 
Table 9-3: ANOVA of Land Sector Annual Budgets 
df F Sig. 
Wage Bill Between Groups 4 14.662 . 000 
Within Groups 25 
Total 29 
Administration Expenses Between Groups 4 9.210 . 000 
Within Groups 25 
Total 29 
Services Expenses Between Groups 4 . 931 . 462 
Within Groups 25 
Total 29 
Investment Expenses Between Groups 4 1.329 . 287 
Within Groups 25 
Total 29 
Conversely, no statistically significant difference is found between the bureaucracies 
regarding their budgets for Services (F4,25 = 0.931, sig. = 0.462) and Investments (F4,25 
=1.321, sig. = 0.287). The results indicate that the probability of obtaining the reported 
F-ratios for budgets on Services and Investments is 46.2 in a 100 and 28.7 in 100 
respectively. These are indications of considerable chances of making an error in 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference in the means of these budget variables. 
With such considerable risk, the null hypothesis is accepted and the lack of significant 
differences in the budgeting traits of the bureaucracies for these budget variables is 
confirmed. Thus for these variables the bureaucracies exhibit similar budget 
maximizing traits. 
To determine which bureaucracies statistically differ significantly in budget 
maximizing traits for Wage bills and Administration expenses recourse is had to a 
posteriori Scheffe comparison tests, one of many of the available multiple methods. It 
is relied on because of its conservativeness in comparing differences between 
variables. The Scheffe's procedure performs comparison on the means of all the 
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possible pair of bureaucracies by computing the arithmetic differences of their means 
and checking if the differences are statistically significant based on their p-values. 
Appendix 3 reports the results of the Scheffe test conducted on Wage bills and 
budgets for Administration. The significantly different pair of bureaucracies are 
indicated in the table by the * next to their means in the column headed Mean 
Difference at alpha level of 0.05. The last column provides the exact significance of the 
difference between any two means. The test confirms that the Land Valuation Board is 
the only bureaucracy that differed significantly from the rest with regard to Wage 
Bills (F4,25 = 14.662, p-value (or sig. < 0.05). The test shows further however that 
regarding budgets on Administration, significant differences exists between Lands 
Commission, Land Title Registry, Land Valuation Board and the Survey Department. 
These results suggest inconsistencies in the budget maximizing behavioral patterns 
across the bureaucracies on the respective budget variables. The results however did 
not confirm the extent to which the budgets are actually growing and whether such 
growth rates can be classified as excessive as imagined in bureaucracy theory. 
9.5 THE BUDGET GROWTH RATE 
Together, Table 9-4 and Table 9-5 present the compounded annualized budget growth 
rates for the bureaucracies under consideration. Specifically Table 9-4 reports the 
indices for the respective budget items whiles Table 9-5 depicts the indices for the 
corresponding bureaucracies. Compounded annualized budget growth rate is an 
index for measuring the year over year growth rate of the budgets for the 
bureaucracies over the survey period. This index provides insights into the pace at 
which the budgets have been growing as well as their respective pattern of growth. 
Bureaucracy theory as reviewed above suggests that, typical bureaucracies would 
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At the minimum, budgets for organisations are expected to keep pace with general 
inflationary increases in prices. Thus, it is expected, a priori, that if these 
bureaucracies are growing excessively, their respective average budget growth rate 
will far exceed the country's prevailing average annual inflation of 28.5 percent (on 
inflation analysis see further CEPA, 2002). Remarkably, the empirical evidence reveals 
otherwise. According to Table 9-4 and Table 9-5, in real terms, the budgets for the 
bureaucracies grew by an average of just about 19 percent per annum oscillating 
erratically from a deficit growth rate of -28.71 percent (Land Title Registry) to a 
maximum of 27.35 percent (Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands) (Table 9-5). 
This rate is substantially lower than the country's average annual inflation rate 
suggesting that the bureaucracies are not running excessively large budgets. Indeed 
these growth rates are even not consistently upwards as often imagined. Overall, the 
bureaucracies exhibit a rather erratic pattern, oscillating from a minimum growth rate 
of -26.10 percent to a maximum of 50.44 percent (columns 6 'and 7 of Table 9-4 and 
Table 9-5 respectively). Again, while the expectations from the theory are that the 
Wage bills will exhibit a significant growth rate or at least consistent upward growth 
pattern typically above inflation also, this expected pattern is wanting. At a typical 
growth rate of 2.29 percent, Wage bills (column 2, Table 9-4), instead records the least 
growth rate in comparison to the other budget variables. 
Besides, the growth rate of Wage bills is also quite erratic rather than consistent, 
ranging from a minimum deficit growth rate of -23.83 percent in 2004 to a maximum 
of 25.65 percent in 2005. Administrative expenses, the recurrent running costs, another 
important indicator of growth, show a similar low pattern of growth. According to 
Table 9-4 administrative expenses grew at an average annual rate of just some 6.53 
percent ranging from a deficit growth rate of -42.84 percent in 2002 to 80.21 percent in 
2003. Similarly, Investment expenses grew less than 10 percent also oscillating 
between deficit growth rates of -37.92 percent in 2003 to a maximum of 80.21 in 2004. 
Service expenses exhibits the largest growth rate of almost 35 percent from a 
minimum of -19.34 to a maximum of 75.68 percent. From Table 9-4 and Table 9-5 it is 
explicit that the growth rate of the budgets of the bureaucracies is not even at pace 
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with general price increases in the country. For the Land Title Registry and the Land 
Valuation Board in particular the trend is essentially downwards. 
Table 9-6: Summary of Budgets in US$ by Expenditure Items 
Admin Services Investment 
Year Wage Bill Expenses Expenses Expenses Total 
2000 $2,755,734.68 $1,163,930.48 $527,842.09 $1,980,459.54 $6,427,966.79 
2001 $2,521,707.72 $1,538,995.39 $1,012,097.79 $2,163,300.35 $7,236,101.26 
2002 $2,058,582.95 $1,077,456.60 $1,032,551.92 $1,569,873.75 $5,738,465.23 
2003 $3,001,592.57 $1,609,314.46 $865,222.83 $1,138,267.92 $6,614,397.78 
2004 $2,424,026.20 $1,784,180.54 $2,586,847.83 $5,751,093.48 $12,546,148.04 
2005 $3,766,706.52 $1,945,148.91 $10,638,431.52 $8,966,475.00 $25,316,761.96 
Grand Total $16,528,350.64 $9,119,026.39 $16,662,993.97 $21,569,470.05 $63,879,841.05 
Proportion of Total 25.87% 14.28% 26.08% 33.77% 100.00% 
Besides as Table 9-6 reports, contrary to theoretical expectations, Wage bills and 
administrative budgets are not large in comparison to the other budget items. 
Administrative budgets and Wage bills represent 14.28 and 25.87 percent of the total 
budgets as compared to 26.08 and 33.77 percent for Services and Investment budgets. 
Yet there are suggestions from the official records that public sector wage bills in 
particular, in Ghana, are generally increasing. For instance in 2001, total government 
public service wage bill (Q3,056.5 billion) accounted for 51.0 percent of total public 
service budgets (MFEP, 2000). This gives a measure of the national index of the ratio 
between wage bills and total public sector budgets. Yet in the same year the wage bill 
for the surveyed bureaucracies ('6,092.1 million) accounted for 21 percent of total 
budget (428,420.6 million), some 30 percent short of the national index for the year. 
This national wage bill-total budget index increased to 70.5 percent in 2002 (MFEP, 
2003). Given such increasing national trends in public service wage bills, it is 
reasonable to expect this to engender similar wage bill increases in the real estate 
sector. Yet on the contrary, in the same year, the wage bills for the real estate sector 
bureaucracies (48,050.1 million Cedis) accounted fell to about 18 percent of their total 
budget (044,880.6 million), a shortfall of about 48.5 percent from the national average. 
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Table 9-7: Comparative Personnel Emoluments (millions of Cedis) 
Std. 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation 
Forestry Commission 6 10,20.09 15,124.29 10,220.40 4,996.28 
Wildlife Division 6 323.76 11,653.11 6,946.50 4,362.93 
Valid N (listwise) 6 
Table 9-7 presents descriptive statistics of the wage bills of two comparable 
bureaucracies within the same Ministry as the real estate bureaucracies' -the Forestry 
Commission and the Wild Life Division. Before 1986, these two bureaucracies 
together with all the surveyed bureaucracies were together as one department, the 
Lands Department. Since the split, each unit became a whole bureaucracy. Now, the 
evidence reveals that the wage bill of what used to be about a sixth of the erstwhile 
Lands Department has overgrown the remaining five bureaucracies put together 
several times over. The table reveals for instance that over the five year period, 2000 to 
2005, in cedi nominal terms, the mean annual wage bill for the Forestry Commission 
alone (one bureaucracy) amounted to Q10,220.40 million (Minimum = C1,020.09; 
Maximum = Q15,124.29 and Standard Deviation = p4,996.28). This represents a whole 
71.1 percent above the wage bills of all the five real estate bureaucracies put together 
over the same period. This becomes even more revealing when compared with the 
real estate bureaucracies individually. If this trend is justifiable on grounds of 
efficiency, then it means that if the split had not taken place, the forestry Commission 
as a department of the erstwhile land department alone would have been some 70 
times larger than the remaining five departments put together. Similarly, the Wild life 
Division, previously a subset of the Forestry Commission, another single bureaucracy 
incurred a mean wage bill of 46,945.50 million (Minimum = 323.76; Maximum = 
11,653.11 and Standard deviation = 04,362.93 million) which is also 57.5 percent more 
than that of all the five real estate bureaucracies put together. 
It is evident that the wage bill of the real estate bureaucracies is, by national 
standards, not excessive or too large, indeed comparatively small. These patterns 
unequivocally contradict the propositions and expectations of public choice theory of 
bureaucracy perspective of consistent budget and Wage bill maximizing behavioural 
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patterns of bureaucracies. Rather, these agencies appear to be financially 
malnourished which is likely to cause a shrinking capacity to deliver. Though these 
growth trends by themselves do not provide direct measures of irrelevant costs, they 
show that even if such costs are inbuilt in the budgets they are not substantial. 
Nonetheless, though these growth rates are not clearly extraordinary, they still do not 
adequately verify the theory that bureaucracies invariably constitute unnecessary 
drains on national resources. 
9.6 BUDGETS' SHARE OF NATIONAL INCOME 
Table 9-8 reports the impacts of the budgets on national revenue. In Ghana, the two 
main internally generated government revenue classes are the tax and non-tax 
revenues. These constitute the traditional funding sources for the budgets of public 
services and government bureaucracies in Ghana. To place the analysis in context a 
comparative analysis of the budget of the Forestry sector and the real estate sector 
bureaucracies is undertaken. Though the two sectors are not exact comparables (and 
none exists anyway), the forestry sector is highly and perhaps the best proximate 
comparable of the real estate sector. The two bureaucracies are fundamentally two 
sides of what used to be a single sector. They are both directly involved in land 
management activities. While the real estate sector bureaucracies concentrates on the 
management of non-forest and non-mining land use activities the forestry sector 
concentrates on the management of forestland use activities. Their activities involves 
basically similar tasks such as allocation of rights in land, recording of transactions 
involving rights in land, consenting and certification of land right transactions and the 
formulation of policies regarding land and natural resources in Ghana. 
Column 6 of the table reports statistics on the percentage or ratio between the 
respective annual budget and total government revenue for the preceding years. 
These statistics help in gauging the scale of the drain that these respective budgets 
constitute on national revenue in Ghana. As reported in the table, the real estate 
bureaucracies' budgets as a proportion of the preceding year's government revenue 
oscillates between a minimum of 0.25 percent in 2001 to a maximum of 0.65 percent 
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attained in 2000. This represents an annual average of less than 0.5 percent (Mean = 
0.49%) share of government internally generated revenue. This diverges starkly from 
the forestry sector's average share of 1.5 percent (minimum = 0.04% and maximum = 
2.42%). 
Table 9-8: Comparison with Government Revenue (Million of Cedis) 
Subsequent Year's Budget Share of 
Total Budget 
for the Government 
National National Tax Internally sampled 
land sector Revenue (%) 
Year Non-Tax G d a enci 
Revenue Revenue enerate Revenue Land 
Sector Forestry Land Forestry Sector Sector Sector 
1999 310,400.00 3,089,100.00 3,399,500.00 20,762.90 1,343.00 0.61 0.04 
2000 961,600.00 3,731,700.00 4,693,300.00 30,596.10 74,883.00 0.65 1.60 
2001 3,731,700.00 6,556,900.00 10,288,600.00 25,998.50 141,861.00 0.2.5 1.38 
2002 252,400.00 8,547,500.00 8,799,900.00 42,029.10 212,585.00 0.48 2.42 
2003 298,600.00 12,556,300.00 12,854,900.00 66,240.40 286,510.00 0.52 2.23 
2004 1,136,300.00 17,403,000.00 18,539,300.00 76,652.60 251,122.00 0.41 1.35 
Mean 1,115,166.67 8,647,416.67 9,762,583.33 43,713.27 161,384.00 0.49 1.50 
Source: Data on non tax and tax revenue were extracted trom the budget statements of 
Ghana (1999 - 2005). 
This indicates that the real estate sector's budget share of the total revenue is about a 
third of that of the forestry sector. At such a comparatively small share, it does not 
appear the budgets of the real estate sector bureaucracies are considerably excessive 
and overbearing on national resources. Thus, their budget sizes or wage bills per se 
do not appear to represent important sources of irrelevant costs. Indeed, over reliance 
on budget sizes to track the sources of extraneous costs in these bureaucracies is 
diversionary and more likely to obscure the true sources of irrelevant costs. 
9.7 THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE PERSONNEL ROSTER 
The low wage bill only provides indications of the direct cost dimensions of these 
bureaucracies as accounted for by personnel expenses. As Hutchful (2002) puts it, 
these salaries hardly suffice for a minimal standard of living. In general wages and 
salaries in the public services in Ghana are very low, indeed the lowest in West Africa 
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(UN DESA DPEPA, 2002, p. 9). According to the World Bank (2005, p. 2) public service 
wage bills as a proportion of Ghana's GDP are lower than the average of low and 
middle-income countries. Thus though the overall size of the wage bill may be small 
the actual workforce deployed in real estate policy delivery could be large in 
quantitative terms. That said a look at the empirical evidence from a comparative 
perspective show that the bureaucracies in practice deploy very small stock of 
workforce in real estate policy delivery in Ghana. The evidence as analyzed in Table 
9-9 shows actually that the workforce sizes of the real estate policy delivery 
bureaucracies are shrinking in real terms. 
As the table shows, overall the five bureaucracies put together employ a total of 1,954 
staff across the ten regions of the country to serve Ghana's 22 million population 
which is growing at an average annual rate of 2.14 per cent (see United Nations, 2005). 
Thus if population growth is indeed an important factor of demand for real estate as 
economic theory suggests then such increasing population trends regardless of the 
structure of the population will most likely engender a increasing demand for real 
estate policy delivery services. Yet the workforce size available to meet this demand 
represents less than one percent (0.24 percent) of the total public service workforce of 
800,000.00 (United Nations, 2005). The distribution of this total staff level among the 
individual bureaucracies show that currently the Lands Commission has a total 
workforce of 264 (0.03% public service), the Survey Department 539 (0.07% of public 
service), Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 251(0.03% of public service), Land 
Title Registry 82 (0.01 % of public service) and Land Valuation Board, 818 (0.1 %). 
These are trivial figures in comparison to the 3000 staff of the Ghana Highways 
Authority (0.38% of public service), 800 of the Department of Urban Roads (0.1% of 
public service), 25,000 of the. Ghana Health Service (3.13% of public service) and 
240,000 of the Ministry of Education (30% of public service) respectively (see further 
World Bank, 2005a, p. 35). Besides, the workforce sizes of the real estate bureaucracies 
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Even the agency, Land Title Registry that grew significantly (24%) over the period, 
grew that much because of its low workforce base of 66 to only 82 staff. It is still the 
smallest real estate sector bureaucracy. This confirms further that by national 
standards, real estate bureaucracies are one of the smallest bureaucracies in the 
country. Overgrowth does not thus appear to be a major source of extraneous costs at 
least by national standards. Given the failure of bureaucracy theory to provide ample 
guidance to the sources of irrelevant costs inbuilt into the operations of the surveyed 
bureaucracy, there is the need to explore other non-traditional routes. 
9.8 THE PROSPECTIVE SOURCES OF EXTRANEOUS COSTS 
This study found large measures of extraneous costs in two key unassuming areas. 
These relate to the structure of the workforce of the real estate bureaucracies and 
inbuilt misallocations in the respective budgets of the agencies. 
9.8.1 Acute Imbalances in Workforce Structure 
In Ghana, as the study found even the Weberian view of bureaucracy as based on a 
high degree of technical competence is far from reality. As Table 9-9 shows the real 
estate bureaucracies are manifestly bereft of professional staff (under 8% of total 
workforce) with major overstaffing and apparent widespread underemployment at 
the lower ends of the echelon- messengers, typists and clerks. These lower end 
employees constitute about 58% of the total workforce. Owing to the continuing 
government freeze on employment, heads of these bureaucracies have no control over 
the' selection of their staff mix and appointments. As a result, overall about 41% of 
established vacancies for professional staff within the real estate sector bureaucracies 
remain unfilled. The situation is unlikely to improve without drastic reconsideration 
of government policy of public service recruitment and any concomitant extraneous 
costs will thus continue to persist. 
This workforce profile gives a relatively high typical supervisor-staff ratio of 1: 12 for 
service organisations as compared to about 1: 4 in major private survey and valuation 
firms in Ghana as the survey found. A fundamental consequence of this is the high 
coordination costs. Managers are unable to effectively coordinate and supervise the 
254 
BUREAUCRACY COSTS 
work of the lower end staff. The methods adopted by managers to ensure that things 
are done well are to part take in the routine tasks. These managers are in the end 
clearly stretched to the limits on routine activities and paper shuffling. The survey 
found that these managers strain to keep up with administrative task, dealing with 
internal and external correspondence, written evaluation of everyday staff work, 
preparation of staff schedules, leave approvals, preparation of reports, internal and 
external meetings and other policy delivery activities such as rent assessment and site 
inspections. Practically, no time is left for effective business strategy, research, policy 
analysis, analytic work and policy development activities that are essential for 
efficient real estate policy delivery. The inefficiency costs of this inertia to the real 
estate market and the broad economy are obviously incalculable. For instance as a 
result of this inertia, all the bureaucracies continue to employ manual procedures in 
delivery policies and continue to rely on archaic maps and files that are defaced and 
in tatters even in the age of information technology. 
Another practical result of this high supervisor-staff ratio is that, without exception, 
errant, secretariat, clerical and technical staff control too much of what goes on in 
these bureaucracies. It does not appear that all these staff are indeed required for the 
work of the bureaucracies and not all of them indeed have identifiable schedules, 
indications of underemployment and a source of waste. Besides these errant staff 
decide when a file moves from one desk to the other, when correspondence, 
transaction documents and certificates are typed and the scale of preference for 
dealing with cases by senior officers. This has culminated in an inbuilt tradition of 
paternalism across the bureaucracies, which tend to view clients as people seeking 
favours from the bureaucracies. The bureaucracies do not perceive these clients as 
necessary forces for their survival or continuous existence. As a result, officially these 
market dealers are described as 'applicants' rather than as 'clients'. Unsurprisingly, 
issues of customer care, which are the prime drivers of efficiency, are explicitly absent 
in these bureaucracies. 
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Given this tradition, staff of these bureaucracies are able to demand favours and extra 
legal payments and bribes which this study established to be as much as three times, 
or more of official payments. The problem is because these bureaucracies are 
monopolist organisations, these clients in most cases have no option than to comply 
and pay these extra legal fees in addition to the official fees to obtain services from the 
bureaucracies. This situation is festered by the generally low salaries of employees of 
these bureaucracies as a result of which, heads of these agencies lack the moral 
courage and justification to exert necessary controls to curb this malfeasance. 
These obviously irrelevant costs may appear trivial at first sight, but definitely not 
after their full impacts are brought into perspective. The welfare costs of these extra 
legal payments are estimated in chapter 8. Thus, Goldsmith (1998) must be 
overlooking these extra extraneous costs in contending that because the salaries of 
these lower level staff are low, getting rid of them would lead to insignificant costs 
savings. This may be so from the government but certainly not from the perspective of 
the clients and social welfare costs perspectives. 
9.8.2 The Extraneous Costs of Input Control Budgeting 
This study found that a more serious source of waste and extraneous costs is inherent 
in the budget preparation and implementation processes rather than the size of the 
budgets per se. The starting point for such waste is the arbitrary ceilings imposed 
unilaterally on the budget sizes of all Ministries and their departments by the 
Ministry of Finance every year. These ceilings are imposed based exclusively on 
financial exigencies without recourse to any critical analysis of the budgetary 
requirements of the Ministries. Perhaps this is to address the public choice concern 
that, when given the opportunity, bureaucrats will inflate their budgetary 
requirements. In that sense some merits may exist in this approach. After a point, 
however increasing budget cuts begins to hinder the fiscal health of organisations, 
which invariably leads to deadweight losses through misallocation, and 
underemployment of existing resources. How this input control budgeting system is 
256 
BUREAUCRACY COSTS 
leading to the accumulation of waste and extraneous costs in the real estate 
bureaucracies in Ghana is interesting. 
Because bureaucrats have little control over the size of their budgets, they show a 
serious lack of commitment to the budget preparation process. These organisations 
thus do not have designated budget units or departments. What are in operation are 
budget committees mandated to be established by the government. Thus, the actual 
task of budget preparation is handled by staff of the Accountant General's 
Department on secondment to the agencies or in some cases by single or very few 
staff. These staff perform these functions in addition to a whole range of other 
functions that are unrelated to budget preparation. The survey found also that in 
general these persons have no formal training in budget preparation. This is even 
compounded by the Ministry of Finance's tradition of requesting for the submission 
of budget estimates always at the last minute. In 2004, the survey witnessed that the 
agencies had just a week to submit their budget statement for 2005. This under normal 
circumstances should not create any problems if a strong permanent budget unit 
exists within the departments. In the absence of such permanent budget units in these 
bureaucracies, the budget process indeed starts on receipt of the deadline for 
submission. 
Behind a veil of urgency to meet deadlines and the importance of not exceeding 
ceilings, budgetary allocations are often made in haste and largely arbitrarily without 
any serious analysis of the fiscal and performance implications of individual budget 
items. The heads of these agencies around this time also tend to be more concerned 
with meeting deadlines and thus show very little concern for the details of their 
agency's budgets. Under such situation, chances are that resources will be 
misallocated and this appears to be the most serious source of waste in the budgets. 
The data (Table 9-6 of page 248 above) show that in the end the misallocations are 
made in favour of Investments and Services - training, foreign travels and the rest as 
those are the two areas that the bureaucracies have full budgetary controls. However 
these misallocations in favour of investments do not appear to have gone into 
257 
BUREAuc1 Aci COSTS 
investments into operational issues and equipments. With all these huge budget 
expenditure these agencies are bereft of basic equipments and resources to effectively 
carry out their functions. The Land Title registry has only three computers all of 
which are used for secretarial purposes. The survey department has only two 
Geographical Positioning Systems (GPS) to carry out land surveys in the whole of the 
Greater Accra region. The services of the agencies continue to deteriorate. These 
suggest that these resource misallocation do not find their way into the efficiency 
stream; they are most likely expended on investments that do not contribute directly 
to the efficient operations of the organisations. 
The analysis confirms the hypothesis Hio that the direct costs of enforcing respective 
categories of real estate policies in Ghana are not significantly different and are also 
not excessive. 
9.9 SUMMARY 
The chapter examined the budget data of the respective land policy administration 
agencies largely from a comparative perspective and confirmed that the budgets of 
the agencies are not comparatively huge. The source of waste, which is contributing 
adversely to policy outcomes, is hidden in non-traditional sources. This chapter 
concludes the analysis phase of the study. The next chapter now provides a summary 
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Chapter 10 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations from the Study 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the research and survey that is described in the thesis 
including an outline of the main conclusions that have resulted from the findings 
of the study. The ways in which the study may be extended in future are also 
discussed and propositions for improvement in the regions real estate markets and 
policy administration are also summarized. 
10.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
Chapter 1 laid out the main foundation for the study. It provided the background 
to the study, the statement of the research problems, the main research questions, 
aims and objectives, the delimitation and limitations of the study as well as the 
significance of the study. This chapter established that the economies of sub- 
Saharan Africa are in dire condition and the regions urban real estate markets offer 
enormous potential for improvement in the economic conditions of the region. Yet 
the prevailing regimes of policies do not appear to be inducing these markets to 
perform efficiently. Nonetheless, due to a divergence of opinion on the true 
economic merits of these policies it has not been easy to point out which policies 
are causing harm and which ones are doing well. These divergent views persist 
because much of these works are qualitative in methodology, which permits value 
judgments to influence outcomes. This 'has produced a stalemate in policy 
decisions and progress is being sought through costly experimentations with 
policy reforms and ideologies. It is in the bid to break this apparent stalemate in 
real estate policy discussions and to move policy decisions forward in the region 
that this study is designed. The chapter thus provides justification for quantitative 
evidence of the economic impacts of real estate policies in the region so that 
harmful policies can be identified and isolated. The study, accomplishes this by 
subjecting existing government real estate policies. to quantitative examination 
with the view to providing quantitative and objectively ascertained evidence of 
their true economic consequences. z 
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To accomplish this, Chapter 2 reviewed the focal literature with the view to 
placing the study within the broad intellectual dialogue surrounding the issues. 
Chapter 2 established in essence that earlier land reform policies of the region 
launched a pattern, which is thriving today. These policies commenced a regime of 
formal land tenure system which operated in parallel to the indigenous tenure 
system. This formal tenure system was achieved by forceful takeover of large 
proportions of indigenous landholdings into government ownership together with 
a series of regulatory and registration requirements. These policies, both in terms 
of ideology and practice established in essence path dependence which set the 
land and real estate market institutional frameworks with lingering effects on long 
term state-market relations (on path dependence see North, 1990). They serve as 
the convenient tool by which postcolonial regimes maintained extensive control 
over land rights in the respective sub-Saharan Africa countries. Accordingly, they 
continue to primarily dictate the distribution of property rights, wealth, land 
endowment, inequalities and political power in these societies with long-term 
poverty and growth consequences. Even the current generation of land reforms 
appear to be threatened by these past policies. Yet little is known about the full 
economic impacts of these policies. This study is designed to bridge this 
knowledge gap. 
Having placed the study within the broad relevant discourse, Chapter 3 
formulated a theoretical framework within which the study was driven. The 
Chapter presented the Coase theorem as the main theoretical perspective from 
which the policies are evaluated. The Coase Theorem provided a yardstick for 
measuring the economic considerations on which real estate policies should be 
enacted in sub-Saharan Africa by presenting transaction costs as the prime 
indicator of the merits of policies. The theorem ultimately helped in understanding 
why the region s policies have taken particular shapes and why they are unlikely 
to change materially for a considerable length of time. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the power to enact real estate policies in Africa have 
for a long while been monopolised by a few. This reflected in the institution of 
colonialism, single party policy process military regimes, and despotic policy 
process within an emergent democracy. The discussion revealed that real estate 
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policies enacted during periods of pure autocratic rule were no different from 
those enacted during the democratic era because transaction costs in organising 
and running a viable opposition, pluralism, negotiation and consensus seeking 
remained considerably high in both periods. Real estate policies were thus enacted 
with virtually no scrutiny and absence of opposition to express indignation about 
inefficient decisions. Public opinion was of little concern, as political power is 
achieved not by winning of votes. Having made the transaction costs of opposition 
exorbitant to monopolise power, the monopolistic administrations faced very little 
or no transaction costs in policy formation particularly in societies where the 
monopolisation of power was absolute. Policies thus emerged at the whim of the 
monopolistic government. 
To provide the equipment for objectively measuring the impacts of the real estate 
policies under review in response to the research questions raised in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 5 formulated a bespoke quantitative measuring framework. This 
framework was measured based on a review of traditional impacts evaluation 
methods and making necessary adjustments in the selected suitable methods to 
accommodate the peculiar data conditions of sub-Saharan Africa. In the end a 
hybrid set of structural equations were presented as the tool for measuring the 
economic impacts of real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Chapter 6 offered the methodology relied on in gathering data on the key 
operational variables required as inputs for the measuring framework in Chapter 
5. Following this methodology, Chapters 7 to 9 were devoted to the reporting and 
analysis of the findings of the empirical component of the study. Chapter 7 focused 
on the analysis of the data relating to the social costs dimensions of the policies 
while Chapter 8 concentrates on the benefits dimensions. Chapter 9 analysed the 
empirical data relating to the costs of real estate policy delivery. 
Chapter 7 found in particular that real estate policies in Ghana are imposing huge 
social costs on the Ghanaian society. About 90 percent of these costs are found to 
emanate from the indirect costs borne by market dealers seeking compliance with 
these policies. Chapter 8 on the other hand revealed deferring impacts of real 
estate policies in Ghana. As the analysis show regulative policies were found to be 
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engendering negative economic consequences whiles distributive policies are 
producing positive economic consequences. While it is clear from economic 
principles that redistributive policies are likely to yield negative repercussions, the 
data relied on showed that they are producing positive outcomes. 
Chapter 9 found, rather curiously, most of the suggestion by public choice theories 
to, be the sources of extraneous costs in bureaucracies largely wanting. The 
bureaucracies involved are not overgrowing neither do they have large workforces 
or budget sizes. Indeed, there is very weak incentive within the sector for 
bureaucrats to exaggerate their budgets in the ways espoused by bureaucracy 
theory. Firstly, salaries of bureaucracies are fixed for all public servants in Ghana 
by central government and budget sizes of particular bureaucracies have no 
bearing on salaries directly. Secondly, the reality is that prestige and manifestation 
of machismo of bureaucrats does not appear to correlate strongly with the budget 
sizes of the agencies. Thus, these did not serve much as sources of extraneous costs 
in real estate policy delivery. 
The data showed instead two unexpected things - about real estate sector 
bureaucracies that are inducing extraneous costs. First, the imbalances in the 
workforce structure which is skewed in favour of errant, secretarial and clerical 
staff is generating profound extraneous costs through inertia in strategic and 
policy development. Second, the input control budgeting systems operational in 
the country is inducing a misallocation of budgetary items leading to costs that do 
not necessarily affect the sizes of the budgets but contributes little to the purpose 
of the organisations or even the amount of tasks they perform. Left unchecked 
these extraneous costs can block progress in the development and performance of 
the Ghanaian real estate market and erode possible policy gains. 
10.3 THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
This section outlines the main conclusions'' drawn from the analysis and 
discussions of the results. It points, with reasons, to the areas of agreements or 
disagreement of the results of this thesis with the conventional theories and 
literature. 
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10.3.1 Attributes, Considerations and Sources of the Policies 
The attributes, considerations and sources of policies, whether in the field of real 
estate or some other economic field has attracted much attention from policy 
analysts as they determine the success of policies. Extant theory of policy analysis 
contends that a liberal policy process in which all relevant actors make informed 
contributions to policy formulation and implementation offer the best basis for 
efficient policies. This research had varied results about the basis for efficient 
policies. By employing insights from transaction costs theory to the policy 
processes of sub-Saharan Africa the study found (Chapter 4) that both 
monopolised and liberal policy processes offer similar potential for efficient policy 
formulation. Rather, what determines, the attribute and efficiency of policies is the 
scale and pervasiveness of the transaction costs faced by respective actors in the 
policy process in particular societies. It is this transaction cost that also determines 
the attributes of the policies that are enacted and their revocability or 
transformation by future regimes. 
On this score, this study demonstrates that real estate markets in sub-Saharan 
Africa have been burdened with manifold government interventions that have 
emerged largely from a highly government monopolised policy environment with 
considerably high transaction costs. This led to four classes of real estate policies: 
Regulative, Distributive, Redistributive and Delivery policies. Because these 
policies evolved from policy processes with considerably high transaction costs, as 
the study establishes, they are engendering particular patterns of costs and 
benefits distribution that have activated particular economic behavioural patterns 
in economic agents, politicians, bureaucrats, voters, clients and interest groups. 
These behavioural patterns feed back into the policy processes through lobbying 
for the maintenance and formation of policies that concentrates benefits on clients 
of incumbent governments, interest groups and bureaucrats. Whether particular 
real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa will continue to remain in place under 
particular regimes of government or. not, depends on whether it affords the 
incumbent the opportunity to distribute favours to their clients or interest groups 
or quell the manoeuvres of their political opponents as opposed to the economic 
rationality of the policies. Yet the, overriding consideration is whether the 
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transaction costs (usually in terms of political costs) associated with reforming a 
policy outweighs its benefits (also usually in terms of political benefits). The 
calculation, this study establishes, often favours the continuous stay of policies that 
offer higher political benefits even if they offer lower economic benefits. This 
explains why policies enacted under dictatorial regimes in these countries have 
proved impervious to change regardless of their economic costs to society. 
This striking paradox explains that while much of these real estate policies were 
intended as ad-hoc measures by previous autocratic governments to eliminate 
political opposition in the policy process they have today become the key policies 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these policies have been granted constitutional 
backing in the democratic era and large state bureaucracies have been established 
to enforce them. In Ghana for instance, the Office of the Administrator of Stool 
Lands and the Lands Commission with average compounded budget of US$ 
2,737,600.00 and US$2,262,280.00 respectively per annum, which is growing at an 
annual rate of 27 percent and 13 percent respectively per annum, exist essentially 
to 
l enforce such policies 
in all the ten regions of the country. All the nine 
succeeding governments after Nkrumah, Ghana's first postcolonial prime minister, 
have adopted and continued . with 
these policies even though some of these 
governments are self confessed capitalist's democratic regimes committed to the 
rule of law and the sanctity of private property rights. 
One could understand the reluctance of these governments to recall such policies 
from the way these policies distribute costs and benefits on particular segments of 
13 
society. The vesting policy in Ghana . 
for instance being a redistributive policy 
concentrates benefits on the few who benefit from the allocation of this land while 
concentrating costs on the affected stools, through significant reduction of their 
property rights and a 77.7 percent loss of revenue. Even so, though the 
expropriation policy under the State Lands Act did not specifically exempt the 
state from compensation payments, the requirement for compensation payment 
under the law has been so spuriously contrived to make acquisition without 
compensation legally possible. Apart from the lack of interest payments on 
delayed compensation payments which is a serious problem in a country where 
inflation is endemic, it has been possible for government to particularly place 
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embargo on compensation payment altogether since 1973 (Larbi, 1995). Thus while 
all expropriation under the colonial administration were paid for, there is an 
estimated unpaid compensation figure of at least 800 billion Cedis as at 2001 
(Kasanga, 2001). All these have been possible both under liberal and monopolised 
policy processes. What has remained constant in both policy processes are the 
considerable transaction costs. 
10.3.2 The Quantitative Measuring Framework 
Chapter 5 finds that existing traditional methods for evaluating economic impacts 
of real estate policies are formulated based on assumptions that are applicable 
largely in the western world. Most of these assumptions regarding, in particular, 
data availability and quality together with the mode of operation and conventional 
practices within the policy environment in sub-Saharan Africa are not applicable in 
sub-Saharan Africa at least in the form presumed. Thus these methods require 
appropriate modifications to make them applicable to the sub-Saharan African 
context. This necessitated the formulation of a bespoke and portable quantitative 
framework for measuring the economic impacts of real estate policies in sub- 
Saharan Africa based on the modification and hybridisation of existing methods of 
impacts evaluation. This framework is largely portable across sub-Saharan African 
countries with some minor modifications to suit local conditions. 
10.3.3 The Quantitative Dimensions of Social Costs of Real Estate Policies 
To date, the literature is devoid of quantitative evidence of the social costs of sub- 
Saharan Africa real estate policies. Studies that have sought to appraise the 
quantitative dimensions of the costs of real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa 
and the developing world have concentrated either exclusively on the out of 
pocket or direct costs of these policies borne by market dealers (DeSoto, 2000) or 
the costs of administering these policies borne by government (Toulmin and Quan, 
2000; World Bank, 2003). The fundamental findings of Chapter 8 are that out of 
pocket costs and costs of administration of policies constitute only fragments of the 
real costs of real estate policies to society. In addition to these fragments, an 
important element of the economic costs of these policies is the welfare costs of the 
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distortions associated with real estate policies that are missing in current 
assessments of sub-Saharan Africa real estate policy costs. 
Chapter 8 finds further that, in the study area, other fragments of costs such as 
travel costs, waiting time, travel time as well as gratuity and expediting payments 
though very important are often missing in studies investigating the costs of these 
real' estate policies. A fuller appreciation of the costs of these policies is thus 
provided by focusing on their social costs, which incorporates all these, as well as 
the traditional costs. Thus by focusing on the social costs as opposed to the out of 
pocket costs this thesis is able to provide more comprehensive evidence and 
indications of the real costs that these policies are reproducing in African societies. 
A fundamental finding of Chapter 8 is that all the categories of real estate policies 
in sub-Saharan Africa are producing social costs or deadweight losses on society. 
The scale of the social costs produced by particular real estate policies in sub- 
Saharan Africa is dependent on the distributive or regulative attributes of the 
policy under consideration. The typical social costs redistributive real estate 
policies per average residential building plot in sub-Saharan Africa is about Q62.40 
million whiles that of regulative policies is x49.40 million. Distributive policies 
produce the least social costs of Q33.00 million per average residential building 
plot. This discovery questions the general applicability of the conventional 
neoclassical and welfare economic thinking that suggests that government 
interventions are needed whenever market failures exist in real estate or other 
markets (see further chapter 3). It also contradicts even the more contemporary 
Transaction Costs theory (see Chapter 3) which also contends that government 
interventions are needed when transaction costs under the price system are 
exorbitant and government interventions can reduce these costs significantly better 
than the price system. The basis for this conventional proposition is that both 
market failure and exorbitant transaction costs produce social costs which harm 
societal wellbeing. So, by introducing government interventions into such markets 
these social costs can be gotten rid of. 
Contrary to this position, the prime insight from this finding is that neither the 
very existence of market failure nor exorbitant transaction costs as such offer good 
grounds for immediate government interventions. This is because in the bid to 
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remove the pre-existing social costs induced by market failures and transaction 
costs, government interventions also invariably produce their own social costs. 
Thus if the social costs brought about by government interventions equals or even 
exceeds the social costs of the market failure that it is intended to remove, society 
will be left worse off. It is only when the social costs of the government 
intervention is considerably lower than the social costs of the market interventions 
that some gains could be achieved from government intervention. This suggests 
also that until the magnitude of the social costs of the market failure considerably 
exceed the potential maximum social costs of the intended interventions to make 
the above condition hold, though market failure may be apparent, the intervention 
will not be economically worthwhile. 
Put practically, in Ghana as in sub-Saharan Africa, the mere existence of real estate 
market failure should not justify government interventions unless the social costs 
associated with the market failure which call for regulative policy intervention at 
.1, Al least exceed 049,500,000.00 (i. e. US$5,320.00 or £2,600.00) per normal residential 
building plot to be justified. So also should the magnitude of the social costs of 
market failures that require redistributive policy interventions must exceed 
462,433.00 (i. e. US$6,800.00 or £3,600.00) per plot to be worthwhile. In the same 
way the social costs of market failures that require distributive policy interventions 
that must exceed 032,900,000.00 (i. e. US$3,573 or £1880) per plot to justify such 
policies. If this criterion is not met, government interventions will, contrary to 
theoretical expectations, be amplifying the overall social costs on society, the 
damaging effect. 
10.3.4 The Benefits Dimensions of the Policies 
Chapter 8 found also that all variants of real estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa 
offer some benefits though at varying degrees. The scale of benefits produced by 
real estate policies in Ghana, as likely to be for sub-Saharan Africa, is however 
dependent on the regulative, distributive or redistributive attributes of the policy. 
Barring inequities and injustices in land allocations, the study found that 
distributive policies generate by far the most substantial benefits (Q383,000,000.00). 
This is followed by redistributive ' policies (85,000,000.00 i. e. about 22 percent of 
that' of distributive policies). ' Regulative policies in all its forms generate very 
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modest benefits (410,320,000.00 i. e. just about 3 percent of that of distributive 
policies). Prior to this study, according to Kasanga (2002) for instance the actual 
quantitative dimensions of the benefits of these policies were unknown. The 
chapter found also quite surprisingly that within regulative policy zone 2 (family 
land areas), contrary to classical theory of land title, no real benefits is offered by 
land title 
10.3.5 The Economic Impacts Dimensions of the Policies 
-1 1 
Chapter 8 found, on the basis of empirically observable evidence, that not all real 
estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa are generating clear positive economic 
impacts. Rather surprisingly Chapter 8's findings are that distributive real estate 
policies are producing by far the highest and clear positive economic impacts 
(Q350,000,000.00). This is inconsistent with the literature. The reason for this 
inconsistency appear to be because much of the claims of negative impacts of 
distributive policies have concentrated on the inequities (Kasanga, 2002) and rent 
seeking activities (Antwi, 2000) surrounding the allocation of government lands 
within these policy zones without due attention to their actual social costs and 
benefit trade offs. 
On the contrary, all the variants of extant regulative policies are generating 
negative economic impacts of about 439.00 per typical residential building plot at 
2005 prices. This negative impact of regulative policies appear to be the real reason 
why only about 8 percent of real estate transactions in Ghana have complied with 
these regulative policies. The real impacts of redistributive policies remain unclear 
or inconclusive as important data on costs of extra legal fees paid to secure 
formalisation was unavailable and could not be incorporated in the social costs 
computation. The availability of this data is likely to alter the reported social costs 
and impacts considerably. 
10.3.6 The Costs of Running the Enforcement Bureaucracies 
The literatures on bureaucracies are almost unanimous on the point that 
bureaucracies invariably accumulate irrelevant ~ costs in the discharge of their 
duties. The literature contends that bureaucracies accumulate these costs mainly 
through the excessive expansion of their budgets and personnel rosters. This study 
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examines the evidence from the perspective of real estate policy delivery 
bureaucracies and found the assertion largely wanting in the Ghanaian context. 
Rather, Chapter 9 finds that both the budgets and personnel rosters of the 
bureaucracies in charge of real estate policy delivery in Ghana are not excessive by 
national standards. Though clear evidence of inbuilt irrelevant costs in their 
operations was found, these emanate largely from non-conventional sources. The 
prime sources of irrelevant costs discovered by this study are imbalances in their 
workforce profiles, resource misallocations inbuilt in their budgets and 
aimlessness and inattentiveness to changing technological environment of the 
world. These factors do not necessarily lead to increases in the budget sizes and 
personnel rosters of the organisations though prominent in creating waste. 
Chapter 9 finds also that irrelevant cost rather than absolute transaction costs is a 
more important yardstick for evaluating the comparative efficiency of policy 
enforcement modalities. This is inconsistent with the thesis of transaction costs 
theory, which posits absolute transaction costs as the best yardstick for evaluating 
the efficiency of organisations. 
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
These conclusions have necessitated the following propositions for improvement 
in, practice of policy formulation and analysis as well as recommendations for 
further studies. 
10.4.1 The Overarching Policy Proposition 
Given that the mere existence of market failure does not imply that the 
introduction of real estate policies will bring success, it is proposed that 
government decisions to adopt particular real estate policies - regulative, 
distributive, and redistributive or delivery- must be formed on the basis of the 
comparative scale of the pre-existing social costs and the socials costs of the 
intervention. Policies should be adopted only on occasions when the pre-existing 
social costs of market failure are more than the potential social costs of the 
prospective real estate intervention. This will ensure that the potential economic 
impacts of prospective real estate policies are well appreciated before they are 
implemented and will reduce the chances of introducing harmful policies that are 
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much difficult to revoke and hence continue to impose greater restrictions on the 
functioning of these markets. 
For this to work, it will be important not to be lulled into false confidence that the 
current democratic and liberal political order offer the right setting for efficient 
policy formulation. As this study concludes, it is the level of transaction costs in 
the policy processes that determine the level of participation and hence efficiency 
of policies. Thus international development agencies seeking to improve policy 
formulation and analysis efforts must work towards lowering the transaction costs 
barriers in the policy processes in these countries. This is the most plausible way 
by which governments could be compelled to employ the above propositions in 
policy formulation. 
10.4.2 The Regulative Policy Reform Proposal 
Since regulative policies are reproducing substantial negative economic welfare 
consequences in Ghana coupled with the fact that only 8 percent of market dealers 
are complying with these policies, removing these policies altogether will offer 
better economic prospects. Nevertheless, this proposition would have to be 
replaced with a single regulative policy that is directed exclusively at compiling 
and supplying land information to free up the market and facilitate efficient real 
estate market transactions. 
10.4.3 The Distributive Policy Reform Proposal 
Though distributive real estate policies are producing considerable positive 
economic impacts, the reported instances of injustices and inequities in land 
allocation in the literature suggests that more could be obtained from this regime 
of policies if distributive equities and justices are built into the allocation of 
government lands. These inequities and injustices "stem basically from the heavy 
government price subsidies on lands within these neighbourhoods. These 
subsidies promote competitive lobbying, bribery and rent seeking activities for 
those seeking allocations. In the process, the powerful, affluent and the influential 
price out the poor in the allocation process. The result is that the rich gets access to 
these lands at government-subsidized prices whiles the poor are left to buy their 
land needs on the open market. The way forward is to create a level playing field 
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for both the poor and the rich so that the poor are not cheated out of these land 
allocations. This can be realized by leaving land allocation within this zone to be 
purely market price operated. This recommendation reinforces similar 
propositions by other researchers as Antwi (2000) and Kasanga (2002). 
10.4.4 The Redistributive Policy Reform Proposal 
At the moment government has not paid compensation for acquiring the lands in 
this policy zones. This is a major source of the social costs of this policy. 
Practically, over 70 percent of the area has been resold and fully developed by the 
dispossessed owners. This means that the purpose for which government acquired 
the area, i. e. the development of a sports village, cannot materialise. Thus denying 
these purchasers and developers official recognition of their rights appears to be 
suppressing benefits from this policy. It is practically impossible or even 
economically unwise for government to demolish all these developments, as the 
extant official policy stance seems to suggest. It will also be economically unwise 
for government to pay compensation in respect of lands that are already 
substantially developed by private actors. Thus to lower the social costs and 
increase the benefits from the real estate markets in this zone, it is proposed that 
ownership of the area should be handed back to the indigenous community who 
have already sold the area and entered into contractual agreements with the 
existing developers. This will mean a transformation of the area from a distributive 
zone to a regulative zone. The few government allocations in the area could be 
kept in the ownership of government and compensation in respect of which has to 
be immediately paid to reduce the size of the social costs. 
10.4.5 The Reform of Policy Delivery Bureaucracies 
Antwi (2000) recommends that all the government bureaucracies involved in 
policy administration should be removed for private organisations to be allowed 
to carry out the task of policy administration in the country. This study takes a 
different and opposing position on this issue. Antwi's position is based on the 
theoretical assumption that private firms are more efficient that public firms. But 
this position is not supported even by the theory. As Coase (1966, pp. 442-5) 
contends, 
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"I would not wish to imply that we fully understand the logic of 
pricing system or that special institutional arrangements are not 
necessary for its tolerable performance ... I would not argue that 
there should be no government regulation... There is no industry, 
which is not in some way regulated". 
Indeed there is evidence that government bureaucracies formed on good economic 
grounds are better placed to infuse trading confidence into otherwise problematic 
trading relations (see for example Goldberg, 1976 and Zucker, 1986). Williamson 
(1996, p. 268) also notes in corroboration that provided the regulatory framework is 
appropriate, both the public bureaux and the customers "would be able to make 
investment in specialised assets on better terms than they would in the absence of 
such regulations". 
As the study finds, the real source of inefficiency in bureaucracies are their inbuilt 
irrelevant and avoidable costs. The sources for these have been identified as 
imbalances in the personnel rosters, misallocation in budget and lack of attention 
to technological changes. It is recommended that these sources should be blocked 
by for instance urging government to lift the curb on employment imposed on 
these bureaucracies since the launch of the structural adjustment era some 20 years 
ago. Since the structural adjustment programme from which this curb evolved has 
lost its merit, there is no grounds for advocating for this curb any longer 
particularly when the analysis shows clearly that these agencies are severely under 
staffed at the top levels. Following the lifting of the curb the respective heads of 
the agencies should be given the full autonomy to decide their staff composition as 
well as powers to hire and fire excess or non performing staff. 
Again strong budget analysis units would have to . 
be 
,, set up 
in all the 
bureaucracies whose task will, exclusively, relate ; 
to budget preparation and 
detailed analysis including performance tracking, and internal auditing. The 
bureaucracies should be given the full mandate over their budgets including the 
determination of salaries. There should be no government ceiling on the annual 
budgets of the bureaucracies. The logical limit on the budgets should be the 
bureaucracies previous year's earnings. However since the services offered by 
these agencies are highly subsidised by government it is unlikely that their 
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accounts for the preceding years will reflect the true state of their financial 
achievements for those years to adequately' serve as a good basis for the 
subsequent year's budgets. To circumvent this position, an accounting system 
could be evolved in which government would credit the accounts of the agencies 
with the total amount subsidies granted in respect of their services for the year 
preceding the budget year. This will bring up their financial position to its true 
state to form the basis for their current year's budgets. This will automatically 
reveal the agencies that are none performing or those whose services lack effective 
demand and hence sufficient economic merits. In this case the market will 
automatically weed out the agencies that are malfunctioning or unneeded but are 
currently hiding behind the generosity of government to survive. This will also 
compel managers to stamp on malfeasance and rent seeking since the full costs of 
such malfeasance will now bear directly on their financial position and hence their 
very survival. 
10.4.6 The Costs of Delays 
Chapter 8 finds that the main ingredients of the social costs of real estate policies 
are the travelling costs and waiting times associated with following up on 
transactions. This means that the current highly centralised locations of the 
agencies are economically harmful to society. The simple but quite costly solution 
to this would be tö set up satellite offices within the districts or localities to handle 
applications. This apart from reducing ' the costs of travel will also encourage 
market dealers to seek compliance, as the services are no longer remote from them. 
But the workability of this proposition has to be empirically established by 
comparing the costs of setting up these decentralised agencies with the reduction 
in the social costs that is likely to be achieved. To reduce the social costs associated 
with the need for applicants to make regular travels to the agencies to follow up on 
their documents, a postal submission system which is a much cheaper alternative 
could be considered as a means of cutting back on the associated social costs. 
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10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
The following recommendations for further studies arose from the research: 
" Though safeguard measure were introduce to improve the external validity 
of the results of the study, the external validity will be stronger if this study 
is replicated in other urban areas of respective sub-Saharan Africa 
countries. It is thus proposed that the study is replicated in all sub-Saharan 
Africa countries for a holistic picture. 
" Though most writers have chastised government as promoting inequities 
and injustices through distributive and redistributive real estate policies 
no quantitative estimates of the costs of these inequities and injustices has 
been provided. There is the need for studies to delve into the real social 
costs of these inequities and injustices so that a comparison can be made 
between these costs and the benefits estimated in this study. 
" Indeed to ascertain whether the social costs brought about by government 
interventions are lower than pre-existing social costs, there is the need for a 
study into the formulation of a bespoke framework that will enable the 
measurement of pre-existing social costs and benefits }under; indigenous 
tenure system. This is vital particularly when the current trends in policy 
are to hand over controls of land allocation to indigenous tenure 
arrangements though no objective assessment of ' the social costs and 
benefits of the indigenous tenure system yet exist. 
10.6 SUMMARY 
This study has provided quantitative indications of the economic impacts of real 
estate policies in sub-Saharan Africa using Ghana'-as'- a ̂ case' study` country. This 
chapter outlines the major conclusions drawn from, the study and provides 
recommendations for practice as well as for further studies. 
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